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ABSTRACT 
Modern treaties are among the most important legal and constitutional documents in 
Indigenous affairs in Canada. The treaties created transformative societal change across the North 
and significantly altered the concepts and understanding of governance. However, the approach 
taken to implement these foundational accords over the past forty-five years has resulted in 
strained relations between the Indigenous signatories and their government partners. This study 
examined the experience of negotiating and implementing modern treaties in Yukon between 
1986 and 2016. Drawing on the experiences of three Yukon First Nations and insights provided 
by 43 former and current negotiators, leaders, implementation staff and other key stakeholders 
from the federal, territorial and Yukon First Nations governments, this study identified four 
major findings that should inform future land claims implementation and intergovernmental 
treaty relations in Yukon and across Canada.   
First, it was clear that participants cannot underestimate the importance of the 
implementation process. The negotiation of an agreement is only one step in the overall process; 
implementation launches a different style and intensity of work. All parties, secondly, need to 
have a clear understanding of the goals and original intent of the agreements, as well as the 
historical, political, socio-economic, and cultural contexts that underpin modern treaties as well 
as those elements that are unique to Yukon.  
The third finding emphasizes the importance of recognizing that Indigenous peoples are 
the co-creators of these agreements. These are government-to-government agreements and this 
should be foundational to their implementation and the approach taken to addressing these 
modern treaty intergovernmental relations. Finally, instrumental to the successful negotiation of 
the agreements were the relationships between the parties and the acknowledgement of a 
common commitment to honour the spirit and intent of the agreements. Critical to the successful 
implementation of modern treaties is an understanding that all Parties to the agreement are 
striving to achieve the same goals. It is understood that different governments will have different 
objectives, interests and values. However, this does not mean that they cannot work toward 
common goals and outcomes. As former Yukon Government Chief Negotiator, Barry Stuart 
asserted, “If we are going to negotiate in good faith it means we have to implement in good faith” 
(IT27, Stuart 2020). 
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PROLOGUE: YUKON ELDER SETS THE STAGE 
On March 1, 2017 at the Kwanlin Dün Cultural Centre in Whitehorse, Yukon, Elder Judy 
Gingell, former Commissioner of Yukon and Grand Chief of the Council of Yukon First Nations, 
gave a powerful speech as part of “The Walrus Talks: Conversations about Canada. We Desire a 
Better Country”.1 Her speech sets the stage for this research on intergovernmental relations and 
modern treaty implementation in Yukon. Elder Gingell granted permission for this to be used as 
an opening to the dissertation. 
 
Good evening everyone. I am Judy Gingell and I am a citizen of the Kwanlin Dün 
First Nation. I represent the Elders as their representative. I am honoured to be 
asked to come here this evening and to speak on “Modern Day Treaties: 
Importance of Building Partnerships and Strengthening Relationships”. 
 
The year 1973 is the most important year for me. I had the honour of travelling to 
Ottawa with Chief Elijah Smith and Yukon First Nations Chiefs, as part of the 
Yukon delegation, to deliver the historic document, Together Today for our 
Children Tomorrow: A Statement of Grievance, which became the foundation for 
the Yukon land claims agreements. That document led to the signing of the 
Umbrella Final Agreement in 1993 and paved the way for the settlement of 11 out 
of the 14 Yukon First Nations’ Final and Self-Government Agreements over the 
next decade. The Yukon agreements represent approximately 50% of the modern-
day treaties in this country today. While the agreements brought certainty for our 
people, it also provided us the ability to secure economic prosperity, which I will 
speak to in a bit. Most importantly for us, the agreements represent a partnership 
and an understanding among governments: Canada, Yukon and First Nations, 
about what our relationship is going forward. These agreements are between the 
governments and are constitutionally protected. These agreements cost First 
Nations land, rights and money. These agreements are about all of these things and 
they are agreements between governments; not between a First Nation government 
and the Aboriginal Affairs department.  
 
The agreements gave all governments direction: how we will manage heritage and 
wildlife; how we will manage land and resources; and most importantly how we 
will work together. The agreements, both the treaty itself and the Self-Government 
Agreements, are based on the principles of sharing and co-management. It is not 
about us going our separate ways. They are about our shared interests. They 
provide a map for all of the parties; a way to move forward together. These 
 
1 “The Walrus Talks” was a national speaker series focused on the future of Canada. The series 
ran from March 1-June 1, 2017 and featured fifty members of the Order of Canada and fifty 
youth leaders from across the country.  
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agreements have positive implications for all Yukoners. This is becoming more 
evident as we implement them. Ultimately, these agreements can help level the 
playing field between all governments and help to ensure Canada, Yukon and First 
Nations work together to meet the shared priorities. At the same time, the treaties 
and Self-Government Agreements cannot solve relationship problems that might 
come about.  
 
At our recent Yukon Forum, I spoke the words of a prominent Nisga’a leader who 
said, “the federal government looks at the treaties as a divorce, and for us, we look 
at it as a marriage”. I say that because Yukon First Nations have always seen our 
treaties as the basis for a new relationship and indeed the partnership that I 
mentioned earlier. But we find ourselves having to continuously defend what was 
negotiated. It is in these circumstances that relationships get strained. Although 
court is not the first option First Nations look to for resolution, other governments 
have turned to the courts when we disagree on how to move forward. For them, it 
is about certainty; what we already thought we had in the treaties. We will defend 
our agreements; however, we would much prefer to discuss matters 
collaboratively. Our first priority is to stay engaged, hold meaningful discussions 
and seek reasonable solutions. If we are going to succeed together as governments, 
there has to be a willingness to remain open minded, explore all of the options and 
be prepared to do things differently.  
 
With that said, I will not say that we haven’t been successful in the 
implementation of our agreements. There have certainly been challenges. Building 
a government and a new relationship between governments is not an easy task. 
Much of our success has come from our ability to think outside the box and our 
willingness to work in collaboration. This is what will enable us to realize the full 
economic, social and political potential of our agreements. Today, due in large 
parts to our modern-day treaties, First Nations are positioned to be major players 
in the Yukon economy. The agreements have provided lots of opportunities for 
partnerships and business ventures; all of which have helped to contribute to 
economic certainty for the future of our people. Intergovernmental initiatives have 
been established at all levels of government with Canada, Yukon, municipal and 
other First Nations in areas such as health, education, justice and infrastructure. 
Yukon First Nations economic development corporations and Yukon First Nation 
Chamber of Commerce have been established. A land registry has been completed, 
opening up the opportunities for Kwanlin Dün and other First Nations, the ability 
to register land leases [and] with that, possibilities of home ownership are created. 
And First Nations’ investments have been made, and partnerships established in 
the areas of air transportation, energy, mining, commercial and real-estate 
development, affordable housing, just to name a few.  
 
Back in 1973, you would have never heard or seen any of this. This is only a 
sampling of how our agreements, in a relatively short time, have benefitted not just 
our communities but the Yukon as a whole. Ultimately, I believe together we can 
achieve the vision of our modern-day treaties, the vision of prosperity of all Yukon 
people. To me, that is reconciliation. Gunalchéesh. Thank you (Gingell 2017).  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Northern Canada finds itself caught between the achievement of negotiating a series of 
major comprehensive land claims agreements and the stalled implementation of many elements 
of these foundational accords. Comprehensive land claims agreements, also known as modern 
treaties, are negotiated and signed in areas where land and resource rights have not previously 
been settled (Land Claims Agreements Coalition 2008). These multiparty agreements are signed 
between an Indigenous group(s), a provincial/territorial government and the Government of 
Canada. James Saku and Robert Bone (2000) explained, “the bottom up approach involves the 
transfer of economic power, land ownership and the creation of institutional structures designed 
to improve the economic wellbeing of Aboriginal people” (268). Modern treaties are one of the 
most important legal and constitutional documents in Indigenous affairs in Canada. Since 1973, 
26 agreements have been successfully negotiated and signed and there are an additional 90 
negotiations in progress across the country (Jai 2014, 7). The negotiation of modern treaties 
signifies an important shift in redefining relations between Indigenous groups and public 
governments in Canada and symbolizes a long-term commitment to reconciliation. However, the 
approach to implementation over the past forty-five years resulted in strained relations between 
Indigenous signatories and their government partners and led to numerous court challenges. All 
parties have perceived this as a deterrent to future negotiations. It also inhibited Indigenous 
groups from fully achieving the original intent of these agreements: cultural preservation, self-
determination, and protection of lands and resources.  
The negotiation of an agreement is only one part of the complex land claims process. 
Implementation is where the real work begins, and a greater commitment needs to be made to 
seeing these agreements put into action. The purpose of this study was to answer two main 
questions:  
1. How have the partners in the negotiation of a modern treaty managed the transition from 
negotiation to implementation?  
2. What does this transition reveal about the modern treaty process in Canada?  
This study set out to answer these questions by examining the experience of negotiating and 
implementing modern treaties in Yukon between 1986 to 2016. Treaties in and of themselves are 
not public policy instruments; they are higher level agreements between governments. However, 
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we can draw on the public policy implementation literature to understand both the successes and 
challenges of modern treaty implementation, as well as the barriers and challenges to 
intergovernmental treaty relationships. This research will contribute to an oft neglected field in 
public policy. 
The year 1986 marked an important turning point for land claims negotiations in Yukon. 
After a failed Agreement in Principle in 1984, land claims negotiations were put on hold. In 
1986, the federal government released an update to its comprehensive land claims policy and for 
the first time included a requirement for implementation planning as part of the negotiation of a 
modern treaty. At this same time, all the Parties to the agreements in Yukon—the Government of 
Canada, Government of Yukon and Yukon First Nations—returned to the negotiation table with a 
renewed commitment to successfully negotiating a Yukon land claims agreement. 2015 to 2016 
was a transitional year across all levels of government in Yukon. At the end of 2015, we saw the 
election of a majority Liberal government under the leadership of Justin Trudeau; in June 2016, 
we saw the election of a new Grand Chief of the Council of Yukon First Nations, Peter Johnston; 
and in October 2016 we saw the election of a new majority Liberal government in Yukon under 
the leadership of Sandy Silver. In each of these election campaigns, we observed significant 
prioritization of First Nations-government relations, and commitment to honouring the 
implementation of land claims agreements and re-establishing intergovernmental treaty 
relationships. This signaled a fundamental shift in the rhetoric and priorities observed over the 
previous two decades that created major barriers and challenges to implementing modern treaties, 
and resulted in a breakdown of intergovernmental treaty relations.  
Yukon provides a foundational case study to understanding the experience of modern 
treaty implementation in Canada. Over a twenty-year period, beginning in 1973, Yukon First 
Nations, the Government of Yukon and the Government of Canada negotiated and signed the 
Umbrella Final Agreement (UFA). The UFA is not a modern treaty in and of itself but is the 
framework document that Yukon First Nations negotiated to be used as the structure for 
finalizing their individual First Nations Final Agreements. Eleven of the fourteen Yukon First 
Nations have successfully completed individual Final and Self-Government Agreements. The 
map of Yukon in Figure 1.1 identifies the traditional territories of the fourteen Yukon First 
Nations. This study examined the firsthand experiences of negotiating and implementing the 
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Umbrella Final Agreement, as well as three separate Yukon First Nations Final Agreements: 
Champagne and Aishihik First Nations, Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in, and Vuntut Gwitchin Government.  
 




The spirit and intent of the modern treaties fundamentally changed the Yukon by shifting 
the social, political, economic, and cultural landscape of the territory. After 28 years, substantial 
portions of the Yukon First Nations agreements remain to be fully implemented. But that should 
not take away from the significant impacts of these Final and Self-Government Agreements and 
the implementation successes that occurred to date. As evidenced in the speech by Elder Judy 
Gingell in the opening of this study, the experience of implementing land claims agreements in 
Yukon continues, resulting in substantial changes in Yukon affairs.  
(Image Source: Castillo et al. 2020, 8. Modified by Lovell 
Johns from Yukon Government Map 2017.)   
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Specific implementation achievements vary between First Nations but there have been 
areas of shared priorities across the First Nations governments throughout the first two decades of 
implementation. These changes occurred predominantly in program and policy areas in health 
and social, education, economic development, heritage and culture, and lands and resources. 
After the signing of the agreements, each of the First Nations focused on setting up their own 
governments and administrations and preparing for program and service delivery. The First 
Nations focused initially on ensuring the wellbeing of citizens by focusing on housing, health and 
social services and education, with substantial policy and outcome shifts across Yukon in each 
area.  
Another priority was to establish all of the intergovernmental boards, councils and 
committees as outlined in the Final and Self-Government Agreements such as the Land Use 
Planning Council, Yukon Heritage Resources Board, Fish and Wildlife Management Board and 
the Water Board. Further, several important intergovernmental accords, agreements and plans 
emerged over the years, including the Porcupine Caribou Management Plan, which creates 
protection for the Porcupine Caribou calving grounds in North Yukon (IT2, Njootli Sr. 2016), in 
addition to the Forestry Management Agreements and the Park Management Agreements (IG13, 
Yukon First Nations government employee 2017).  
Preservation and revitalization of heritage and culture remained a key priority for Yukon 
First Nations. Heritage and Culture departments were set-up within the First Nations 
governments and delivered programs and services such as language revitalization and 
management of heritage sites, such as Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in’s Forty Mile historic site and 
Tr’ochëk. Many of the heritage sites around Yukon are now managed cooperatively between the 
different levels of government.  
In 2007, the Parties completed a nine-year review of the UFA Implementation Plan, as 
well as a review of the first seven Yukon First Nations Final Agreement implementation plans, 
Self-Government Agreements and Self-Government Agreement implementation plans.2 The 
review speaks to the significance of recognizing the implementation activities, even within 
discussions of the implementation barriers and challenges. The fact that all of the Parties to these 
 
2 The seven Yukon First Nations included in the review were: Teslin Tlingit Council, the First 
Nation of Na-cho Nyak Dun; Champagne and Aishihik First Nations, Vuntut Gwitchin 
Government, Little Salmon Carmacks First Nation, Selkirk First Nation and Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in. 
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agreements conducted the review of the implementation “can be seen as an indicator of success if 
one considers that they illustrate how significantly the level of discussion has changed from that 
which prevailed under the Indian Act regime” (Indian Affairs and Northern Development 2007, 
14). The report goes on to read: “Self-government will likely require more than a generation to 
implement fully and effectively” (DIAND 2007, 14).  
Implementation, however, is still being neglected, and the barriers and challenges to 
modern treaty implementation have often overshadowed many of the successes. Although 
meaningful change occurred in more recent years to the modern treaty implementation approach 
and rhetoric on paper at the federal and territorial level, substantive action has been incremental 
at best. From the beginning of negotiations, Yukon First Nations signatories intended these 
agreements to last seven generations. To the First Nations communities, it is imperative that the 
commitment across all three levels of government to the implementation of the objectives of the 
agreements remain a focus point if governments are truly going to live up to honouring the spirit 
and intent of the compact. One Yukon First Nation government employee shared:  
…As somebody who has lived here for 25 years, I see [the agreement] as a form of 
social contract. More than that actually, it’s a treaty. But underlying the treaty is a 
kind of broadly speaking, social contract, and the social contract is that these 
agreements were made with a specific spirit and intent there. The original 
negotiators, the Elders, the Chiefs, the officials, and all of the other people that 
were involved all of the way through for 20+ years, had an intent, and we have to 
honour that. To me, that’s what implementation really is, to fulfill that intent 
(IT11, First Nation government employee 2017). 
 
The existing literature on modern treaties focuses on the impacts of modern treaties. 
Conversely, little is available on the negotiation processes themselves nor the relationships that 
underlie these agreements. Research into the implementation processes and intergovernmental 
relations can inform government implementation strategies and policy development. In addition, 
research on the unfolding of modern treaty implementation and the identification of best practices 
could assist in changing the current approach to treaty implementation. This could lead, in time, 
to a shift in thinking around how implementation planning is prioritized and defined within future 





1.1 Organization of the Dissertation  
 The remainder of this dissertation is divided into six substantive chapters. Chapter 2 
provides a historical background to the Yukon land claims process. It begins by looking at early 
contact Indigenous-government relations and the historic treaties. This is followed by an 
introduction to modern treaties in Canada and an overview of the negotiation process and 
structure. The chapter ends with a detailed summary of the origins and experience of the Yukon 
land claims process. 
 Chapter 3 is a summary of the current scholarly literature that has assessed the modern 
treaty process and experience in Canada. The chapter concludes with an overview of theoretical 
and conceptual frameworks from the field of public policy and political science that guided this 
study. As is evidenced from this literature review, there is a growing body of work on modern 
treaty negotiations, with a specific focus on distinct elements of the agreements, such as co-
management and land disputes. However, there is limited research that has centered around 
modern treaty implementation. The work that does exist is predominantly from the legal field or 
from outside of academia in grey literature. Due to the narrow scope of research focused on 
modern treaty implementation, there is limited relevant theory or theoretical debate that exists. 
Therefore, this study draws on theoretical and conceptual frameworks from the public policy and 
political science literature—such as top-down and bottom-up theories of implementation (see: 
Van Meter and Van Horn 1975; Sabatier and Mazmanian 1980; Hjern, Hanf, and Porter 1978), 
and Chris Alcantara’s framework for studying the politics of intergovernmental relations in 
modern treaty implementation (see: Alcantara 2017)—to gain a clearer understanding of the 
complexities of implementation and intergovernmental relations.   
 The research methodology and design for this study is described in detail in Chapter 4. An 
overview of the three Yukon First Nations who were the focus of this study, are included, along 
with a description of the research methods that were used to allow for an iterative, adaptive and 
responsive research process. These included constructivist grounded theory, semi-structured 
interviews and document analysis.  
 Drawing on the first-hand experience of current and former negotiators, leaders, and those 
working within implementation at all three levels of government—Yukon First Nations 
governments, the Government of Yukon and Government of Canada—Chapter 5 provides a 
detailed understanding of the process and structure of modern treaty implementation in Canada. 
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Analysis of how these processes and structures were initially developed and how they have 
evolved over time reveals how complex these tripartite agreements are. After analyzing all of the 
calls for change that have been targeted at federal implementation policy, processes and 
structures, the chapter concludes by arguing that a significant change is needed across all three 
levels of government in order to honour the spirit and intent of the agreements and to see them 
fully implemented.  
 Chapter 6 analyses the intergovernmental relations embedded within the modern treaty 
context. So often within the study of public policy, it is easy to neglect the human dynamics that 
are integral to the development and implementation of policy. This chapter focuses on the 
importance of the people and the relationships that are foundational to the successes and 
challenges of modern treaty implementation. Many interviewees identified that one of the main 
reasons the Yukon land claims were successfully negotiated was due to the strong relationships 
and level of trust that was developed between the individuals on the ground at all three levels of 
government. These relationships have significantly deteriorated throughout implementation. The 
chapter explores three broad trends that contributed to the breakdown of these relationships: (1) 
continuity, capacity and understanding of the agreements; (2) the conflict between the spirit and 
intent of the agreements versus the letter of the law; and (3) dispute resolution and reliance on the 
courts. The final chapter, Chapter 7, is a discussion and conclusion of the key findings and 
importance of this study.  
1.2 Qualifications 
This study has been cautious about making direct comparisons between agreements or 
between the experiences of different Nations. Though all eleven Yukon First Nations took part in 
the negotiation of the Umbrella Final Agreement, there are no uniform experiences in the 
negotiation and implementation of the individual Yukon First Nation Final and Self-government 
Agreements. Throughout the research and analysis phase of this study, efforts were made to 
identify patterns and common themes from within the uniqueness of each land claim agreement.  
Yukon is different than other regions. The negotiation of the Umbrella Final Agreement 
(UFA), which acted as a framework agreement for the individual Yukon First Nations Final 
Agreements, created a very different experience for negotiating land claims. No other Indigenous 
groups in Canada have successfully negotiated on behalf of such a large number of individual 
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First Nations. The federal government indicated that it does not expect to negotiate modern 
treaties as comprehensive in the future. Though this research intends to share lessons learned for 
future land claims negotiations, it is important to recognize the distinctiveness of the UFA and 
the Yukon First Nations Final and Self-Government Agreements.  
Yukon First Nations fought hard for the inclusion of self-government within the 
negotiation of the Yukon land claims. Chapter 24 of the Yukon First Nations Final Agreements 
lays out the provisions for the negotiation of separate Self-Government Agreements (SGAs). 
SGAs outline the powers, authorities and responsibilities of each Yukon First Nation 
government. After the signing of the first four Yukon First Nations Self-Government 
agreements—Champagne and Aishihik First Nations, the First Nation of Na-cho Nyak Dun, 
Teslin Tlingit Council, and Vuntut Gwitchin—the negotiation of self-government was included 
as part of the ongoing federal government land claims negotiation process, beginning in 1995. 
Although this study is limited to examining the experience of negotiating and implementing the 
Yukon First Nations Final Agreements, it is important to understand the significance and 
relevance of the SGAs, and the overlapping experience of negotiating and implementing these 
agreements.  
Finally, this study sought insight into the successes and challenges of modern treaty 
implementation in Canada. Much more can be learned about how the communities viewed these 
processes and there are many additional voices and experiences that could have been captured on 
this theme. The field of public policy implementation and intergovernmental relations really does 
not provide tools or frameworks for understanding how Indigenous communities and individuals 
on the ground view these processes. This thesis, by focusing on the specific topic of modern 
treaty implementation in Yukon, is able to offer one of the first comprehensive studies of modern 
treaty implementation in Canada. A clear understanding of the success and challenges of treaty 
implementation and the complexity of intergovernmental relations from firsthand perspectives 
will aid in the identification of specific policy implications for all levels of government. 
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2. PUTTING THE YUKON LAND CLAIMS PROCESS IN CONTEXT 
Indigenous Scholar Taiaiake Alfred (2009) argued, “without a good understanding of 
history, it is difficult to grasp how strong Native people have resisted, and how much we have 
recently recovered” (25). Canada’s history of treaty making between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous groups dates back to the seventeenth century. In order to appreciate the significance 
of modern treaties in Canada, it is important to comprehend what preceded them and how 
Crown-Indigenous relations have changed over time. Anthropologist Michael Asch, one of 
Canada’s leading scholars of Indigenous-government relations, had an important insight into the 
historic treaty process and the Crown-Indigenous relations that were intended to emerge from 
these agreements:  
…the relationship established through treaty entails that the Indigenous parties 
agree to share their lands in perpetuity with those subjects of the British Crown 
who wish to settle on them by establishing an enduring partnership akin to one 
that exists between relatives in a family. More specifically, the partnership is 
based on an equality of political standing between the parties in which the kind of 
sharing and mutual aid that flows from kindness are foundational principles 
(Asch 2019, 5). 
 
This chapter begins by examining the evolution of Crown-Indigenous relations and the 
historical treaties signed between 1764-1921. This is be followed by an overview of the modern-
day comprehensive land claims history and negotiation processes. The chapter concludes with an 
overview of Yukon’s land claims history.      
 
2.1 Historical Treaties and early Crown-Indigenous Relations 
In northern North America, treaties between newcomers and Indigenous groups date back 
to the seventeenth century with the signing of commercial trade compacts and treaties of peace, 
friendship and alliance in the eastern part of the continent  (Miller 2009, 4; see also: Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) 1996; Coates 1992). When Europeans arrived, the 
land was occupied by Indigenous groups who adapted over many centuries to living in what the 
newcomers viewed as a “new world”. Both the British and French realized that to survive, and 
even prosper, they needed to establish cooperative partnerships with the different Indigenous 
groups in the area (Alcantara 2013; Miller 2009; RCAP 1996; Poelzer and Coates 2015).   
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The earliest treaties reflected economic and commercial trade partnerships, 
predominantly through the fur trade. These commercial compacts were generally seen as 
mutually beneficial and established formal kinship ties between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
groups. The newcomers learned to navigate the different protocols and ceremonies of each 
group, which were integral to traditional Indigenous treaty-making pre-contact (Miller 2009, 5; 
2015). A primary example of one of the traditional ceremonial practices that were adopted 
throughout the east was wampum. Miller (2009) pointed out how remarkable it was that many 
European newcomers “adapted to the use of wampum” so quickly “and sometimes became 
masters of it” (43). Wampum belts were constructed with two types of beads: white beads 
signified positive events and relations, while purple or black represented death or war (Miller 
2009, 39). Wampum were often presented as gifts, but they also played an important purpose in 
negotiations. Wampum strings and belts were used to record “important discussions and 
agreements between nations, especially in matters of peace and war” (Miller 2009, 49; see also: 
RCAP 1996).  
Peace and friendship treaties, as well as formal military alliances, became increasingly 
important as the colonial powers competed for territory. The Report to the Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) explained the importance of these relationships: “Economic and 
strategic ties with Indian nations became important, for the Europeans needed treaties to justify 
their competing territorial claims and to garner allies for their struggle” (RCAP 1996, 115; see 
also: Miller 2009; 2015; Eyford 2015).    
In 1763, following defeat in the Seven Years’ War, France ceded all of its North 
American territory to Britain in the Treaty of Paris, and on October 7, 1763, Britain issued a 
Royal Proclamation, which “remains the Magna Carta of Aboriginal Rights in Canada” (Morse 
and Hylton 1999, 16). The Proclamation made clear that no land belonging to an Indigenous 
group was to be allocated to newcomers or settled upon, without having been ceded or 
purchased, and without having signed a treaty (Morse and Hylton 1999; Poelzer and Coates 
2015). More importantly, the Proclamation recognized Indigenous rights for the first time and set 
out some of the key principles of the treaty-making process that are still applied today. Former 
Governor General David Johnson, in his address at the 250th anniversary of the Royal 
Proclamation of 1763 spoke to the significance of this document:  
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The Royal Proclamation showed the way forward for the country that would 
become Canada. Its guiding principles—of peace, fairness, and respect—
established the tradition of treaty making, laid the basis for recognition of First 
Nations rights, and defined the relationship between First Nations peoples and the 
Crown (Fenge and Aldridge 2015, 7). 
This new phase of treaty making began with the signing of the Upper Canadian Treaties between 
1764 and 1862 and ended with the signing of the so-called “numbered treaties” (Treaty 1 to 
Treaty 11) in Western Canada between 1871 and 1921.  
 After Confederation in 1867, the Crown focused on expanding settlement and 
determining land concessions and was much less concerned with negotiating agreements that 
necessarily benefitted both parties. During this time the relationship between Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous peoples began to deteriorate as it shifted away from a focus on nation-to-nation 
agreements to a relationship based on marginalization and paternalism (RCAP 1996, 132; 
Poelzer and Coates 2015, 6; Miller 2009). 
In anticipation of the agricultural settlement of the west and expanded resource 
development in the North, eleven historic numbered treaties were negotiated and signed in what 
subsequently became Northern Ontario, the three Prairie provinces, and the Northwest 
Territories. The goal of these treaties, in addition to preparing for agricultural settlement, was to 
develop and assimilate Indigenous populations into the mainstream non-Indigenous society. The 
first seven treaties were signed between 1871 and 1877, largely at the instigation of First Nations 
who resisted the settlement of their lands without an agreement, drawing on treaty-making in the 
United States for inspiration and motivation. Flanagan (1992) explained that despite the 
important differences between each of these treaties, there were significant similarities. In each 
case the First Nations received a cash settlement as well as “annual payments in perpetuity; the 
promise of educational and agricultural assistance; the right to hunt and fish on crown land until 
such land was required for other purposes; and land reserves to be owned by the crown in trust 
for the Indians” (46). In exchange for these treaty rights and benefits, Indigenous groups agreed 
to “cede, release and surrender” all of their lands to the Crown forever through an explicit 
extinguishment clause (Eyford 2015; Miller 2009; 2015; RCAP 1996; Senate Standing 
Committee on Aboriginal Peoples 2008).  
The text in the extinguishment clause, found in each of the agreements, signified an 
important difference in the spirit and intent of these treaties. Hall (2016) explained, “Evidence 
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from elders suggest that they envisaged a kind of kin relationship with newcomers in which they 
would be respected and supported as necessary, and would share the resources of the region. 
Elders believed that the treaty process was about not surrendering their lands, but sharing them” 
(16). Contrary to this, the Canadian Government believed that the key objective of the treaties 
“was to acquire full title to the land in preparation for its peaceful occupation by white settlers” 
(Hall 2016, 3–4; see also: Krasowski 2019). The government was seeking certainty and finality 
through the treaty relationship.  
Miller (2015) explained the approach to negotiating these first seven treaties was 
reminiscent of the peace and friendship treaties: they followed ceremony, customs, and 
traditional protocols. However, “in reality, there was more dissonance than harmony in the result 
of the treaty negotiations in the West” (Miller 2015, 98). Much was lost in the language barriers 
between the Indigenous groups and European newcomers, and there were conflicting 
expectations and interpretations of the outcomes of the treaties. Jai (2009) argued, “differences 
of language, culture, and world view, time constraints and other factors often led to different 
understandings by the parties as to what had been agreed to” (27). Further, what was agreed upon 
orally was not always translated into the government’s written text (2009). Debates still continue 
today as to the original meaning and intent of the historic treaties (Jai 2009; Miller 2009; Asch 
2014; Krasowski 2019). 
Before the Government of Canada completed the negotiation of the numbered treaties, 
Parliament passed the Indian Act of 1876, thereby giving the federal government constitutional 
authority over “Indians, and Lands Reserved for Indians” (RCAP 1996, 235). The ultimate 
policy goal that surrounded the Indian Act was three-fold: “first protection, then civilization, and 
finally assimilation” (RCAP 1996, 237). The Indian Act controlled almost every aspect of a First 
Nation person’s life from cradle to grave (RCAP 1996, 237; see also: Coates 2008). It played a 
significant role in defining Indigenous identities and became the dominant institution through 
which the Canadian government regulated and administered the lives of individual status First 
Nations and reserve communities across the country. The Indian Act remains entrenched in the 
federal Indigenous policy system, and was a precursor to many other destructive Indigenous 
policies and programs, such as the colonial policy of defining who is a status Indian, the creation 
of residential schools, and the reallocation of people on reserves (RCAP 1996; Coates 2008). 
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Further evidence of the deteriorating Crown-Indigenous relationship was seen through the 
negotiation of the final set of numbered treaties. Between 1899 and 1921, the Crown and 
Indigenous groups signed four more agreements in the northern regions of Western Canada and 
Ontario, with an objective of gaining access to natural resources by securing land rights and title 
(Miller 2015, 100). There was much less inclusion of Indigenous ceremony and protocol 
throughout these negotiations and the discrepancy between what was agreed upon orally and 
what was contained in the written text of the agreements widened significantly (Miller 2015, 
100–101).   
With the exception of the Williams Treaties, signed in 1923 between the First Nations of 
the Chippewa of Lake Simcoe, the Mississauga of the north shore of Lake Ontario, and the 
governments of Canada and Ontario, the final four numbered treaties concluded the historic 
period of treaty making between the Crown and Indigenous groups. The Williams Treaties “were 
intended to repair deficiencies in the early Upper Canadian treaties” (Miller 2009, 224). 
However, unlike the provisions laid out in many of the historic numbered treaties, the Williams 
Treaties did not include any guaranteed hunting or fishing rights, nor did they include any 
reserve land and there was very little negotiation involved (225). The Crown offered the First 
Nations a one-time lump sum payment in exchange for a very large tract of land (225). After the 
signing of the Williams Treaties, treaty making in Canada was suspended. In 1927, the Crown 
made amendments to the Indian Act, including prohibiting Indigenous groups from raising funds 
for the purpose of political and legal representation in pursuit of land claims and Indigenous 
rights. Much of the Canadian North, Northern Quebec and most of British Columbia were left 
“without treaties or the prospect of negotiating them” (Fenge 2015, 107). The treaty process was, 
in the first instance, designed to ensure that Canada avoided the conflict and warfare that 
characterised the western expansion of the United States. The historic treaties, which failed in 
implementation in many ways, did contribute to the peaceful settlement of the prairie west and 
the development of crucial transportation corridors. The Government of Canada routinely 
rebuffed attempts to extend the treaty process further North. 
2.2  Assimilation Policies and Indigenous Political Mobilization   
 The assimilationist paradigm became the model for Indigenous-government relations for 
the first century after Confederation (Cairns 2000; Scholtz 2006; Poelzer and Coates 2015). 
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Tennant (1990) contended that Canada’s Indigenous policy “was rooted in the longstanding 
small “L” liberal ideological view that individual Indians desired to be and should be assimilated 
as equals in the larger Canadian society” (139). Between 1923 and the early 1970s, the Crown 
suspended treaty making, and focused much of its Indigenous policy on assimilation through 
interventions such as forced relocation, residential schools, and enfranchisement (Scholtz 2006, 
5; see also: Miller 2009, 232–33). The long-term goal of the government’s Indigenous policies 
was to “civilize” Indigenous peoples by having them abandon their traditional and cultural ways 
of knowing and being and “become prepared for the rights and responsibilities of full 
citizenship” (Scholtz 2006, 41). 
 Indigenous groups began to mobilize to confront the detrimental impacts of the Indian 
Act, the poor conditions of life on First Nations reserves, and to bring greater attention to the 
issue of Indigenous rights (Scholtz 2006, 43). Miller (2009) described, “Aboriginal communities 
were becoming better organized politically, better equipped, and more willing to assert 
themselves politically about the continuing disregard of their rights” (Miller 2009, 244). In the 
1930s and 1940s, regional-level associations such as the Union of Saskatchewan Indians (later 
known as the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations) and the Native Brotherhood of British 
Columbia, began to emerge. This political mobilization marked an important turning point for 
Indigenous groups across the country as they unified their voices to push back against the 
assimilationist and colonial government policies. 
 Alongside these regional associations, a broader Indigenous rights movement began to 
grow across Canada and the United States throughout the 1960s. In 1967, provincial and 
territorial organizations, representing status Indians, formed the National Indian Brotherhood 
(NIB). NIB played a key role in lobbying for changes to federal and provincial policies and 
would later become the Assembly of First Nations (AFN) in 1982. In 1968, the Canadian Métis 
Society was formed, to represent Métis interests. The Canadian Métis Society later became the 
Native Council of Canada (NCC). The NCC was developed to represent both Métis and non-
status Indians and was composed of provincial and territorial organizations (Barckwell n.d.). The 
NCC played a significant role in lobbying government to include the Métis as one of the three 
groups included in the definition of Aboriginal Peoples of Canada in The Constitution Act, 1982. 
In 1983, the Métis split from the NCC to form the Métis Nation of Canada (Barckwell n.d.). 
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 In 1968, Canada saw a significant shift in Indigenous policy making when Pierre Trudeau 
was elected Prime Minister under a Liberal majority government. Trudeau’s broad policy goals 
were equal citizenship for all Canadians, and non-recognition of special rights claims. Trudeau 
argued that special rights ultimately conflicted with formal equality and citizenship. Trudeau 
appointed Jean Chrétien Minister of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development 
(DIAND) and tasked him with overseeing the development of a white paper on Indian policy. 
Chrétien travelled across the country consulting with Indigenous leaders, who continued to unify 
around the fight for Indigenous rights and title. 
 In June 1969, “The Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy” (otherwise 
known as “The White Paper”) was introduced. Amongst other things, the paper proposed 
abolishing the Indian Act, dismantling DIAND, and ending special rights for Indigenous peoples 
(Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 1969). Despite the extensive consultation with Indigenous 
leaders, nowhere in the paper was there mention of recognizing Indigenous rights. Within days, 
there was growing opposition to the report from regional Indigenous associations and groups 
across the country and, within a short period, they had many journalists and academics on their 
side. Under the leadership of Harold Cardinal, the Indian Association of Alberta published a 
response paper entitled, “Citizens Plus” (known today as “The Red Paper”). In the paper they 
asserted,  
To us who are Treaty Indians there is nothing more important than our Treaties, 
our lands and the well-being of our future generation. We have studied carefully 
the contents of the Government’s White Paper on Indians and we have concluded 
that it offers despair instead of hope (Indian Association of Alberta 1970, 189).  
 
Concerted opposition across the country forced the federal Government to abandon the White 
Paper in June 1970 (Miller 2009; Scholtz 2006).  
In the late 1960s in British Columbia, the Nisga’a Nation was fighting their own battle 
over Indigenous rights and title. The Nisga’a took the Government of British Columbia to court, 
on the grounds that title to their lands had never been lawfully extinguished. The case was 
dismissed by the Supreme Court of British Columbia as well as the British Columbia Court of 
Appeals. On January 21, 1973, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled on the issue of Aboriginal 
title in the Calder et al. v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, “The Calder Case”. Although 
the Nisga’a lost the case, the Calder Case had important implications: the Supreme Court 
acknowledged that Indigenous peoples had title to their land before Europeans arrived. This was 
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the first time that the Supreme Court had recognized the legal existence of Aboriginal title to 
land (Alcantara 2013; Tom Flanagan 2008; Henderson 2006).  
 The Calder Case ruling forced the federal government to reassess some of the 
fundamental components of its land claims policy (RCAP 1996, 533). In August 1973, 
responding to claims put forward by the Nisga’a, the James Bay Cree and Inuit, and the Yukon 
Native Brotherhood, the federal government released a policy on comprehensive claims, marking 
a significant turning point in Crown-Indigenous relations in Canada. Scholtz (2006) explained, 
by committing to implementing negotiation policies, governments are required to “explicitly 
recognize the validity of indigenous collective claims to land as well as indigenous communities’ 
equal standing as Parties to an agreement” (14). Yukon First Nations now had an opportunity to 
place their demand for the negotiation of land claims before the Government of Canada.    
 
2.3 Canada’s Comprehensive Land Claims Processes  
The year 1973 marked the beginning of the comprehensive land claims process in 
Canada. After releasing its policy on comprehensive claims, the federal government invited 
Indigenous groups to submit claims. However, there were restrictions on who could submit. 
Comprehensive land claims, also known as modern treaties, were only open to Indigenous 
groups who lived in areas where land and resource rights had not previously been settled. The 
intent of negotiating a comprehensive land claim agreement was to achieve certainty by granting 
Indigenous groups a set of defined rights, such as land and resource rights, as well as rights such 
as hunting, fishing and trapping, in exchange for ceding undefined Indigenous rights. 
An additional restriction to negotiating land claims, was that the federal government 
limited negotiations to only six claimant groups at one time. The first groups to negotiate 
included the James Bay Cree in Northern Quebec; the Inuvialuit, and the Dene and Metis in the 
Northwest Territories; the Nisga’a in British Columbia; the Council of Yukon Indians in Yukon; 
and the Inuit of Nunavut (Alcantara 2013). The table below outlines all of the modern treaties 
that have been completed to date, along with their signatories. The summary of the treaty process 
that follows, draws heavily on the work of Chris Alcantara (2013; 2009; 2007b), who is one of 




Table 2.1 Completed Modern Treaties3 
Name of the Final Agreement Year Signed Signatories to the Agreement 
James Bay and Northern Quebec 
Agreement 
1975 
The Grand Council of the Crees (of Quebec), the 
Northern Quebec Inuit Association, the Government of 
Canada, Government of Quebec, the James Bay Energy 
Corporation, the James Bay Development Corporation, 
and Hydro Quebec 
Northeastern Quebec Agreement 1978 
Naskapi Band of Quebec, the Government of Canada, 
the Northern Quebec Inuit Association, Government of 
Quebec, the James Bay Energy Corporation, the James 
Bay Development Corporation, and Hydro Quebec 
Inuvialuit Final Agreement 1984 
The Committee of Original Peoples’ Entitlement 
(representing the Inuvialuit) and the Government of 
Canada 
Gwich’in Comprehensive Land Claim 
Agreement 
1992 Gwich’in Tribal Council and the Government of Canada 
Nunavut Land Claims Agreement 1993 
The Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement Area and the 
Government of Canada 
Champagne and Aishihik First Nations 
Final Agreement  
1995 
Champagne and Aishihik First Nations, the Government 
of Canada, and the Government of Yukon  
First Nation of Na-cho Nyak Final 
Agreement 
1995 
First Nation of Na-cho Nyak Dun, the Government of 
Canada, and the Government of Yukon 
Teslin Tlingit Council Final Agreements 1995 
Teslin Tlingit Council, the Government of Canada, and 
the Government of Yukon 
Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation Final 
Agreement 
1995 
Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation, the Government of 
Canada, and the Government of Yukon 
Sahtu Dene and Metis Comprehensive 
Land Claim Agreement 
1994 The Sahtu Tribal Council and the Government of Canada  
Selkirk First Nation Final Agreement 1997 
Selkirk First Nation, the Government of Canada, and the 
Government of Yukon 
Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation 
Final Agreement 
1997 
Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, the Government of 
Canada, and the Government of Yukon 
Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in Final Agreements 1998 
Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in First Nation, the Government of 
Canada, and the Government of Yukon 
Nisga’a Final Agreement 2000 
The Nisga’a Nation, the Government of Canada, and the 
Government of British Columbia 
Ta’an Kwach’an First Nation Final 
Agreement 
2002 
Ta’an Kwach’an First Nation, the Government of 
Canada, and the Government of Yukon 
Kluane First Nation Final Agreement 2004 
Kluane First Nation, the Government of Canada, and the 
Government of Yukon 
Kwanlin Dün First Nation Final 
Agreements  
2005 
Kwanlin Dün First Nation, the Government of Canada, 
and the Government of Yukon 
Labrador Inuit Land Claim Agreement 2005 
The Inuit of Labrador, the Government of Canada, and 
the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador 
Tlicho Agreement 2005 
The Tlicho, the Government of Canada, and the 
Government of the Northwest Territories 
Carcross/Tagish First Nation Final 
Agreement 
2006 
Carcross/Tagish First Nation, the Government of 
Canada, and the Government of Yukon 
Nunvik Inuit Land Claims Agreement 2008 Nunavik Inuit and the Government of Canada 
 
3 Note: Table 2.1 includes all of the land claims agreements that have been negotiated and signed 
in Canada. This does not include stand-alone Self-Government Agreements. 
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Tsawwassen First Nation Final 
Agreement 
2009 
Tsawwassen First Nation, the Government of Canada, 
and the Government of British Columbia 
Maa-nulth First Nations Final Agreement  2011 
Huu-ay-aht First Nations, Ka:’yu’k’t’h’/Che:k’tles7et’h’ 
First Nations, Toquaht Nation, Uchucklesaht Tribe, 
Ucluelet First Nation, the Government of Canada, and 
the Government of British Columbia   
Eeyou Marine Region Land Claims 
Agreement 
2011 
The Crees of the Eeyou Istchee, the Governmetn of 
Canada 
Yale First Nation Final Agreement 2013 
Yale First Nation, the Government of Canada, and the 
Government of British Columbia   
Tla’amin Final Agreement  2014 
Tla’amin Nation, the Government of Canada, and the 
Government of British Columbia   
(Source: This table was built using data from Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada. 2015. 
“Fact Sheet: Implementation of Final Agreements.” Retrieved from: https://www.rcaanc-
cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1100100030580/1542728997938 and from the individual agreements).  
 
The Office of Native Claims (ONC) was established in 1974 to represent the federal 
government with the purpose of negotiating and settling both comprehensive claims and specific 
claims.4 Indigenous groups wishing to pursue comprehensive claims, had to first submit claims 
to the ONC and to the Department of Justice to analyze “in terms of both their historical 
accuracy and legal merit” (Indian Affairs and Northern Affairs Canada 1981, 13). The 1973 
claims policy did not contain a formal process for negotiating a claim once it had been submitted 
(Alcantara 2013). In 1981, the federal government released a new policy statement, In All 
Fairness, which outlined a more structured process for negotiation. This policy was significantly 
amended in 1986 and had multiple minor amendments and changes since. The 1986 policy 
statement outlined the process for submitting a statement of claim. The following elements had 
to be met in order for a claim to be accepted:  
• a statement that the claimant group has not previously adhered to treaty; 
• a documented statement from the claimant group that it has traditionally used 
and occupied the territory in question and that this use and occupation 
continues; 
• a description of the extent and location of such land use and occupancy, 
together with a map outlining the approximate boundaries; and 
• identification of the claimant group including the names of the bands, tribes 
and communities on whose behalf the claim is being made, the claimant’s 
linguistic and cultural affiliation, and approximate population figures for the 
claimant group (Indian Affairs and Northern Affairs Canada 1981).  
 
4 The 1973 policy statement on land claims also outlined a separate process for dealing with 
“specific claims” regarding the federal government’s failure to live up to the terms of the historic 
treaties or to fulfill its obligations under the Indian Act. This study only focuses on 
comprehensive land claims.  
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Once the ONC and the Department of Justice had reviewed a statement of claim, the claim was 
sent to the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development for final approval or denial. If a 
claim was approved, ONC was responsible for initiating negotiations (Indian Affairs and 
Northern Affairs Canada 1981). The same process and requirements remain in place today. 
The negotiation process required identifying the negotiating parties who would be at the 
table. The Government of Canada was represented by Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada 
(INAC)5 and was led by a Chief federal negotiator(s) “from within or outside of the public 
service” (CIRNAC 2014). The Chief Negotiator(s) received negotiating mandates from the 
Minister. The Minister and Deputy Minister also played an important role in working with their 
counterparts in the other federal departments to get them on side with negotiated elements that 
would directly affect their departments (Alcantara 2013, p.7).    
 Representation from the provincial and territorial governments differed in each 
jurisdiction. At the provincial level, the Indigenous Affairs department usually took the lead on 
negotiations. It is important to note that until the 1980s, territorial governments had a very 
limited role in the negotiation of land claims. Agreements that were negotiated with Indigenous 
groups in the territories, were bilateral. The 1986 Comprehensive Land Claims Policy stated, “in 
the territories, lands and resources fall under federal jurisdiction. Negotiations in these areas will 
be bilateral in nature… Territorial governments will participate fully in the application of land 
claims policy and in negotiations, under the leadership of the federal government” (Indian 
Affairs and Northern Affairs Canada 1981, 19; see also: Alcantara 2013, 18–19). Table 2.1, 
found on p.17-18, shows there were four bilateral agreements that were signed between 
Indigenous groups and the Government of Canada 
In Yukon, the territorial government fought hard to have its own seat at the table but was 
not immediately welcomed as a standalone party. It was not until 1979 that the Yukon 
government was granted its own seat. In his study of modern treaty negotiations in Yukon and 
 
5 For consistency throughout this dissertation, INAC will be used to refer to the federal 
department responsible for Indigenous and Northern affairs. However, when using direct quotes, 
it may be referred to by different names depending on the time period. The title of the 
department changed multiple times over the period of 1986-2016. This included: Department of 
Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND); Aboriginal Affairs and Northern 
Development Canada (AANDC); Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC); and most 
recently Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada (CIRNAC).    
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Labrador, Alcantara (2013) described the important role that territorial and provincial 
governments played during the negotiation period: “Several Yukon government officials and 
others told me that territorial governments are the primary government negotiators in the final 
stages of negotiations because it is their governments and citizens who will have to live with the 
aftermath of a Final Agreement” (20). 
The Indigenous group(s), made up of individual bands or an umbrella organization 
formed to represent multiple Indigenous communities or groups, hired negotiators to represent 
them (Alcantara 2013, 19). For example, in the Sahtu Dene and Metis Comprehensive Land 
Claim Agreement, the Sahtu Tribal Council represented and negotiated on behalf of seven Dene 
and Metis Communities in the Northwest Territories. In Yukon, in the beginning, the Council for 
Yukon Indians (later known as Council of Yukon First Nations) negotiated on behalf of all 
fourteen Yukon First Nations. Once it was established that each Yukon First Nation would 
negotiate individual Final and Self-Government Agreements, each Nation was represented by its 
own negotiator(s). Many Yukon First Nations chose to be represented by the same negotiator(s).  
With the negotiating parties in place, the next step was the negotiation of a framework 
agreement. The claims policy explained that the framework agreement would “determine the 
scope, process, topics, and parameters for negotiation. Approaches to obtaining certainty with 
respect to lands and resources” and a timeline of negotiations would also be included (Indian 
Affairs and Northern Affairs Canada 1981, 24). The federal government approved the framework 
agreement, and then work on negotiating the agreements-in-principle (AIP) would commence. 
This was the most comprehensive, challenging and time-consuming part of the negotiation 
process.  
The AIP, which is not legally binding, outlined all of the comprehensive details that 
would be contained in each chapter of the agreement. This included areas such as eligibility and 
enrollment, lands, access, expropriation, land use planning, development assessment, heritage, 
water management, fish and wildlife, forest resources, non-renewable resources, financial 
compensation, taxation, economic development, resource royalty sharing, dispute resolution, 
implementation and sometimes self-government (Indian Affairs and Northern Development 
1993b; 1998). Not everything was negotiated during the AIP stage. Alcantara (2013) explained, 
the negotiating parties would usually wait until the Final Agreement negotiations to negotiate the 
specific parcels of settlement land, and “also tend[ed] to wait until this stage to negotiate the 
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exact wording of the “cede, release, and surrender” provision, the clause that settles the nature 
and ownership of all lands subject to the treaty” (16). The federal government required AIPs to 
be ratified by the Indigenous group(s) before negotiating the Final Agreement. Mandatory 
ratification of the AIP was not part of the original claims policy; however, there were several 
instances early on where Final Agreements failed to be ratified, so the federal government made 
ratification a requirement at the AIP stage (Alcantara 2013, 16). If the AIP received endorsement 
by the Indigenous group(s), the next stage was negotiation of the Final Agreement.  
The negotiation of the Final Agreement formalized everything into a modern treaty. 
However, the agreement was still not finalized until an implementation plan was negotiated and 
signed. The requirement for inclusion of implementation plans was added in to the 1986 claims 
policy. The negotiation of the implementation plans involved a new team of negotiators. This 
will be described in more detail in Chapter 5.  
With the signing of the implementation plan and the Final Agreement, the modern treaty 
was sent out again for ratification by the Indigenous group(s), the provincial/territorial 
government and the federal government. Once ratified, legislation was passed, giving effect to 
the agreement, and the Final Agreement became constitutionally protected under section 35 of 
the Constitution Act. To date, the Canadian government has signed twenty-six modern treaties 
with Indigenous groups and provincial and territorial governments in all three of the Northern 
territories, British Columbia, Quebec and Labrador (see the map below). Eighteen of these 
agreements include self-government. Approximately ninety additional negotiations are taking 
place across the country that are either in progress or have been stalled (Alcantara 2013). Most of 




Figure 2.1 Map of Modern Treaty and Self-Government Agreements 
 
 
2.4 The Origins and Experience of the Yukon Land Claims Process 
Yukon land claims negotiations were part of the national process and reflected the 
evolution of legal and political systems; though, First Nations in Yukon played a critical role in 
sparking and shaping the national approach. In January 2020, the “First Principles Project” 
gathering took place in Whitehorse, Yukon in response to the lack of knowledge and 
understanding of the main principles and the underlying intent and content of the UFA and 
Yukon First Nations Final and Self-Government Agreements. It was acknowledged that those 
involved in the original negotiations have had a limited role in implementation at all levels of 
government. Tony Penikett, former Premier of Yukon and one of the organizers of the project, 
observed that “if few Yukoners have ever studied the UFA’s detailed text and even fewer 
understand its core principles, who then will defend the ideas and values it embodies?” (Penikett 
2020). One of the main outcomes of this gathering, was a nine-page draft document, “The First 
Principles Project: 40 @ -40°”, which summarizes the key principles that were discussed. 
(Image source: Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada 2019) 
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Land claims emerged at a time of major resource expansion, the growth of Yukon’s non-
Indigenous population and growing tensions within the territory. As the First Principles Project 
draft document asserted: 
We came together to build a new relationship so that we could speak to each 
other as equal partners. We came together because we could no longer turn away 
from the pain and suffering that the laws of the day had created for the Yukon 
First Nation peoples (First Principles Project 2020, 3).  
 
The discovery of gold in Yukon in 1896, brought thousands of miners, settlers and 
missionaries to a predominantly unsettled Yukon. Prior to this, Yukon First Nations had little 
contact with the outside world, with the exception of the odd missionary or fur trader, and their 
lands remained largely untouched. Due to the influx of people and development that 
accompanied the gold rush, Yukon First Nations experienced significant loss to their lands and 
detrimental impacts to subsistence harvesting and their traditional ways of life. Hunde-aelth, 
otherwise known as Chief Jim Boss, hereditary Chief of the Ta’an Kwäch’än Council, wrote two 
letters to Yukon Commissioner and Superintendent General of Indian Affairs in Ottawa in 1900 
and 1902, urging the government to settle a claim with Yukon First Nations and to provide 
compensation for their lost lands and hunting grounds (McClellan 1987, 99). In his letter from 
1902, Hunde-aelth wrote, “Tell the King very hard we want something for our Indians because 
they take our land and game” (Neufeld 2002). The federal government was not interested in 
signing a treaty in Yukon. They did not want to risk giving away reserve land that could 
potentially have gold, and they believed Yukon First Nations “were ‘best left as Indians’ – living 
as nomadic hunter gatherers as far away from settlement as possible” (Coates and Morrison 
2005, 115). The government also did not believe that the gold rush and resource development 
was going to last long in the territory, and therefore, the signing of a treaty was not necessary 
(Coates and Morrison 2005, 115). 
Yukon First Nations did not abandon their pursuit of Indigenous rights and title in 
Yukon. Joining the rise of Indigenous mobilization taking place across the country in the mid-
1960s, Elijah Smith and several Yukon First Nations leaders from across the territory began to 
organize to address many of the issues facing Yukon First Nations. In January 1960, First 
Nations chiefs and representatives from Northern British Columbia and Yukon held a meeting in 
Whitehorse  (Coates 1993, 237). At this meeting, it was decided that a territory wide First 
Nations organization should be formed. Later that year, the Klondike Indian Association was 
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established with the following objectives: “The settlement of the Yukon land claim, the election 
of an Indian to the Yukon Territorial Council, the encouragement of economic development, 
aboriginal culture, and education, and the improvement of social conditions” (Coates 1993, 237).  
In 1968, with land claims becoming a central focus for Yukon First Nation leaders, 
Yukon First Nations separated from the Klondike Indian Association, to form their own 
organization, the Yukon Indian Brotherhood (later known as Yukon Native Brotherhood) 
(Coates 1993, 238). Yukon Native Brotherhood (YNB) represented all Status Yukon First 
Nations. Elijah Smith was elected Chief of YNB and Dave Joe was the executive director. 
Coates (1993) asserted, “The YNB had an immediate impact on the Yukon… It inundated the 
DIA [Department of Indian Affairs] with position papers, requests for assistance and project 
proposals” (238). YNB quickly became a powerful voice for First Nations’ rights across the 
territory. 
Demands for settling land claims became more urgent with the increase in oil and gas 
development in the North. In his book, Best Left as Indians, Coates (1993) explained that in 
1970, Northern Oil Explorers were granted permission to begin exploration in the Old Crow 
Flats, an area of significance to Vuntut Gwitchin traditions and economy (236). The Old Crow 
Band (now known as Vuntut Gwitchin Government) petitioned for an injunction to stop the 
exploration, asserting in their petition, “…We do not consent to the diversion or tempering [sic] 
with the waters of the Porcupine River Valley drainage the lands of which we claim as ours by 
original occupation or possession” (as cited in Coates 1993, 237; see also: Castillo, Schreyer, and 
Southwick 2020, 97). Although the federal government made some concessions, its legal 
advisor, Hugh Fischer, argued that no treaty had ever been negotiated or signed with First 
Nations in Old Crow and therefore the Old Crow Band had no property rights or title, thereby 
asserting the Crown’s sovereignty over the land (Coates 1993, 237). 
Although Yukon First Nations viewed this as a setback, they did not back down in their 
pursuit of a land claims settlement. In 1971, a separate group, the Yukon Association of Non-
Status Indians (YANSI), was formed under the leadership of Joe Jacquot, to “represent the 
interests of First Nations people who fell outside the legal definition of an ‘Indian’ under the 
terms of the Indian Act” (Coates 1994, 11). The following year, in a display of unity, YANSI and 
YNB held a three-day conference to discuss land claims. The main focus of the conference was 
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to educate and inform Yukon First Nations on the land claims process, benefits of land claims, 
and to gather ideas and input from community members (Whitehorse Star 1972, 8a). 
In July 1972, YNB received funding from Lloyd Barber, the Indian Claims 
Commissioner for Canada, to put together a position paper outlining its grievances. This funding 
was only allocated to YNB, at the exclusion of YANSI members. With the involvement of all 
twelve Yukon First Nation bands, YNB spent the next six months outlining and drafting the 
paper, with lots of time spent consulting with the communities (Whitehorse Star 1973a, 1). On 
February 14, 1973, Chief Elijah Smith, along with a delegation of Yukon First Nations Chiefs 
travelled to Ottawa to present Prime Minister Trudeau with a formal claims settlement paper 
entitled, Together Today for our Children Tomorrow: A Statement of Grievances and an 
Approach to Settlement by the Yukon Indian People (Yukon Native Brotherhood 1973). The 
paper focused on the past injustices and dispossession that Yukon First Nations had faced, the 
present-day conditions of inequality, discrimination and suffering that First Nations were 
enduring, and a vision for a better future that they sought to create for their children. In his 
speech to the Prime Minister, Elijah Smith stressed the importance of settling land claims with 
Yukon First Nations:  
Our people have lived in the Yukon many years before the white man came to 
Canada. This is the first time the leaders of the Yukon Indian people have came to 
the capital of Canada. We are here to talk about our future. The only way we feel 
we can have a future is to settle our land claims… The Yukon Indian people are 
offering the government of Canada, the people of Canada, a plan for our future. 
This will be a future that will return to us our lost pride, self-respect and economic 
independence. When we have control over our own land, our own bank account 
and our own program, then we will be able to really participate. We want land and 
resources, so we can develop ourselves. We do not want to be developed by 
Indian Affairs or anyone else. We want the chance to develop programs that will 
help solve the problems of today and prepare a future for our children (“Elijah 
Smith Speech” 1973). 
 
Together Today called for a “fair and just” settlement that would recognize Yukon First Nations 
rights and title to their land. The presentation of this document began the long journey towards 
modern-day treaties in Yukon. Prime Minister Trudeau accepted the claim and promised to 
assign a federal team to begin negotiations.  
Later that year, negotiations for a Yukon claim began between the Department of Indian 
Affairs, representing the Crown, and the Council for Yukon Indians (CYI), representing Yukon 
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First Nations. Although YNB and YANSI continued to exist, CYI was formed to be the 
negotiating body on behalf of all Yukon First Nations. Negotiations started out bilaterally, 
though the Government of Yukon was invited to sit at the table with the Government of Canada 
and provide input. Yukon First Nations leadership decided that a single territory-wide agreement 
would be negotiated for all Yukon First Nations. The complex explanation for why this decision 
was made is a matter for historians to deal with.  
The Government of Yukon had immediate concerns about the land claims process and 
the impact it could have on non-Indigenous people in Yukon. In addition, there were concerns 
that land claims could constrain its own jurisdiction and slow the transfer of administrative 
power being sought through the establishment of responsible government for Yukon. In October 
1974, the Yukon government published an analysis and position paper on “Yukon Indian and 
Claims”. In this paper, the Yukon government demonstrated support for the pursuit of land 
claims; however, they emphasized that they wanted the claims settlement to result in giving 
Yukon First Nation peoples, “all rights, privileges and obligations inherent in Canadian 
citizenship” while also terminating any “legal distinctions based on race” (Yukon Government 
1974, 3). Further, the Yukon government wanted to ensure that certainty was obtained, and that 
the settlement would “clearly extinguish all existing claims, special rights, privileges and 
obligations of Yukon Indian people” (3). Yukon faced, in fact, two transformative, critical, 
complicated, and overlapping political processes: the devolution of political authority to the 
Government of Yukon and the negotiation of land claims with Yukon First Nations.  
In 1979, the Government of Yukon was brought to the negotiation table as a separate 
negotiating party and Willard Phelps was appointed as its Chief Negotiator. Tripartite 
negotiations began towards the development of an agreement in principle (AIP) for the Yukon 
claim. In 1980, recognizing the strength a united front would bring, YNB and YANSI 
amalgamated with CYI to form one umbrella organization that would represent all Yukon First 
Nations. By 1984, an AIP was completed and was sent out for ratification. Eight out of twelve 
Yukon First Nations bands rejected the AIP based on numerous concerns. The biggest concern 
was around the concept of complete extinguishment of all Indigenous rights. Ultimately, the AIP 
was rejected on five main points: “the issue of extinguishment, the need for full recognition and 
affirmation of subsistence hunting, land selections based on need, control of lands, and 
recognition of non-status Indians” (Council of Yukon First Nations n.d.; LegendSeekers 
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Research Inc. 2002, 77). In addition, the First Nation of Na-cho Nyak Dun and a few other 
Yukon First Nations wanted to see the negotiation of self-government as part of the land claims 
package. The federal government declared that the AIP had failed, and negotiations were put on 
hold while the Government of Canada conducted a review of its existing land claims policy.  
In 1986, the federal government released the new federal Comprehensive Land Claims 
Policy with significant additions and amendments to the previous policy. Of important note, the 
new claims policy did not use the word “extinguishment” in the certainty clause. The policy 
read, “The federal government has examined this feature and has concluded that alternatives to 
extinguishment may be considered provided that certainty in respect of lands and resources is 
established” (Indian Affairs and Northern Development Canada 1986, 12). Rather than 
prescribing specific language to be used in the certainty clause, the policy stated that “wording 
will be subject to agreement between parties” during individual negotiations (12). Further, the 
new policy clarified that rights relinquished through the claims process are only those related to 
lands and resources; “other Aboriginal rights, as may be defined or recognized by the courts, 
would not be affected by the terms of the treaty (Eyford 2015, 71).6 In addition, the new policy 
included resource revenue sharing, discussion of harvesting rights in offshore areas, 
environmental management, and a broader range of self-government matters (Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development Canada 1986), though still no recognition of a distinct right to self-
government.  
In 1987, negotiations resumed under the new claims policy, and in 1988 the Parties to the 
agreement signed a Framework Agreement, followed by the signing and successful ratification 
of a new AIP in 1989. Although the new AIP included less money than the one tabled in 1984, it 
included slightly more land, First Nations rights would be retained on settlement land, and 
agreement was made to develop a model of self-government. Shortly after signing the AIP, the 
Parties to the agreement concluded that individual Final and Self-Government Agreements 
 
6 The certainty clause has been further clarified and amended over the years to recognize section 
35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.  
 28 
would be completed with each of the fourteen Yukon First Nations.7 The CYI agreement, “the 
Umbrella Final Agreement” (UFA), would not be a modern treaty in and of itself but would 
become the template for each of the individual Final Agreements. Each Yukon First Nation 
would negotiate separate provisions that would be unique to its individual circumstances 
(Alcantara 2013, 73). In 1991, a model framework agreement for self-government was reached 
and negotiations began with four Yukon First Nations to settle the first Yukon Final and Self-
Government Agreements.  
On May 29, 1993, after twenty years of negotiations, all three negotiating parties signed 
and ratified the UFA. The agreement guaranteed a total of 41,595.21 km2 in Settlement Land for 
all Yukon First Nations. Of this land, up to 25,899.88 km2 would be Category A Settlement Land 
and up to 15,695.33 km2 would be Category B “fee simple” Settlement Land (Council for Yukon 
First Nations and Yukon Government 1997).8 The agreement also included a $242.6 million 
(based on 1989 dollars) cash settlement, as well as specific harvesting rights, guaranteed 
participation on management boards and committees, and several other guaranteed rights, and 
social and economic benefits. In addition to the signing of the UFA, Final and Self-Government 
Agreements were signed with Champagne and Aishihik First Nations, the First Nation of Na-cho 
Nyak Dun, Teslin Tlingit Council, and Vuntut Gwitchin. Financial Transfer Agreements, Final 
Agreement Implementation Plans, and Self-Government Agreement Implementation Plans 
accompanied these agreements. Over the next two years, the federal and territorial governments 
drafted legislation and the Treasury Board and Cabinet finalized and approved the 
implementation funding. In 1995, the UFA and first four Yukon First Nation Final and Self-
 
7 In the late 1950s, the Department of Indian Affairs decided there were too many Indian bands 
in the territory and joined six bands into three. This led to the creation of the Whitehorse Indian 
Band (known today as Kwanlin Dün First Nation) and Kluane Indian Band. When negotiations 
started in 1973, there were twelve Yukon First Nations Bands: Liard River Band, Champagne 
and Aishihik Band, Dawson Band, Teslin Band, Old Crow Band, Mayo Band, Kluane Band, 
Whitehorse Band, Ross River Band, Selkirk Band, Carcross Band, and Carmacks Band. In 1987, 
Ta’an Kwach’an chose to separate from the Whitehorse Indian Band and re-established 
themselves as a distinct First Nation (Ta’an Kwäch’än Council n.d.). In 1990, the Kluane Indian 
Band split its membership into two distinct Nations: the Kluane First Nation and the White River 
First Nation. This resulted in the negotiation of fourteen separate Yukon First Nations Final and 
Self-Government Agreements. 
8 Category A Land indicates that the First Nation owns both the surface of the land, as well as the 
subsurface, including all minerals and oil and gas. Category B Land indicates the First Nation 
owns only the surface of the land but does not have rights to the subsurface. 
 29 
Government Agreements came into effect. Over the next 10 years, an additional seven Yukon 
First Nations Final and Self-Government Agreements were signed. See Appendix A: 
“Chronology of the Yukon Land Claims History” for the specific year each agreement was 
signed. 
To date, there remain three Yukon First Nations who have not settled land claims 
agreements: Liard First Nation, Ross River Dena Council and White River First Nation. Little 
has been officially documented about the negotiation experience of each of these three First 
Nations; however, we do know that all three had reached a memorandum of understanding on 
almost all issues; however, during ratification the majority of members in these communities 
voted against the agreements (Alcantara 2013, 96).9 Alcantara (2013) conducted a study of the 
Ross River Dena Council and Liard First Nation (Kaska Nations) experiences with negotiating 
claims. He explained that Kaska leaders and elders rejected the claim because they did not agree 
with the provisions that were negotiated in the UFA, and they believed “that the UFA has failed 
to address the issues that are unique and are of utmost importance to them” (99). In addition, 
they did not agree with the amount of land quantum that had been negotiated and did not support 
the “permanent sharing or surrendering of any of their traditional lands” (98). On March 31, 
2005 the Federal mandate to negotiate Yukon land claims expired and the Government of 
Canada decided not to renew its mandate. Today, Liard First Nation, Ross River Dena Council 
and White River First Nation remain divided on whether they should pursue formal land claims 
processes. The federal government stated it will not revisit the mandate to negotiate 
comprehensive land claims in Yukon to the same extent that it did in the past. However, all three 
of these First Nations groups are currently participating in Recognition of Rights discussion 
tables with the Crown to advance the recognition of Indigenous self-determination and protection 
of their rights.10   
 
9 For a more detailed account of the Liard First Nation and Ross River Dena Council (Kaska 
Nations) experiences with negotiating their land claims, see Chris Alcantara’s book Negotiating 
the Deal: Comprehensive Land Claims Agreements in Canada (2013).  
10 In 2018, the Government of Canada committed to renewing Crown-Indigenous relations based 
on recognition of rights, including inherent and treaty rights. As part of this renewed 
relationship, the Government of Canada is participating in 80 separate Recognition of Rights 
discussion tables with Indigenous groups representing over 390 communities across the country. 
Discussions can focus on a specific priority area or may cover a diversity of issues (Government 
of Canada 2020).   
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Yukon First Nations Final and Self-Government Agreements are seen as a model for 
Indigenous-government relations in Canada. However, there is still a long way to go to seeing 
these agreements implemented. “The First Principles Project: 40 @ -40°” document opens with 
stressing the importance of the UFA and the compact and contract that it formed for all 
Yukoners: 
[The Umbrella Final Agreement] was negotiated as a living document over many 
years by hundreds of Yukoners and Canadians. It sets out how a unique and 
dynamic partnership will work now and in the future between First Nation and 
non-First Nation Yukoners. It is a key part of the Yukon social contract. All 
Yukoners are affected by it and are partners in how it works—all Yukoners are 
treaty people (First Principles Project 2020, 2). 
 
2.5 Conclusion  
The negotiation and signing of the land claims agreements across the country, and in 
particular in Yukon, created transformational societal change. In Yukon, the land claims 
agreements were foundational to restructuring relationships between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous Yukoners, and between Yukon First Nations and the Crown, even before agreements 
were concluded. During the negotiating period (1973-1993), Yukon experienced a fundamental 
transformation in cultural, social and political thinking and perspectives, as well as a revolution 
in the concepts and understanding of governance (Coates and Morrison 2005; Coates and Powell 
1989; see also: Duffy 1988; Hamilton 1994). In addition, the signing of Self-Government 
Agreements brought the eleven Yukon First Nations signatories out from under the Indian Act, 
meaning the Indian Act, with few exceptions, no longer applied. But it was not just the act of 
signing the agreements but the process itself that had such significant power. The process that 
each of the Parties to the agreements and individual negotiators went through over a twenty-year 
period had remarkable impacts on the majority of Yukoners. The process of finalizing and 
legalizing the accords further expanded the transformation of social and political relationships. 
These agreements were not just agreed upon by senior officials and politicians; over twenty 
intense and impactful years, these negotiations, which often played out in public, engaged all 




agreements were ratified and endorsed by the First Nations communities themselves, following 
months of intense discussions.     
The negotiation and signing of these agreements, however, has proven to be only one half 
of making them a reality. Of equal importance is seeing them fully and properly operational. 
Implementation of the agreements involves ongoing commitment to fulfilling obligations “that 
require both the separate and joint participation of the parties” (Senate Standing Committee on 
Aboriginal Peoples 2008, 7). The federal government’s 2003 Implementation Handbook stated 
that, “Implementation is not a passing phase, but rather an enduring one, marking a new 
relationship among the parties—the federal government, the Aboriginal group and the provincial 
or territorial government involved” (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) 2003). 
Interestingly, these complex processes that have completely recast the political, legal, and 
economic structure of the Canadian North have made only a small dent on the scholarly 
literature.  
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS 
Modern treaty-making emerged as a centrepiece of Indigenous policy in Canada and 
internationally, spurring greater academic interest in this important field. The collection of 
scholarly work that focuses on the modern treaty process in Canada is growing, although the 
scope of the existing work is still limited. Of the work that does exist, the predominant focus is 
on the negotiation of agreements and more specifically, on distinct elements of the agreements, 
such as co-management boards, land disputes and impact benefit agreements. The limited work 
centered around the implementation of modern treaties has mostly derived from the legal field, 
concentrating on the interpretation of the texts and the role of the courts. In addition to the body 
of scholarly work, there have been several practitioners and advocacy groups who have made 
important contributions to the literature on modern treaties (for example, see Land Claims 
Agreements Coalition 2008; 2006; 2004).  
3.1 Assessing the Modern Treaty Negotiation Process in Canada 
Modern treaties are negotiated and signed in unceded areas where treaties have not 
previously been settled. The establishment of modern treaties empowered Indigenous groups and 
had significant impact on Indigenous-government relations. The Indian and Northern Affairs 
Canada report, “Resolving Aboriginal Claims: A Practical Guide to Canadian Experiences” 
explained that the negotiation processes “are intended to fundamentally change the relationship 
between Aboriginal peoples, the province or territory in question, and Canada, a relationship that 
has been unsatisfactory for several hundreds of years” (2003, 35). Whether or not this 
relationship has in fact changed is debated amongst scholars, as is discussed in full below. 
Julie Jai wrote about the significance of modern treaties in Canada (Jai 2014; 2009). Jai 
has held senior-level government positions in Indigenous law in Ontario, Yukon, and with the 
federal government. During her time with the Government of Yukon, she was involved in 
several successful land claims and self-government negotiations. Jai (2009) illustrated how the 
modern treaty negotiation process significantly differs from the historical treaty process. First, 
the negotiations expanded over a long period of time, lasting years, rather than months (28). She 
contended the lengthy process allowed the tripartite teams to build relationships and develop 
trust. Secondly, each of the parties in the negotiation had legal representation and professional 
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negotiation teams (28). In theory, this allowed each party to enter into the negotiations on more 
equal footing. In addition, the negotiations usually took place in the home community of the 
Indigenous group(s), which allowed the government negotiation teams to gain an understanding 
and appreciation of the Indigenous perspectives and environment (34). Jai explained that the new 
negotiation “process forced all parties to try and understand each other’s different values, 
cultures, and worldviews, and to take them into account in developing solutions which work for 
all parties” (33). Jai asserted that modern treaties have empowered Indigenous groups and have 
played an important role in improving Indigenous-government relations by developing a 
negotiation process that is mutually beneficial to all those involved.  
3.1.1 Why Governments Choose Negotiation  
Jai (2009) explained that the decision to implement a negotiation policy is “important 
because the government consciously and explicitly commits itself to a future long-run strategy 
over a number of claims and across a number of groups” (35). Christa Scholtz (2006) conducted a 
comparative study to assess why governments choose to negotiate land claims rather than resolve 
claims through alternate means. In her book, Negotiating Claims: The Emergence of Indigenous 
Land Claim Negotiation Policies in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States, 
Scholtz asserted that the key decision by governments to implement negotiation policies requires 
them to “explicitly recognize the validity of indigenous collective claims to land as well as 
indigenous communities’ equal standing as Parties to an agreement” (14). Through the use of 
four international case studies, Scholtz examined the policy options available to governments in 
each of these countries and the factors involved in whether they chose to implement a negotiation 
policy.  
Of the four case studies Scholtz examined, Canada and New Zealand are the only two 
countries that have fully implemented negotiation policies nationwide. Scholtz explained that 
these policies are considered “institutionalized alternatives to litigation” (2006, 4). In New 
Zealand, governments view “judicial review as fundamentally undemocratic” and therefore “the 
legitimacy of non-judicial dispute resolution mechanisms is much higher” (Scholtz 2006, 7). 
Scholtz explained that Australia “represents a case of halted and gradual negotiation” (4). 
Although the Australian Commonwealth implemented a negotiation policy in 1976, it was 
exclusive to the Northern Territory in Australia. It was not until 1993 that a limited national 
negotiation policy was implemented; and only in the past twenty years have efforts been made to 
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negotiate agreements (5). The United States is the exception in Scholtz’s study, as it is the only 
country that has chosen to rely on litigation and third-party arbitration to resolve claims. Scholtz 
contended that the reliance on the courts to resolve claims “served assimilationist principles” and 
is associated with the liberal principal that all citizens should be treated equally (6).  
In her assessment, Scholtz determined that in all three of the countries where negotiation 
policies have been introduced, “indigenous people had mobilized politically before key judicial 
decisions examining the status of rights under the law were made” (Scholtz 2006, 5). In the 
United States, the judicial ruling on Indigenous rights took place before groups had a chance to 
politically mobilize (152). Other scholars have affirmed that one of the key contributing factors 
that led to the creation of a renewed negotiation policy in Canada was mobilization of Indigenous 
leaders and groups across the country (Miller 2009; Alcantara 2013; Nadasdy 2003; Coates 
1993).  Miller (2009) explained that the renewal of treaty-making in Canada revealed “better-
organized, more articulate and considerably more aggressive Native-leadership” (278). Scholtz 
argues that the executive policymakers in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand chose to 
implement negotiation policies based on the “credible threat that aboriginal peoples could exact 
future political costs” (Scholtz 2006, 17). This credible threat decreased the utility of court 
decisions “since legal or arbitrated solutions would not fix the larger political problem” (17). 
Governments and policymakers in each of these countries wanted to find a solution that would 
give them certainty and finality.  
3.1.2 Original Intent and Motive 
In each of the negotiations, the tripartite teams entered into the agreements with different 
intentions and objectives (Jai 2014; Alcantara 2013; 2007a; Nadasdy 2003; Asch 2014). Chris 
Alcantara (2013) explained that from the perspective of public governments, modern treaties 
replace undefined Indigenous rights “with specific, defined treaty rights and title. For Indigenous 
peoples, by contrast, comprehensive claims agreements are mechanisms to affirm and protect 
their traditional holdings and territories” (3-4). Alcantara is a political scientist who contributed a 
pragmatic and realist perspective to the discussion of Indigenous land claims processes and 
Indigenous-government relations. He made several contributions to the scholarship on land 
claims negotiations (2013; 2009; 2007b; 2007a) and most recently to the scholarship on land 
claims implementation (2017). Alcantara demonstrated that each of the negotiating parties has a 
different stake in signing a modern treaty. The federal government sees the agreements as a way 
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of benefitting all Canadians, by increasing Indigenous capacity for governance and encouraging 
economic development (Alcantara 2013, 21; 2009, 332; see also: Papillon 2008; Slowey 2008). 
Murray Angus (1992) explained, “the government continues to hold the view that the claims are 
“once and for all” transactions, with fixed and preferably limited costs” (76). The provincial and 
territorial governments, on the other hand, tended to be more resistant to completing modern 
treaties because the agreements have a larger impact on their governments (Alcantara 2013, 19). 
Alcantara explained that the provincial and territorial governments also sought to obtain certainty 
and finality through these agreements and to “ensure that the treaties did not hinder its future 
ability to manage its lands and resources” (2013, 28). Indigenous interests are more overarching. 
Both governments see the benefits of modern treaties as providing control over their traditional 
lands and territories, providing means for economic development and a source of revenue. The 
agreements also facilitated the ability for Indigenous peoples to assert their self-determination 
and jurisdiction over areas such as education, environmental protection, heritage, and hunting, to 
name a few (Alcantara 2013, 24; 2007a).  
In their book, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without Giving In, Fisher, Ury, and 
Patton (2011) provided a method for negotiating mutually beneficial agreements. Based on the 
work of the Harvard Negotiation Project, this interest-based method provides a step-by-step 
negotiation process that can be universally applied. Fisher, Ury, and Patton explained that the 
“basic problem in negotiation lies not in conflicting positions, but in the conflict between each 
side’s needs, desires, concerns and fears” (Fisher, Ury, and Patton 2011, 42). Each of the 
negotiating parties enters into the negotiations with a similar position of wanting to complete a 
modern treaty; however, their desired outcomes and motivations for negotiating in the first 
instance, are often in conflict, which can hinder the negotiation and implementation process.  
After the failed Yukon agreement in principle in 1984, the negotiating parties decided to 
adopt this interest-based approach to negotiation as opposed to the adversarial approach that was 
being used. This co-operative approach changed the motivating factor for each negotiator away 
from “how far can I push for what I want?” to “how can we solve the problem together?” 
(Council for Yukon First Nations, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, and 
Yukon Territorial Government 1999). Many of the negotiators on the Yukon claim from all three 
levels of government have cited this approach as a contributing factor to successful negotiations 
and the signing of the Yukon land claims agreements. 
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3.1.3 Bargaining Situations 
Land claims negotiations have often been compared to bargaining situations (Scholtz 
2006; Coyle 2011; Alcantara 2013; 2007a). Alcantara (2013) explained that at the root of the 
negotiations are “bargaining situations in which Aboriginal and government participants 
negotiate to achieve their preferences” (139). Economist Abhinay Muthoo (2000) defined 
bargaining situations as “a situation in which two or more players have a common interest to co-
operate, but have conflicting interests over exactly how to co-operate” (146). Different players 
will have different sources of bargaining power and different incentives for bargaining. Scholtz 
(2006) explained there are two possible outcomes of these bargaining situations:  
At best, land claim negotiations are bargaining sites where the state and an 
indigenous group enter into a good faith effort to address past wrongs and build an 
enduring basis for a beneficial future. At worst, they make a mockery of good 
relationship building, where one party is forced by a lack of bargaining strength to 
accept a bad deal that will taint future prospects for good relations (14). 
 
Scholtz contended, governments that choose to implement a negotiation policy are making a 
conscious decision to “sit at the bargaining table with indigenous groups”, rather than rely on 
alternative methods of resolution (15). This decision signifies an important shift in relations 
between Indigenous groups and public governments. As discussed above, this decision gives 
“indigenous communities’ equal standing as Parties to an agreement” (14). What Scholtz did not 
discuss, however, is the relative bargaining power of each of the negotiating parties, and whether 
one side has the ability to influence the outcomes of the negotiation process. 
 Michael Coyle (2011) examined the effects of asymmetric power imbalances within the 
land claims negotiation process in New Zealand and Canada. Coyle explained that in determining 
whether or not to participate in negotiation, each party will gauge what alternatives are available 
to them. Indigenous groups stand to lose the most by not engaging in negotiations. For this 
reason, the federal governments in each of these countries will usually hold a stronger bargaining 
position. Coyle claimed, “where such power advantage exists, it will translate into a greater 
capacity on the part of the Crown to influence negotiation outcomes” (608).  
 Alcantara (2013; 2007a) examined the relationship between preferences, incentives, and 
relative bargaining power. He contended that although each of the negotiating sides has 
incentives to negotiate a deal, the public governments hold greater bargaining power than the 
Indigenous groups. He asserted, public governments “are subject to much stronger incentives to 
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delay negotiations as much as possible” (Alcantara 2013, 31). For example, if a government can 
benefit from economic development on Indigenous territory without signing a modern treaty, 
there is little incentive to negotiate (29). It is in the best interest of Indigenous groups to devise 
strategies to encourage the government parties to complete the negotiation process (21).  
 Indigenous groups can employ tactics to increase their bargaining power. Muthoo (2000) 
explained, “a player’s bargaining power is greater the more patient she is relative to the other 
negotiator” (149). Although governments try to draw out the negotiation process, the Indigenous 
groups who have been successful in completing agreements have often had to be patient, 
determined and tenacious. Miller (2009) asserted, “modern treaty making since the Calder 
decision reveals that the game goes, not to the swift, but to the persistent” (280). Alcantara 
(2007a) pointed out that the existing scholarship on negotiation primarily focused on the role of 
the provincial, territorial, and federal governments. He argued we “need to pay more attention to 
the role of aboriginal agency in affecting the CLC [comprehensive land claims] negotiation 
outcomes” (204). This will be discussed in more detail in the following section.  
3.1.4 Factors that Lead to Successful Completion of Treaties 
Alcantara (2013; 2007a) provided assessments of why some groups successfully complete 
modern treaties, while others do not. He determined there are four key factors that contribute to 
whether an Indigenous group is likely to complete an agreement (Alcantara 2013, 121). The first 
factor is whether the Indigenous group has compatible goals with the governments with which 
they are negotiating. Compromises must be made to ensure that the major goal(s) of the 
negotiations are in line, while satisfying the concerns and interests of each negotiating party 
(Alcantara 2007a, 195). For example, Alcantara explained that Indigenous groups “must accept 
some version of the ‘cede, release, and surrender’ provision” (Alcantara 2013, 123). In one of the 
most detailed “insider” accounts of a land claims negotiation, Without Surrender, Without 
Consent: A History of the Nisga’a Land Claims, Daniel Raunet (1996) explained that despite the 
significant improvement in relations between Indigenous groups and public governments in 
Canada, “the wind of reform that was supposed to be blowing through the Indian Affairs 
department had failed to shake loose the old concept of surrender” (231). Alcantara (2013) 
explained that in all four of the cases he examined, the “key determinative factor was the 
willingness of the Aboriginal groups to move towards the Crown’s position on certainty and 
finality” (123). As was discussed in Chapter 1, Indigenous groups fought hard against the 
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complete extinguishment of Indigenous rights within the land claims agreements. However, in 
the UFA and each of Yukon First Nation Final Agreements, there is still the inclusion of the 
Certainty “cede, release and surrender” clause.11  
The second contributing factor is minimal confrontation tactics. Alcantara asserted that 
governments are more willing to work with Indigenous groups that “show commitment to 
negotiations” than those who are confrontational (Alcantara 2007a, 196; see also: 2013). 
Confrontational tactics are perceived as a deterrent, and governments tend to react negatively to 
them. This also relates to the third factor: government perception. Government’s perception of 
Indigenous groups will determine whether they are willing to complete a treaty negotiation. 
Alcantara posited, “the task of Aboriginal leaders and negotiators, therefore, is to alter how 
government officials perceive their groups” (Alcantara 2013, 125). He explained that Indigenous 
groups need to demonstrate a level of acculturation, “financial accountability and capacity for 
negotiation and self-government” (Alcantara 2007a, 198). With their presentation of Together 
Today for Our Children Tomorrow, Yukon First Nations leaders demonstrated to Prime Minister 
Trudeau and Minister Chrétien that they had the capacity and motivation to complete a successful 
negotiation. These initial perceptions contributed to the federal government agreeing to begin 
negotiations on the Yukon claim.  
The final factor that will determine whether an Indigenous group is successful at 
completing a modern treaty is group cohesion. In his findings about the Inuit in Labrador, 
Alcantara explained the “federal and provincial interviewees have identified the Inuit’s clear and 
consistent leadership, strong capacity, and relatively few internal problems as key factors for their 
completed agreements” (Alcantara 2013, 63). In contrast, the Innu in Labrador were burdened by 
internal divisions and divisive leadership and were not able to complete a modern treaty 
(Alcantara 2013; 2007a). 
The four factors that Alcantara attributed to the successful completion of negotiations 
focus primarily on actions and behaviours of the Indigenous groups. These findings provide an 
important piece that has often been overlooked in much of the existing literature. Nevertheless, it 
is imperative that the role played by federal and provincial/territorial governments be understood. 
To date, scholars have taken the behaviour of federal and provincial/territorial governments as a 
 
11 For the full certainty clause, see: Council for Yukon Indians. 1993. “2.5.1 Certainty” in 
Umbrella Final Agreement, p.15-17. 
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given but have underestimated the impacts that political and administrative people, structures, 
and processes have had on negotiations and collaborations. The behaviour of public governments 
is often taken for granted and is seen as a fixed element when, in fact, it is anything but static. It 
is critical to continue to evaluate the existing institutional frameworks that have created the 
unequal bargaining situation between Indigenous groups and public governments, and to 
determine how both groups can contribute to the successful negotiation and the often overlooked 
and ongoing processes of implementation of agreements.  
3.1.5 Unintended Consequences 
In his discussion of government perception of Indigenous groups, Alcantara stated that 
one of the types of perceptions that matter most to governments is acculturation. He stated, “the 
term refers to the level at which a group is familiar with Western institutions, processes, ideas, 
culture and languages” (Alcantara 2007a, 199; see also: Nadasdy 2003). According to Alcantara, 
a group’s level of acculturation will determine whether a government is willing to negotiate 
(2007a, 200). 
Paul Nadasdy (2003) referred to this emphasis on acculturation as the “bureaucratization 
of First Nation’s societies” (2). Nadasdy is an anthropologist who wrote about the land claims 
process and Indigenous-government relations in Yukon (2017; 2012; 2003). He spent years living 
in the community of Burwash Landing, Yukon, where he observed and participated in the 
negotiation of the Kluane First Nation’s land claim agreement. Nadasdy examined the challenges 
First Nations face during the negotiation of modern treaties, and the impact the negotiation 
process has had on their communities. Nadasdy (2003) contended that to participate in land 
claims negotiations, First Nations have had to learn to use bureaucratic language and discourse 
and have had to adopt “Euro-Canadian political institutions” (2). Acknowledging that modern 
treaties have empowered Indigenous peoples in many ways, Nadasdy (2012) argued that this 
empowerment has come at a cost. He stated, 
Northern First Nation people have had to restructure their societies in dramatic 
ways just to gain a seat at the negotiating table. To be heard at all, they have had to 
frame their arguments in a language intelligible to lawyers, politicians, and other 
agents of the Canadian state (500).  
 
Nadasdy (2003) explained that the learning curve of having to develop this new bureaucratic 
discourse and behaviour have contributed to the First Nations’ inferior bargaining position. 
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Further, “it also serves to undermine the very way of life they hope to preserve by participating in 
these processes” (261). Nadasdy argued that the unintended consequences of the negotiation 
process “will significantly alter how they [First Nations] relate to one another and the land, as 
indeed, it already has” (262). As Nadasdy and others recognized, negotiating land claims proved 
to be one major piece of the puzzle. Figuring out how to implement the agreements has been an 
equally difficult and complicated process. 
3.2 Implementing Modern Treaties 
Limited research has been conducted on the implementation of modern treaties. Until 
recently, the scholarly literature has mostly focused on co-management boards and impact benefit 
agreements (see: Caine and Krogman 2010; White 2009; 2008; 2002; Kulchyski and Bernauer 
2014; Natcher et al. 2009), or on legal issues (see: Newman 2011; Jai 2014; 2009).12 The grey 
literature includes reports from the Senate Standing Committee on Aboriginal Peoples (2008) and 
advocacy coalition groups such as the Land Claims Agreements Coalition (2008; 2006; 2004). 
Recognizing the limitations in the scope of the existing literature, this section will briefly assess 
the scholarly literature focused on modern treaty implementation.  
The implementation process is a significant element in settling modern treaties. In their 
article, “After the Deal: Talk, Trust Building, and the Implementation of Negotiated 
Agreements”, Mislin, Compagna and Bottom (2011)  stressed the importance of the 
implementation process. They asserted, “the success of negotiated agreements depends on 
implementation and implications for future exchange between the parties” (55). The successful 
implementation of modern treaties strengthens the relationships that have been built between the 
Indigenous signatories and public governments and allows Indigenous groups to realize the 
objectives that brought them to the negotiations in the first place: increasing capacity for 
governance and ensuring protection of their culture, traditions, languages, lands and resources. 
Martin Papillon (2008) examined the impact of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement 
 
12 In 2014, Dr. Stephanie Irlbacher-Fox and the Land Claims Agreement Coalition were awarded 
a six-year Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Partnership Grant to conduct 
research on modern treaty implementation. “The Modern Treaty Implementation Research 
Project” is conducting research around five key themes: indigenous relationships to the land; 
intergovernmental relations and multilevel governance; treaty financing and fiscal relationships; 
implementation evaluation and socio-economic impacts; and Indigenous and settler legal 
systems.  
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(JBNQA) on the Cree Nation of Eeyou Istchee and the Inuit of Nunavik. He asserted, “treaties 
have re-emerged as an important means for Aboriginal peoples to assert their political agency, 
define their place in Canada and gain some control over their well-being” (6). He explained that 
although there have been many challenges throughout the implementation of the JBNQA, the 
agreement strengthened the political identities of the Crees and Inuit of Northern Quebec and 
increased their economic governance capacity. Jai (2009) contended, “the lengthy negotiation 
process, and subsequent implementation and co-management process, have improved 
relationships and mutual understanding between Aboriginal groups and non-Aboriginal peoples; 
yet the implementation process has not come without challenges” (55). 
The implementation of treaties is at least as difficult a process as the negotiation of the 
treaties in the first instance (Miller 2009, 263; see also: Alcantara 2017; Eyford 2015; Jai 2009; 
Fenge 2008). Douglas Eyford (2015) explained, “the challenges of treaty implementation are 
compounded by the fact that there are unique provisions in each of the 26 modern treaties, 
establishing a range of obligations that must be fulfilled at different times and in different ways” 
(77). Some of the most insightful and critical reviews of treaty implementation that have emerged 
have come from non-academics. This material is examined at length in Chapter 5. The following 
section examines some of the key interpretation difficulties that have limited the full 
implementation of treaties, and have highlighted the role played by the courts.  
3.2.1 Modern Treaty Interpretation and the Role of the Courts 
Implementation strategies, such as the lack of a clear policy or structure, have created 
barriers, resulting in tensions between Indigenous signatories and public governments. In 
anticipation of such conflict, most modern treaties include a chapter that outlines dispute 
resolution processes, including mechanisms for arbitration and mediation (Senate Standing 
Committee on Aboriginal Peoples 2008, 17). Despite the inclusion of these mechanisms, the 
Senate Standing Committee found that there has been an almost universal refusal by the federal 
government to submit to these processes (2008, 17). By refusing to commit to participating in 
internal mechanisms for resolution, Indigenous groups are left without resolve or are forced to 
turn to the courts to intervene in the conflict (Alcantara 2017). Eyford observed that “despite the 
Court’s preference that reconciliation be pursued through good faith negotiation, litigation 
continues to dominate Crown-Aboriginal relations” (2015, 29).  
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Julie Jai (2009) and Dwight Newman (2011) have contributed to the assessment of 
modern treaties by providing a legal perspective, focused on modern treaty interpretation. Both 
scholars provided an assessment of the different principles adopted by the courts for interpreting 
historic versus modern treaties. One of the key differences is that “the emphasis now is on the 
text rather than on any external promises that may have been given orally” (Newman 2011, 478; 
see also: Jai 2009). Dwight Newman is the Canada Research Chair in Indigenous Rights in 
Constitutional and International Law at the University of Saskatchewan. He examined the 
evolution of treaty interpretation principles from the historic to modern treaties (2011). Newman 
began his article by introducing two of the first complex modern treaty cases that ended up in the 
courts. The first case was Quebec (Attorney General) v. Moses, regarding interpretations of the 
James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement. The second case was Beckman v. Little 
Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, which considered “whether an ongoing duty to consult applied to 
the Crown in the context of arguments that the 1997 Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation 
Agreement excluded this requirement” (476). Newman explained that although the judgements of 
these cases differed, in both, the judges were significantly split in their verdicts (477). Despite 
this split, the judges on both sides adopted “a different attitude to and philosophy of Aboriginal 
treaty interpretation,” placing strong emphasis on the interpretation of the texts of the treaties 
(477). This focus on textual interpretation was a marked feature of modern treaty interpretation 
that had not been seen in previous historic interpretations (Newman 2011, 478; see also: Jai 
2009).  
 Another interpretation principle that is no longer relevant to the interpretation of modern 
treaties is the Nowegijick principle “that ambiguities should be resolved in favour of Aboriginal 
parties” (Jai 2009, 49–50; see also: Newman 2011, 480). Jai (2009) stated that not applying the 
principle of Nowegijick, “demonstrates the desire of all parties to ensure that the terms of the 
agreement will be interpreted in a normal contractual way without the court applying a special 
interpretive principle” (50). In her article, Jai discussed the applicability of contractual 
interpretation principles to modern treaties. She suggested that “textual, contextual and 
intentional approaches from contract interpretation can be applied to assist in interpreting modern 
treaties” (59).  
 Newman disagreed with Jai, arguing that modern treaties signed between Indigenous 
groups and the Crown should not be seen simply as contracts between two parties. Instead, he 
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argued, they should be seen as “covenants”, explaining that a “covenantal conceptualization of 
treaties would essentially see them as agreements between political communities expressing the 
terms of the ongoing evolution of relationships between those communities” (Newman 2011, 
486). Newman asserted the importance and unique nature of modern treaties must be seen as 
“distinct from that of a contract” (488). Modern treaties were intended to build and strengthen 
relations between Indigenous groups and public governments in Canada, with the long-term goal 
of reconciliation. In the Standing Senate Committee report on implementation, James Eetoolook, 
Acting President of Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated also described the modern treaties as a 
covenantal relationship:  
[Our Agreement] was the beginning of a new relationship between us and the 
Government of Canada. This was not a cash-for-land transaction…When we 
signed, we saw it as a new covenant that would shape our place in Canada for 
generations to come (2008, 13).  
 
Newman explained that if courts recognized modern treaties as covenants, rather than contracts, 
they might approach their judicial rulings with a focus on the long-term impacts and goals of 
reconciliation, rather than simply focusing on the “case before the court” (2011, 487).  
 In her article, Jai (2009) also outlined the role that courts should perform with regard to 
modern treaties. She argued that due to the unique and complex nature of modern treaties, courts 
should attempt to play a limited role, when possible. She contended courts “should exercise 
restraint in making changes to complex land claims and Self-Government Agreements when it is 
probably not possible for them to fully understand the context of the agreement” (64). Miller 
(2009)  also warned against reliance on the courts to resolve implementation issues. He argued 
that there is a “disturbing trend in legal affairs towards increasing complexity, delay, and expense 
for those who resorted to the courts to deal with their concerns” (281). Eyford (2015) also 
discouraged the use of litigation, arguing that it is inefficient. He contended, “judicial 
proceedings are time-consuming and expensive and do not always provide certainty of result” 
(29). Jai added that the uncertainty of court rulings could have more far-reaching impacts by 
discouraging governments and Indigenous groups from negotiating agreements in the future 





3.3 Drawing on Theoretical and Conceptual Frameworks 
The field of research focused on modern treaty implementation is relatively new, and 
there is limited relevant theory or theoretical debate that exists within the scholarly literature. 
However, theoretical and conceptual frameworks from the public policy and intergovernmental 
relations literature can help us to understand the competing intentions, motivations and 
interpretations that occur during the negotiation and implementation of modern treaties. Further, 
these theoretical constructs can help us to understand both the successes, and the barriers and 
challenges to modern treaty implementation and intergovernmental relations that have been 
discussed above and that will be examined in the upcoming chapters.  
3.3.1 Policy Implementation Research 
From the 1970s through to the early 1990s, extensive research was conducted on policy 
implementation, and many competing theoretical and conceptual frameworks for understanding 
implementation were developed. This body of scholarly work is often discussed as having three 
generations. The first generation of implementation research was mostly focused on examining 
implementation as “one phase of the larger policy cycle” (Lindquist and Wanna 2015) and 
usually concentrated singularly on senior politicians and officials. These studies focused on 
analyzing single cases and centred around the factors that contributed to policy failures (Barrett 
2004). For example, Pressman and Wildavsky’s (1973) seminal work, How Great Expectations 
in Washington are Dashed in Oakland, or Why it’s Amazing that Federal Programs Work at 
All, is often recognized as being one of the earliest implementation studies in this first wave. In 
their book, the authors examined the problems with policy implementation by investigating the 
case of the Economic Development Administration’s Oakland Project.  
The second generation of implementation research was “more analytical and comparative 
in perspective” (Sabatier 1986, 21) and scholars were divided into two main schools of thought: 
top-down and bottom-up approaches. The top-down theorists continued the work of the first 
generation by examining how policy decisions at the top were achieved and put into action 
(Sabatier 1986, 22). These scholars sought to understand why the outcomes of a policy were so 
different from what was intended during the policy design (Lindquist and Wanna 2015, 212). 
The main focus was on central authorities and “to better coordinate implementation activities 
within and across governments” (212). Van Meter and Van Horn are amongst the leading 
scholars within this school and developed one of the first theoretical frameworks for analyzing 
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policy implementation (see: Van Meter and Van Horn 1975). The intent of their framework was 
to explain why there were inconsistencies between policy goals and the real outcomes once a 
policy was implemented (Menzel 1987, 5). They were concerned that these inconsistencies 
resulted in “differences between policy promise and performance”, which could ultimately lead 
to policy failure (Menzel 1987, 5). Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) argued, “the ability to 
implement policies may be hindered by such factors as overworked and poorly trained staffs, 
insufficient information and financial resources, or impossible time constraints” (480).  
Much of the emphasis of the top-down approach centred around rational models under the 
assumption “that the process of implementation will flow on in a fairly linear fashion” 
(Schofield 2001, 251). This group of scholars also saw implementation as separate and distinct 
from policy development. Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980)  are central to this approach and 
argued that policy developers and authorities have the ability to constrain and shape the 
behaviours of street-level bureaucrats to ensure the intended goals of the policy are met 
(Sabatier 1986). 
Scholars who advocated for the bottom-up approach, also sought to explain why policy 
outcomes deviated from policy intentions; however, the focus here was studying behaviours of 
the people on the ground: the “street-level” bureaucrats and organizations, as opposed to the 
central government. Schofield (2001) argued the bottom-up approach “seeks to describe 
networks of implementation and in so doing has made an important methodological contribution 
to implementation analysis” (251). Benny Hjern is a leading scholar in this field and along with 
his colleagues, David Porter and Ken Hanf, developed a detailed methodological approach to 
studying policy implementation (see: Hjern, Hanf, and Porter 1978). Sabatier (1986) wrote a 
critical analysis of the top-down and bottom-up approaches. He explained that Hjern et al.’s 
work “starts by identifying the network of actors involved in service delivery in one or more 
local areas and asks them about their goals, strategies, activities, and contacts” (Sabatier 1986, 
32). They then use these contacts to identify the actors involved at different levels and in 
different stages of implementation. This approach “provides a mechanism for moving from 
street-level bureaucrats (the ‘bottom’) up to the “top” policy-makers in both the public and 
private sectors” (Sabatier 1986, 32). Hjern et al. concluded that implementation success was a 
result of the work of implementers at the bottom, as opposed to those in the central government 
(Sabatier 1986, 32).  
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The third generation of implementation researchers focused their work on integrative 
frameworks that combined the top-down and bottom-up approaches. These scholars argued that 
policy design and implementation should be analyzed through a wider context by understanding 
“its broader political history and environment, its complexity, and the organizational and 
broader environment” (Lindquist and Wanna 2015, 216). Elmore (1985) was one of the first 
scholars to combine the two approaches. He developed an approach that combined some of his 
earlier bottom-up work called, “backward mapping”, with a top-down approach called, “forward 
mapping” (Matland 1995, 151). The main idea here is that policy makers consider the different 
policy instruments available to them and lay out clear “criteria by which to judge policy at each 
stage” (forward mapping) (Matland 1995, 148). In addition, it is critical to examine the 
behaviours at the ground-level where implementation is taking place (backward mapping).  
Sabatier (1986) also moved away from his earlier focus on top-down approaches towards 
an integrative framework in the mid-1980s. He developed a conceptual framework to conduct 
analysis of policy change over a longer period of time (Sabatier 1986, 38). Sabatier argued that 
this shift to examining policy over ten or more years allowed scholars to examine policy change 
and policy learning, as opposed to just implementation (Sabatier 1986; Matland 1995).  
With the rise of New Public Management (NPM) in the 1990s, public policy research 
shifted away from a focus on implementation (Barrett 2004; Schofield 2001). Barrett (2004) 
explained, “there was a belief that the ‘reforms’ in the public service associated with the New 
Public Management had addressed the key problems of ‘implementation failure’ which included 
a lack of clear unambiguous policy objectives, resource availability and control over 
implementing agencies” (258). Much of the research focused on policy design and evaluation 
and “less attention to how policy is put into effect” (Schofield 2001, 245).  
Since the 1990s, the development of new policy implementation research and theories has 
been seen to be minimal and predominantly focused on incremental changes to existing theories 
and frameworks (see: O’Toole 2000; Barrett 2004). On the other hand, some scholars contend 
that implementation research is occurring “at the margin of the traditional field of study” and in 
subfields such as institutional analysis and governance (O’Toole 2000). 
3.3.2 A Framework for Understanding Modern Treaty Implementation 
Most recently, Alcantara (2017) contributed to the field of implementation research by 
developing “an analytical framework for studying the politics of intergovernmental relations in 
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the implementation of modern treaties in Canada” (329). This is one of the first studies to 
combine modern treaty research with implementation theory. Alcantara proposed that the 
dynamics at the core of modern treaty implementation can be understood by examining two 
characteristics: 1) actor congruence/incongruence, which “refers to the extent to which the 
federal, provincial/territorial, and Indigenous government signatories agree or disagree on the 
goals and means of a particular treaty provision” (332); and 2) the coherence/incoherence of 
treaty provisions, which “refers to the extent to which the relevant treaty provision is clear or 
ambiguous in terms of its goals and means” (332). These characteristics “interact with each 
other to produce four different types or styles of treaty implementation: 1) administrative 
implementation; 2) experimental implementation and policy learning; 3) compromised 
implementation, and; 4) no action or zero-sum implementation” (333). Alcantara explained that 
these different styles can be analyzed to determine the amount of conflict that could occur 
between the different Parties to the agreement, what the possible outcome could be, and what 
factors would contribute to successful implementation (333). 
 Alcantara (2017) tested this framework and typology by applying it to an analysis of 
modern treaty implementation in Nunatsiavut and the Inuvialuit Settlement Region. Although 
this framework has not been empirically tested and applied beyond Alcantara’s article, it makes 
an important contribution to the field of policy implementation and the dynamics of 
intergovernmental modern treaty relations.  
3.4 Conclusion  
The existing literature on Indigenous governance and policy does not focus substantially 
on what is happening on the ground in Indigenous communities, within Indigenous governments, 
and between Indigenous peoples and regional/national governments. Public administration and 
policy differ considerably within these communities and ever more substantially between 
Indigenous and public governments. Most scholarship in the field, as is standard in political 
science and public administration, focuses on the search for identifiable patterns and discernable 
structures. Much less attention is paid to the role of key individuals, the nuances of regional 
politics, and the intricate relationships between treaty makers and implementation teams. That so 
many of the negotiators, on all sides, became lifelong friends reveals much about the treaty-
making process; that there is considerable social distance between federal, territorial and First 
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Nation implementation team members says a great deal about the inherent tensions and lingering 
problems with ensuring that the treaties become operational. Further, within the theoretical and 
methodological schools of thought in political science and public administration, there are 
culturally bound elements that reflect the values and systems of the nation as a whole, but do not 
necessarily reflect Indigenous values and ways of knowing and doing. Western scholarship, 
therefore, has key elements, like the negotiation and implementation processes, that reveal how 
participants and observers can often work at cross-purposes. 
The assumption in the literature is that governments involved in implementation do so 
from a homogenous starting point and/or on the basis of common cultural assumptions. This is a 
flaw. In all negotiating environments, context and the characteristics of the partners matters. In 
the case of Indigenous affairs, there is little understanding of the historical and cultural context 
that is critical to understanding modern treaty implementation. 
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4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN 
A significant gap in understanding the complexity and importance of modern treaty 
implementation in Canada currently exists; both from public policy and intergovernmental 
relations perspectives. The purpose of this study was to answer two main questions:  
1. How have the partners in the negotiation of a modern treaty managed the transition from 
negotiation to implementation?  
2. What does this transition reveal about the modern treaty process in Canada?  
Drawing on the land claims experiences of three Yukon First Nations, this study set out to answer 
these questions by examining the experience of negotiation and implementation of modern treaties 
in Yukon between 1986 and 2016.  
Though this research was not explicitly developed using an Indigenous research paradigm, 
some key principles and common themes that emerged from Indigenous research literatures were 
influential in shaping how I approached and developed the framework. In particular, I was guided 
by the research protocols and ethical standards that are rooted within Indigenous research (Kovach 
2009; Tuhiwai Smith 1999; Wilson 2008). Margaret Kovach is a leading First Nation scholar on 
Indigenous research methods and methodologies. She contended,  
With respect to research conducted in an Indigenous community, there are specific 
ethical guidelines that include, but are not limited to, a mutually respectful research 
relationship; that the research benefit the community; that appropriate permission 
and informed consent is sought; that the research is non-exploitive and non-
extractive; and that there is respect for community ethics and protocol (Kovach 
2010, 46). 
 
Indigenous and northern communities have experienced a long and ongoing history of extractive 
research practices that consistently allowed researchers to reap the benefits of the research to the 
exclusion of the communities. Tosh Southwick is a Kluane First Nation citizen and Yukon First 
Nations leader and wrote about her own experience of research in Yukon: “I grew up in the North, 
a place that has for a long time, seen southern institutions and researchers arrive in our 
communities, conduct research and then leave, never to be seen again” (Southwick and Silas 2018, 
35). In conducting this study, I wanted to ensure that I took a different approach by keeping the 
individuals and communities I was working with at the centre of the research and committing to 
sharing the results of my work. This meant ensuring that I identified a research topic that would be 
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beneficial to Yukon; that I took the time to develop relationships and to build trust with the 
communities and individuals that I would be working with; and ensuring that I was constantly 
reflective and reflexive throughout the research process. Charmaz (2017) contends that as 
researchers, we need to look inwards more and to develop a reflexivity that forces us to examine 
our own privilege and positions of power. She argues, “Methodological self-consciousness requires 
scrutinizing our positions, privileges, and priorities and assessing how they affect our steps during 
the research process and our relationships with research participants” (35). Being reflexive required 
me to be cognizant of how my own values, position, and ways of knowing had potential to create 
biases and to inadvertently impact the research that was being conducted. It also required me to be 
aware of my own assumptions throughout the research process. The next section begins by locating 
myself within this research and identifying my own positionality. This is followed by an overview 
of the aim and scope of the research, and finally a thorough discussion of the research approach 
and methods.  
4.1 Self-location and Positionality   
One of the first things that I learned about conducting community research is the importance 
of positioning and locating yourself within the research and being able to identify the privilege that 
can come with this positionality (Snelgrove, Dhamoon, and Corntassel 2014). Absolon and Willett 
(2020) contend, “location of self in writing and research is integral to issues of accountability and 
the location from which we study, write and participate in knowledge creation” (5). I am a daughter, 
sister, wife, mother and teacher, and of importance to this study, I am also a student and researcher. 
I was born and raised in Amiskwacîwâskahikan (Edmonton), Alberta on Treaty 6 territory and the 
homeland of the Métis, and settlement to many other Indigenous peoples who have come to this 
land, continue to and will in the future. On my mother’s side, I am sixth generation Canadian and 
my ancestors came from Ireland, Scotland and England. My late father was first generation 
Canadian and was adopted to a Polish family. We have traced his birth family to eastern European 
roots but beyond that I do not know where my paternal ancestors came from. Since 2010, I have 
been living on the traditional territory of the Kwanlin Dün First Nation and the Ta’an Kwäch’än 
Council in Whitehorse, Yukon, with a three-year period where I travelled between Treaty 6 
Territory (Saskatoon) and Whitehorse when I was going to school.  
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When I began my PhD in 2014, I knew that I wanted to focus my research on the North, 
and in particular in Yukon, the place that I had called home for several years. I wanted to be able 
to build on existing networks and to foster new relationships that I could continue working with 
into the future. For this dissertation research, I was a visitor to the traditional territories of 
Champagne and Aishihik First Nations, Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in, and Vuntut Gwitchin Government in 
Yukon.13 I recognized that as a student, researcher and visitor, I was an outsider to these 
communities, which created both advantages and disadvantages. I had to ensure that I took the time 
to demonstrate my intentions, to prove that I could be trusted, to learn how I could develop 
reciprocity through my research, and to maintain continuous accountability and communication 
with those who chose to participate in this study. This was not always an easy exercise, and I often 
felt myself forced into uncomfortable situations that required me to reflect on my own positions of 
power and privilege. I am grateful for the mentorship I received from Tosh Southwick early on in 
my graduate studies. She taught me how to approach building respectful relationships with First 
Nations communities in Yukon and how to work with communities in meaningful ways. She taught 
me the utmost importance of learning to actively listen, and to acknowledge that sometimes, a visit 
with a participant might only involve sitting and having a cup of tea. That first cup of tea, however, 
would be integral to developing mutual respect, to demonstrating that I was well intentioned with 
my approach to this research, and what my intentions were.  
When I travelled to Old Crow for the first time in June 2016, I had set up an interview with 
a highly regarded knowledge holder, Stanley Njootli Sr. Stanley, who self-identifies as an “old 
guy”, is a former Vuntut Gwitchin Deputy Chief and was involved from the early days of land 
claims as a Councillor and community negotiator (IT2, Njootli Sr. 2020). I was incredibly nervous 
and at first, he was quite skeptical of meeting with me. The first time we met, we sat on the bank 
of the Porcupine River and ate bananas while he asked me a series of questions that made me feel 
like I was under interrogation. It was not until I returned to my room that evening, that I realized 
that he was rightfully trying to figure out who I was, what I was doing, and why he should share 
his knowledge and experiences with me. He would later explain that he was tired of meeting with 
so many researchers (IT2, Njootli Sr. 2020). I was relieved when he contacted me the next day and 
agreed to a second meeting. The second time we met, we sat and had tea, but I was still not allowed 
 
13 For an indication of where these First Nations are located, see Figure 1.1: Map of Yukon First 
Nations Traditional Territories on p.3.  
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to ask any specific questions related to my research. A day before I was scheduled to fly out of Old 
Crow, he agreed to a third meeting, at which point we sat for nearly two hours and engaged in an 
insightful conversation that led to rich contributions to this study. A week later, when I was 
spending time in Dawson City conducting research, I ran into Stanley, and we ended up spending 
an afternoon together walking, having a meal, and sharing stories. This experience taught me so 
much about the value of respecting the time it takes to establish mutual trust and to build 
relationships and how critical this is to sustaining long-term research relationships and 
partnerships; a lesson I will carry with me throughout my life and career.  
4.2 Aim and scope of the study 
During the initial development stage of this research topic, I knew that I wanted to study 
intergovernmental relations and the experience of modern treaty making in Yukon. I also wanted 
to ensure that I identified research needs and gaps that would be beneficial to Yukon First Nations 
and policy and decision makers across all levels of government. Of the twenty-six land claims 
agreements that have been completed in Canada, eleven are signed with Yukon First Nations. From 
the presentation to Prime Minister Trudeau of Together Today for Our Children Tomorrow in 1973 
to the signing of the first four Yukon First Nations Final and Self-Government Agreements in 
1993—these being the first Self-Government Agreements to be signed in Canada—Yukon First 
Nations have been leaders in modern treaty making. Yukon First Nations’ experiences with modern 
treaties produced a broad spectrum of successes and challenges during the transition from 
negotiation to implementation.  
In Fall 2015, I reached out to all eleven Yukon First Nations who have signed Final and 
Self-Government Agreements, to begin to identify areas of research that would support policy and 
governance work being done in the territory, and to gage interest in being part of this research. In 
October 2015, I travelled from Saskatoon to Whitehorse, Yukon to meet with senior administrators 
and implementation staff from five Yukon First Nations governments, as well as individuals who 
had been involved in the original negotiation of modern treaties from the federal and territorial 
governments. These engagements were critical for narrowing down the focus of this research to 
examining modern treaty implementation issues and identifying those interested in participating in 
the project. In December 2015, I also travelled to Ottawa to attend the Land Claims Agreements 
Coalition conference, “Making Treaties Work for Future Generations: Implementation Research 
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Planning Conference”. This conference reaffirmed for me the need for modern treaty 
implementation research. I was also able to meet with Indigenous community members and 
scholars working in this field. Through these preliminary discussions in Yukon and Ottawa, it was 
acknowledged that despite the many successes of modern treaty implementation, significant 
barriers and challenges have led to a perception that modern treaty implementation failed. All levels 
of government questioned why this was occurring. From here, I was able to determine the focus of 
this research and the main research questions I was seeking to answer. 
With the research focus identified, the next step was to narrow down the scale and scope of 
the research. I determined that the scope of the project would examine the experience of 
implementing the Umbrella Final Agreement (UFA) and two to three individual Yukon First 
Nations’ Final Agreements. In early 2016, further preliminary work was done to confirm the 
specific First Nations who would be involved in the project, which included an additional trip back 
to Yukon to gain permission and consent from the three Yukon First Nations governments who 
had expressed interest in being involved: Champagne and Aishihik First Nations, Tr’ondëk 
Hwëch’in, and Vuntut Gwitchin Government. This work included completing a traditional 
knowledge research application for Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in and traveling to Dawson City to present to 
the Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in Elder’s Council; completing a research ethics application for Vuntut 
Gwitchin Government and acquiring written consent from its Chief and Council; and traveling to 
Haines Junction to present to Champagne and Aishihik First Nations’ Chief and Council to obtain 
permission and consent to conduct this research. Once consent was granted from all three of these 
First Nations governments, I set out to obtain a Yukon Scientists and Explorers’ License, and to 
complete the University of Saskatchewan behavioural research ethics approval process; the final 
steps required to begin the research. 
4.3 Research Approach 
To gain an understanding of some of the key successes, barriers and challenges to 
intergovernmental treaty relations and land claims implementation, this qualitative research study 
was designed to draw on firsthand experiences of modern treaty negotiation and implementation 
in Yukon. This study explored the process and experience of implementing three different modern 
treaties in Yukon over a thirty-year period (1986-2016). This particular time period allowed me to 
examine the evolution of modern treaty implementation from the early experience of mandating 
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implementation to implementation planning and negotiations, and finally to the direct experience 
of implementing the agreements and putting them into action.  
After lengthy conversations during the preliminary fieldwork, I recognized that I could not 
conduct a comparative examination of experiences with treaty implementation in Yukon, nor could 
I assume that there had been a single common experience. Each Yukon First Nation had unique 
experiences with the negotiation and implementation of its Final and Self-Government 
Agreements. This is due to its individual experiences with negotiations, the cultural and linguistic 
diversity of each of these groups, as well as its geographical location, structural capacity, and 
economic circumstances. The period in which an agreement was negotiated also influenced the 
implementation process and outcomes. A useful study of the experience of implementing modern 
treaties, therefore, had to consider more than one experience. However, rather than conduct a direct 
case comparison, I chose to conduct a thematic comparison (i.e., showing how different First 
Nations and their government partners responded to specific implementation challenges). Through 
my preliminary discussions with key respondents from all three levels of government, I identified 
four themes that were used to frame the initial set of interviews: (1) the pre- and post-effective date 
implementation processes; (2) capacity building for implementation at all three levels of 
government; (3) interpretation difficulties; and (4) impact of divergent motivations and 
expectations of negotiation and signing a modern treaty. In addition, through the data analysis, I 
decided I would look for common themes and shared experiences to draw conclusions that could 
be applied more broadly to modern treaty processes in the future. The following section provides 
a brief introduction to the three Yukon First Nations whose experiences with implementation were 
examined for this research.  
4.3.1 Examining the Experience of Three Yukon First Nations 
Yukon is a vast and diverse landscape located in the northwest corner of Canada, bordering 
British Columbia, Northwest Territories and Alaska. People have resided in Yukon for over 30,000 
years and during that time the environment, landscape and people have changed drastically 
(McClellan 1987, 17). Before 1839, all of the Yukon population was First Nations, with the 
exception of a number of Inuvialuit living along the Arctic coast (McClellan 1987, 40). The 
population shifted significantly in the past 150 years. The 2016 Census population in Yukon was 
35,874 people with 25% identifying as Aboriginal (First Nation, Métis and Inuk) (Statistics Canada 
2016).  
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All Yukon First Nations follow matrilineal patterns, meaning lineage is passed down 
through the mother. In Yukon there are eight First Nations language groups including, Gwich’in, 
Hän, Upper Tanana, Northern Tutchone, Southern Tutchone, Tagish, Kaska and Tłingit (Castillo, 
Schreyer, and Southwick 2020). The first seven of these languages belong to the Athapaskan 
family. All three Yukon First Nations who were part for this research are Athapaskan-speaking 
peoples. Of the 14 Yukon First Nations, 11 have completed Final and Self-Government 
Agreements. These agreements outline the settlement land and traditional territories of Yukon First 
Nations, which can be seen in the map in Figure 4.1 and in Figure 1.1 on page 3.  
 




(Image Source: Castillo et al. 2020, 48. Modified by Lovell 
Johns from Yukon Government Map 2017.)   
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The Shadhäla yè Äshèyi Kwädän (Champagne and Aishihik First Nations) are Southern 
Tutchone-speaking Nations located in Yukon and northwest British Columbia. The government 
website explains, “the Champagne and Aishihik people and government are named after two 
historic settlements: Shadhäla (Champagne), located on the Dezadeash River; and Äshèyi 
(Aishihik), at the headwaters of the Alsek River drainage”(Champagne and Aishihik First Nations 
n.d.). One of the largest Yukon First Nations, Champagne and Aishihik First Nations has over 1200 
citizens (Champagne and Aishihik First Nations 2020, 15). All Champagne and Aishihik First 
Nations peoples “are members of either Ägunda (Wolf) or Käjet (Crow), following the matrilineal 
system where clan14 affiliation is inherited from one’s mother” (Champagne and Aishihik First 
Nations 2007, 8). Historically, Champagne and Aishihik First Nations peoples had close 
relationships with the coastal Tłingit and therefore, many Champagne and Aishihik First Nations 
citizens identify as both Southern Tutchone and Tłingit (Champagne and Aishihik First Nations 
2007, 8). Champagne and Aishihik First Nations also has close ties with its neighbouring First 
Nations, Kluane First Nation and Ta’an Kwäch’än Council.15  
Many Champagne and Aishihik First Nations citizens played important leadership roles 
through the land claims process in Yukon, including the late Chief Elijah Smith who led Yukon 
First Nations Chiefs to Ottawa to present Together Today for Our Children Tomorrow, and Dave 
Joe, former chief negotiator and lawyer for the UFA and many of the Yukon First Nations 
agreements. Speaking to the significance of Dave Joe’s role in the Yukon land claims, Stanley 
Njootli Sr. asserted, "these land claims agreements would not have happened without Dave Joe. 
No Dave Joe, no land claims agreement. That’s a fact” (IT2, Stanley Jr. Sr. 2020). Champagne and 
Aishihik First Nations was one of the first four Yukon First Nations to negotiate and sign its 
agreements in 1993; though its land claims negotiations concerning its British Columbia territory 
are still ongoing. Through its Final Agreement, Champagne and Aishihik First Nations settled 
1230.24 km2 of Category A land and 1165.49 km2 of Category B land (Yukon Bureau of Statistics 
2006a). 
 
14 In the Yukon, what Anthropologists would typically call a moiety has been termed clan by 
some Yukon First Nations.  
15 For a more detailed account of Champagne and Aishihik First Nations history and traditional 
lands, Champagne and Aishihik First Nations’ (2007) Dän Kéyi Kwändür (Stories from our 
country), provides a detailed overview and captures a number of oral stories told by Champagne 
and Aishihik First Nations Elders.  
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The Van Tat Gwich’in (Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation)16 was also one of the first four 
Yukon First Nations to negotiate and sign its Final and Self-Government Agreements in 1993. The 
Van Tat Gwich’in peoples are one of nineteen communities spread throughout northern Alaska, 
Yukon and Northwest Territories that make up the Gwich’in Nation. In 1950, the Van Tat Gwich’in 
peoples moved to Old Crow, situated along the banks of the Porcupine River. Old Crow is the most 
northern community in Yukon and is only accessible by air or boat. Van Tat Gwich’in has 
maintained much of its traditional way of living and the “isolation means residents rely on 
subsistence harvesting for a significant portion of their diet” (Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation 2009, 
1). In particular, they greatly rely on the Porcupine Caribou herd.17 As of August 2020, there were 
585 registered Vuntut Gwitchin members, with 261 members residing in Old Crow (Statistics 
Canada 2020). The negotiators of the Vuntut Gwitchin agreement pride themselves on the fact that 
all of their negotiated settlement land parcels are Category A land, meaning they have access to 
both the surface and subsurface, including mines and minerals (IT1, Linklater June 2016; IT3, Josie 
June 2016). This grants them much greater control over, and protection of their lands. This is the 
only agreement in Yukon that was successful in doing this. All the other Yukon First Nations’ 
settlement lands are divided up between Category A and Category B lands. Through the terms of 
the agreement, Vuntut Gwitchin Government settled 7,744.06 km2 of Category A land (Indian 
Affairs and Northern Development 1993c).  
Of all the Yukon First Nations, Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in has been the most impacted by the 
arrival of newcomers in Yukon, dating back to the 1880s goldrush. The Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in are 
Hän-speaking peoples and their approximate 1,100 citizens descend from a mix of families from 
Gwich’in, Northern Tutchone and other language group speakers (Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in, n.d.). 
Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in Elder Gerald Isaac (February 1999) explains the roots of the Tr’ondëk 
Hwëch’in name:  
The name Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in tells the story of our ancestral occupation of the 
ancient site located at the mouth of the present day Klondike River. Tr’o means 
hammer rock used to drive the salmon weir stakes into the mouth of the river, ndëk 
 
16 Vuntut Gwitchin is the legal spelling from the land claim agreement and uses the older 
Archdeacon Macdonald orthography. The modern Gwich’in orthography uses the spelling Van 
Tat Gwich’in. Vuntut Gwitchin Government is used when referring to the administrative body. 
17 Vuntut Gwitchin Government has made a concerted effort to document their history by 
gathering and translating oral stories told by Vuntut Gwitchin Elders. These oral accounts can be 
found in Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation and Shirleen Smith’s  (2010) Peoples of the Lakes.  
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is the “river” part and Hwëch’in means “the people.” Liberally translated, it means: 
“the people who lived at the mouth of the Klondike” (Dobrowolsky 2014).  
 
The Hän-speaking peoples’ traditional territory is found in Alaska and Yukon. The Tr’ondëk 
Hwëch’in originally lived at the heart of their traditional territory in a village called, Tr’ochëck, 
located at the mouth of the Klondike River in Yukon (Dobrowolsky 2014, xii). With the discovery 
of gold in 1896, and the onslaught of gold seekers arriving in the area, the Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in were 
displaced from Tr’ochëck and forced to relocate to another traditional site called Moosehide, 
located 5 km down the Yukon River. At the height of the Klondike Gold Rush, there were 30,000 
people living in the Dawson area. It was not until the 1950s that the majority of Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in 
citizens began to relocate to Dawson City (Dobrowolsky 2014, xiii). Due to the detrimental impacts 
of the goldrush and residential school, the Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in faced significant loss of language, 
culture and traditions.  
In part due to Hän elders who “preserved their language and culture through oral tradition”, 
the resilience of their people, and the signing of the Final and Self-Government Agreements, 
Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in saw a resurgence of its language and culture in the past two decades.18 
Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in began negotiating its agreement in 1991 and signed the Final and Self-
Government Agreements in 1998. Through the Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in Final Agreement, Forty Mile 
and Tr’ochëck were both designated as heritage sites, and the Tombstones Territorial Park—
another area of significance for Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in —was identified as a Special Management 
Area (Yukon Bureau of Statistics 2006b). Through the terms of the Final Agreement, Tr’ondëk 
Hwëch’in was allotted 1,553.99 km2 of Category A land and 1,036 km2 of Category B land.  
The Umbrella Final Agreement (UFA) is the framework document that Yukon First Nations 
negotiated to be used as the structure for finalizing their individual First Nation Final Agreements. 
Each Yukon First Nation negotiated separate Final and Self-Government Agreements, which were 
also accompanied by a Final Agreement implementation plan, and a Self-Government Agreement 
implementation plan. The Final Agreement includes all the provisions from the UFA in addition to 
specific provisions that are unique to that First Nation. Though the UFA itself is not legally binding, 
each Yukon First Nation Final Agreement is both legally binding and constitutionally protected 
under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.  
 
18 For more on the history of the Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in and the preservation of their language and 
songs, see: Dobrowski, Helene. 2014. Hammerstones: A History of the Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in.  
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The Self-Government Agreements outline the provisions that grant the First Nations self-
governing and law-making powers and authorities. They also allow First Nations to come out from 
under the Indian Act, meaning that with few exceptions, the Indian Act no longer applies. Yukon 
Self-Government Agreements allow the First Nations “to decide who is a citizen of their Yukon 
First Nation, pass their own laws, and to design and provide services and programs for their 
citizens” (Castillo, Schreyer, and Southwick 2020, 110). Unlike the Final Agreements, the Self-
Government Agreements are not constitutionally protected. While this research study is only 
focused on the experience of implementing Final Agreements, both the Final and Self-Government 
Agreements are very closely connected.  
4.4 Research Methods 
I wanted to select methods that would allow for a research process that was iterative, 
adaptive, and responsive. Though I was not intending to put forward a new theory through the 
outcomes of this research, I chose to use a constructivist grounded theory approach as my main 
method for the processes through which data collection and analysis were conducted. 
Constructivist grounded theory (CGT) is derived from grounded theory methodology, which is 
“characterized by an ongoing systematic process of collecting, coding, analysing and theoretically 
categorising data using the information that emerges from the data itself, rather than forcing 
preconceived ideas onto the coding and subsequent analysis” (Lauridsen and Higginbottom 2014, 
2). After the initial round of data collection and coding, additional data is collected and compared 
with the emerging categories. This process continues until saturation is met.  
Grounded theory, which can be used as both a research methodology and method, was 
originated in the seminal work of Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss (2009) that examined the 
treatment of dying patients in hospitals and clinics (Lauridsen and Higginbottom 2014, 1). In the 
1990s, grounded theory schools of thought were further developed by Glaser (the Glaserian 
grounded theory) and by Strauss and Corbin (the Strausssian grounded theory). A second 
generation of grounded theory scholars have developed new schools of thought, such as 
constructivist grounded theory (see: Charmaz 2017; 2006; 2001) and situational analysis (see: 
Clarke, Friese, and Washburn 2018).   
Constructivist grounded theory, which is largely attributed to the work of Kathy Charmaz 
beginning in the mid-1990s, challenged the original tenets of grounded theory that assert that 
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research should be generalizable, that there is only one external reality, and that researchers are 
objective bystanders “with little influence on the data and analytic process” (Lauridsen and 
Higginbottom 2014, 3). Charmaz asserts, “The constructivist version [of grounded theory] fosters 
asking probing questions about the data and scrutinizing the researcher and the research process. 
Unlike other versions of grounded theory, the constructivist version also locates the research 
process and product in historical, social, and situational conditions” (Charmaz 2017, 34). Much 
like the discussion at the start of this chapter, constructivist grounded theory emphasizes the 
importance of ongoing reflexivity throughout the research process and locating how our 
positionality as researchers can impact the research process, in particular how we gather and 
interpret the data (Charmaz 2017; 2006).   
Thematic analysis was used as a tool to support the constructivist grounded theory. 
Chapman, Hadfield and Chapman (2015) drew connections between the use of grounded theory 
and thematic analysis, arguing that grounded theory “provides a structured and systemic process 
of analysis that allows themes to emerge from the data” (201). Within thematic analysis, there are 
two primary ways that themes can be identified from a dataset: “in an inductive or ‘bottom up’ 
way” or in a “deductive or ‘top down’ way” (Braun and Clarke 2006, 83). Paralleling grounded 
theory, the inductive approach allows themes to be identified directly from the data and not from 
preconceived ideas of what the data will reveal. Braun and Clarke (2006) contended, “Inductive 
analysis is therefore a process of coding the data without trying to fit it into a pre-existing coding 
frame, or the researcher’s analytic preconceptions” (83). Through preliminary discussions with 
implementation staff and leadership from Yukon First Nations governments and key stakeholders 
from the federal and territorial government, initial themes were identified that were used to develop 
the primary semi-structured interview guides. As interviews were conducted and data analysis 
commenced, further themes were identified. Findings and themes that emerged from the interview 
data were then used to inform the proceeding set of interviews. The new raw data gathered from 
the interviews was then coded again and compared and contrasted against new and existing themes 
(Chapman, Hadfield, and Chapman 2015, 203).  
Charmaz (2006) contends, “grounded theory methods can complement other approaches to 
qualitative data analysis, rather than stand in opposition to them” (9). To support the constructivist 
grounded theory method and to address the preliminary research themes, qualitative data was 
gathered through a semi-structured interview method and analyzed using a document analysis 
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method. Interviews, whether structured or semi-structured, are one of the most commonly used 
qualitative research methods. Structured interviews abide by a set of predefined questions and do 
not allow the researcher to divert away from these. Semi-structured interviews, on the other hand, 
allow for more flexibility. General topics and themes are determined in advance and are used to 
facilitate and guide the discussion without restricting the researcher and participant from opening 
the dialogue to new ideas. Semi-structured interviews add a reflexive component to research by 
giving participants a chance to provide insight into their own lived experiences (Whiting 2008; 
Rapley 2004).    
To gain first-hand insight into the divergent perspectives and experiences of the different 
Parties to the agreements, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 43 individual 
participants. Several participants conducted additional follow-up interviews. The 25 participants 
representing the Council for Yukon First Nations, Champagne and Aishihik First Nations, 
Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in and Vuntut Gwitchin Government included past and present Yukon First 
Nations Chiefs, administrators, negotiators, economic development and implementation staff, as 
well as Elders and key community stakeholders. The nine participants representing the Government 
of Yukon included former negotiators, senior officials and political leaders, and former and current 
implementation staff. The nine participants representing the Government of Canada included 
former and current negotiators and lawyers, implementation staff, senior officials, and additional 
key stakeholders. Whenever possible, interviews were conducted face-to-face in Whitehorse, Old 
Crow, Dawson City and Haines Junction. Due to some participants residing outside of the territory, 
the timing and availability of some participants, and with travel restrictions due to the Covid-19 
pandemic, several interviews were conducted over the telephone or through video conference. A 
complete list of interviewees, as well as the participant consent form and semi-structured interview 
guides can be found in Appendix (X).  
Due to the limited documentation of the experience of implementing land claims in Canada, 
the interviewees themselves were the subject matter experts. The ability to gather stories and 
narratives that people shared about their own experiences provided an invaluable insight into their 
lived history and experiences. This provided a greater understanding of the direct and indirect 
impacts and effects of land claims implementation.  
When I was first conducting the preliminary research for this study, I was asked by several 
participants to focus my research on the experience of implementing “Chapter 22: Economic 
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Development Measures”. I decided that this would be the narrow scope through which I conducted 
my thematic analysis. However, after the first set of interviews that I conducted, I very quickly 
realized that generally, participants were not interested in speaking to the experiences of 
implementing this chapter. Rather, they wanted to speak to the overarching experience with 
implementation and intergovernmental relations. I was grateful that I had chosen to use a 
constructive grounded theory approach for my data gathering and analysis because this allowed me 
to be responsive to this sudden shift in focus. I had initially developed an interview guide that I had 
framed around the comparative themes of the research, with a particular focus on the experience 
of implementing Chapter 22. After the first set of interviews and coding were completed, I modified 
the questions and prompts to allow me to dig deeper into the themes that were beginning to emerge 
from the initial coding. After three rounds of interviews, I continued this process of data gathering, 
coding and analysis while I began writing. This allowed me to further identify research gaps and 
to conduct a few key additional interviews.  
Document analysis, which entails studying and evaluating printed and electronic texts, was 
an important part of this study. Bowen (2009) explains that “document analysis requires that data 
be examined and interpreted in order to elicit meaning, gain understanding, and develop empirical 
knowledge” (27). Documents can either be primary, secondary, or tertiary. Document analysis is 
often used in combination with other methodologies, such as interviews, to strengthen or validate 
the research findings (Bowen 2009; Yin 1994). Throughout the research process, I collected and 
analyzed archival documents and secondary sources from the Yukon archives, libraries, and from 
personal collections of research participants. These included implementation plans and reviews; 
negotiation and implementation policies, guidelines, and handbooks; annual reports; primary 
documents such as draft agreements, negotiation documents, correspondence, and meeting notes. 
In addition, personal communications, grey literature, and audit reports were examined.  
Similar to the data gathered from the interviews, these documents, reports, and materials 
were coded and analyzed using the initial set of comparative themes as a framework. One of the 
important aspects of grounded theory and constructivist grounded theory, as well as thematic 
analysis is the coding process. Charmaz (2006) explains, “through coding, you define what is 
happening in the data and begin to grapple with what it means” (46). My initial coding and analysis 
of the documents and materials gathered assisted me with framing the questions I wanted to ask to 
interviewees and to identify gaps in my understanding and interpretation of the experiences of 
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implementation. Once I completed the initial coding of the interview data, I was then able to 
identify additional documents and materials that I needed to analyze for comparative themes and 
findings. These materials assisted in providing additional information on the historical, political, 
and social context of this period and important insight into how implementation processes, policies 
and structures have evolved. For example, when analyzing the implementation plans, reviews, 
guidelines, and handbooks the texts of these documents were compared with the firsthand 
experiences of the interviewees. This allowed me to better understand what was occurring in 
practice and how implementation policy, processes, and structures both interconnect and 
disconnect. 
4.5 s 
The size and scale of the Yukon situation in no way eliminated the complexity of modern 
treaty making in Yukon. The Yukon complexities included the number of First Nations taking part 
in negotiations, the changing role of the Yukon government, changing political environments, and 
the complexity of the legal and political processes involved in the negotiation and implementation 
of modern treaties. A multi-layered approach was needed for both the research methodology and 
design of this study to be able to understand the complex nature of this topic.   
This research design was both explanatory, descriptive, and exploratory. It set out to explain 
the cause-and-effect relationships that resulted in barriers and challenges to modern treaty 
implementation. In addition, the study attempted “to present a complete description of a 
phenomenon within its context” (Hancock and Algozzine 2006, 33) by describing in depth the 
evolution of treaty implementation policies, processes and structures across the different levels of 
government within the context of Yukon. This study can inform future land claims implementation 
planning pre- and post-effective date, Indigenous-government relations in modern treaty 




5. PROCESS AND STRUCTURE OF MODERN TREATY IMPLEMENTATION 
Treaty implementation began without rules, manuals or significant precedent and 
continues to evolve as experience is gained and lessons are learned. All major agreements—the 
North American Free Trade Agreement and successors, union-institutional agreements, 
international treaties, and armistices—have implementation, oversight, and renewal procedures. 
Yet the significance of treaty implementation is often overlooked and not seen as important as 
the negotiation of the agreements (IT28, Armour 2019; IT24, Constable 2016; IT18, Crutchlow 
2016; IT7, Gerberding 2016; IT6, First Nation government employee, 2016; IT5, a Tr’ondëk 
Hwëch’in citizen 2016; IT1, Linklater 2016). The success of any agreement unquestionably rests 
on the quality and comprehensiveness of treaty implementation, but surprisingly, this vital aspect 
of the process is often ignored. Even in an area as important as modern governance of Canada-
Indigenous treaties, this stage of policymaking attracted comparatively little attention. Thus, to 
appreciate Yukon’s experience of modern treaty implementation from 1986 to 2016, one must 
first understand what treaty implementation is and what implementation planning entails.  
In the years following the signing of the Umbrella Final Agreement (UFA) and the first 
four Yukon First Nations Final and Self-Government Agreements in 1993, all participants 
realized that negotiation was only stage one of a complex process. When negotiation was done, 
the real work was just beginning. To demonstrate how implementation planning processes, 
structures and policies have evolved over time and have often been overlooked, this chapter 
provides a structural and process overview of modern treaty implementation in Canada. An 
assessment of the effectiveness and implications of these processes and structures was conducted 
by examining what occurred on the ground in Yukon, and broadly speaking, in Ottawa. Although 
this analysis reveals that all participants—from the First Nations, the Government of Canada and 
the Government of Yukon— had faith in tri-partite negotiations to handle any problems that 
emerged, it also indicates that they lacked foresight and understanding of key concepts and 
terms. These gaps in understanding came to light during collaborations in the early years, with 
the parties quickly agreeing on a second-stage process, eventually exceeding the treaty 
negotiations in time, cost and complexity. As implementation planning and negotiation processes 
were taking place parallel to many other complex processes, interviewees found it difficult to 
speak to the implementation planning process itself. A few key interviewees, including Tim 
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Gerberding, former chief negotiator and implementation director for Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in, 
featured predominantly in these discussions.19 
5.1 The Early Days of Modern Treaty Implementation Planning  
In the early days of modern treaty negotiations, very little forethought went into what 
would be required to put land claims agreements into action once they had been signed. 
Implementation planning was not initially part of the negotiation process. For the first three 
modern treaties signed in Canada, the Parties to the agreements were certainly anticipating 
considerable post-signing work, but nothing was laid out in detail by way of an implementation 
plan. Importantly, the parties never agreed to the different roles, responsibilities and obligations 
for implementation once the agreements had been signed, nor were there any timelines attached 
(Government of Canada 1986, sec.11.108). As Barrie Robb, former Director of Claims 
Implementation Planning for the federal government, explained:  
When it came to making these agreements work on the ground, or to 
implementing them, the clarity wasn’t there. It might have been there in the eyes 
of the negotiators or the drafters of the agreements but when those agreements 
were handed off to the others, things were less clear (IT19, Robb 2016).  
 
Once the agreements came into effect, this lack of clarity created many barriers and challenges, 
including several court cases (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 1989; Miller 2009). Tim 
Koepke, former Chief Federal Negotiator for Yukon claims asserted that “the Government of 
Canada learned the hard way by not requiring implementation plans in advance of completion of 
the agreements for the Cree Naskapi, James Bay Northern Quebec and the Inuvialuit. They’re 
still fighting over implementation of the Inuvialuit Final Agreement” (IT16, Koepke 2016). The 
same holds for the James Bay agreement, currently the focus of a multi-billion-dollar court case. 
To a certain degree, Yukon built on a very thin layer of earlier agreements that had been 
signed in Canada. The first two land claims agreements in Canada to be negotiated and signed 
were the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (JBNQA) in 1975 and the Northeastern 
Quebec Agreement (the Cree Neskapi (NEQA)) in 1978. Neither of these agreements included 
formalized processes for negotiating and planning for implementation. Immediately after the 
JBNQA and the NEQA were signed, it became apparent that the roles and responsibilities for the 
 
19 Restrictions on access to government documents made it difficult to include and assess the 
detail of the experiences of the territorial government.   
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parties involved in implementation were not clear. Major problems arose. Reflecting on the 
implementation challenges facing the JBNQA, Billy Diamond (1986), Chief of the Waskaganish, 
Quebec Cree, who played an instrumental role in negotiating the agreement noted, “What the 
Crees and Inuit have learned over the last 11 years is that negotiation of a claim settlement is 
only half the battle and implementation is the other half” (as cited in Miller 2009, 281).  
Right from the beginning of putting the early land claims into action, oversight processes 
in Canada flagged major problems with the treaty implementation process. The Auditor 
General’s report to the House of Commons in 1986 identified the consequences of the federal 
government’s failure to meet its obligations in implementing the JBNQA. The report reads, “The 
lack of specificity, the failure to dedicate resources to the obligations, and the fact that 
obligations were not always assigned to a specific department through an approved 
implementation plan have caused serious problems in implementing parts of the agreement” 
(Government of Canada 1986, sec. 11.108). The Auditor General recommended that all future 
land claims agreements be accompanied by a formal implementation plan (sec. 11.109). That 
same year, the new federal government claims policy added a mandatory element of 
implementation: all land claim agreements negotiated after 1986 had to include separate 
implementation plans (Indian Affairs and Northern Development Canada 1986, 25). After these 
recommendations were put forward, the federal Cabinet also agreed to a process for fulfilling the 
Crown’s obligations under the JBNQA and the NEQA. In 1990, the JBNQA and the NEQA 
Implementation Agreements were signed, clarifying the roles and responsibilities for 
implementation, and outlining processes for monitoring and reporting.   
 Despite the signing of these implementation agreements, 10 years after the the JBNQA, 
lessons still had not been learned about the negotiation and implementation process for modern 
treaties. The third treaty to be signed was the Inuvialuit Final Agreement (IFA) in 1984, and, 
once again, this agreement included no formal implementation planning. In 1986, the Minister of 
INAC signed a separate Implementation Agreement with the Inuvialuit, leading to the creation of 
the Implementation Coordinating Committee. This committee met many times between 1986-
1988 and then ceased to meet until 1999, when it was re-established (Government of Canada 
2007). Although the implementation agreement was signed in 1986, the IFA faced many 
implementation challenges. In 2007, the Auditor General of Canada reviewed the federal 
government’s role in meeting its obligations under the IFA, finding that “INAC had neither 
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formally identified which obligations were Canada’s responsibility nor which federal 
organizations were responsible for their implementation” (Government of Canada 2007, 23). In 
addition, despite committing to an internal implementation plan, INAC had not developed an 
approach to this plan (Government of Canada 2007, 23) nor had it taken any measures to monitor 
any headway in executing the Agreement’s principles (3). Ideally, internal implementation plans, 
as well as mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating progress, would have been part of the 
implementation planning process at the outset; however, because implementation plans were not 
required in the land claims package, these evaluations and processes were not built into the 
treaty-making system.   
For those involved in land claims negotiations across the country in the late 1980s, 
implementation planning was uncharted territory (IT16, Koepke 2016; IT28, Armour 2019). 
Involved from the early days of land claims, former Vuntut Gwitchin Deputy Chief Stanley 
Njootli Sr. put it like this: “we were breaking the ground in Yukon. There is no other agreement 
like we have in our Self-Government Agreement and especially in our Final Agreement” (IT2, 
Njootli 2016). Although the 1986 Comprehensive Land Claims Policy outlined the requirement 
for implementation plans, it provided very little information on what these entailed and what the 
overarching goals and objectives of implementation planning were meant to be. The following 
was the only mention of implementation in the new federal policy: 
Final Agreements must be accompanied by implementation plans. All elements of 
agreements related to land, title, quantum of resources (where applicable) and 
financial arrangements will be final. Provisions related to management and 
decision-making agencies will be subject to review from time to time, as agreed, 
and subject to legislative amendment where the parties agree that specific 
provisions are unworkable, obsolete or no longer desirable. The negotiation 
process will take account of the federal regulatory reform policy and the Citizen’s 
Code of regulatory fairness, and the Final Agreements and implementation plans 
will provide for regulatory impact assessments (Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development Canada 1986, 25).  
 
As Koepke explained, “We had to design a lot as we went because this was the first time 
that this amount of detail was required as part of a settlement” (IT16, Koepke 2016).  
As time passed, the Government of Canada soon realized that it needed to develop a more 
formalized structure for federal implementers to follow. In 1989, INAC developed a set of 
guidelines to support the new requirement for implementation planning. These guidelines were 
developed internally within government, drawing on lessons learned from the experience of 
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implementing the IFA as well as from piloting the development of a sub-agreement on the 
implementation of the Dene/Métis Agreement in Principle (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 
1989, 1). INAC supplemented the documentary evidence from these two experiences with 
information and analysis gathered from 45 interviews with officials from federal and territorial 
government departments and agencies, as well as 18 interviews with senior federal officials 
(Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 1989, 1). The 1989 guidelines and supporting 
documentation reveal no mention of consulting with or drawing on the direct implementation 
experience of Indigenous negotiators or signatories. Once again, the process was dictated by the 
federal government without consulting Indigenous groups or eliciting their input. The power to 
decide what the implementation planning process was going to look like was directly in the 
federal government’s hands. Implementation quickly became yet another bureaucratic process 
that Indigenous groups had to learn, alongside everything else that they had before them. Talking 
about the challenges of learning these processes and structures, Gerberding asserted, “You’ve got 
to be able to operate successfully within that culture, and it takes training and experience” (IT7, 
Gerberding 2016). This steep learning curve for the Indigenous groups at the table placed further 
power in the hands of the federal and territorial governments, who were accustomed to the 
culture and imperatives of the bureaucratic systems. 
As this was a brand-new process for everyone at all levels of government, the 1989 
guidelines were intended to inform the other negotiating parties—territorial/provincial 
governments and Indigenous groups—of the implementation planning process and its overall 
goals and objectives (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 1989, sec. 6.2). Catherine Constable 
began working as the Director of Land Claims and Implementation for the Government of 
Yukon in 1992 and remained in this role until 2009. Speaking to the approach to implementation 
negotiations in the early years, she explained that “following the tabling of the federal financial 
offer in November 1992, the direction for the implementation negotiations was the agreements 
[themselves] and the federal policy” (IT24, Constable 2016). The federal government expected 
that the Indigenous groups and provincial/territorial governments involved in land claims would 
follow these guidelines and policy closely.  
An examination of the multiple roles, levels of decision making, and detailed 
consultations required within the federal government illustrates the complexity and time-
consuming nature of this new implementation planning process. The guidelines began by 
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outlining, in a detailed table, the alignment of implementation planning roles and responsibilities 
across the federal government for three stages of the land claims process: the Agreement in 
Principle (AIP) stage, the Final Agreement stage and the operations stage post-effective date 
(Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 1989, 4). The alignment table (see Appendix C) identified 
four key departments and teams that were integral to the implementation planning process: the 
Claims Negotiating Team; the Program Development and Implementation Directorate; the 
DIAND regional offices; and the Policy and Legislation Directorates. The Program Development 
and Implementation Directorate were instrumental in developing the implementation sub-
agreements and plans and acted as a liaison between the other negotiating parties, DIAND and 
other federal government departments (3). The Directorate also worked closely with the main 
table negotiating team. For claims negotiated in the Territories, the regional offices, located in 
Whitehorse and Yellowknife, advised on the organization and implementation of claims 
provisions, so they could align with other departmental activities (4). The regional offices were 
central to understanding the politics, relationships and Indigenous contexts that were unique to 
Yukon. These were less understood by the federal bureaucrats and politicians working in Ottawa.  
This new implementation planning process, of course, was not taking place within a 
vacuum. Other processes and negotiations were taking place concurrently. When the AIP for the 
Yukon claim was signed in 1989, a new set of negotiations were initiated to develop the UFA 
implementation plan. Once it was determined that individual Final Agreements would be 
negotiated in addition to the UFA, the components required for the implementation package 
became much more complex. The UFA negotiations were immediately followed by the 
negotiation of individual Final Agreements with four Yukon First Nations (Champagne and 
Aishihik First Nations, First Nation of Na-Cho Nyäk Dun, Teslin Tlingit Council and Vuntut 
Gwitchin First Nation). In addition, individual Self-Government Agreements (SGAs) were being 
negotiated for these four First Nations, representing another new process in Canada. Each of 
these separate agreements—the Final Agreements and the Self-Government Agreements—had to 
be accompanied by separate implementation plans. The SGAs also had to be accompanied by 
financial transfer agreements and the first program and service transfer agreements (IT7, 
Gerberding 2016; IT12, Joe 2017; IT28, Armour 2019). Many of these negotiations involved 
different teams, processes and structures and were taking place after 17 years had already been 
spent negotiating the Yukon claim. Describing Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in’s (TH) experience—whose 
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agreement was not signed until 1998, five years after the UFA and the first four Yukon First 
Nations agreements—Gerberding explained:  
It took TH seven years of intensive negotiations to negotiate the Final and Self-
Government Agreements, and that had been preceded by a lot of agreement in 
principles. Way back in 1973, Percy Henry was one of the Chiefs that went to 
Ottawa with Together Today, and so, the people had been at this for literally 25 
years when the TH Final Agreement was finally signed. Going through that 
process, symbolically blood was let… So, you go through all of that, and the First 
Nation was literally exhausted when the negotiators memorandum was eventually 
signed. But then, hold on, you’re not finished yet because there are several more 
important documents that still had to be negotiated (IT7, Gerberding 2016). 
 
The sequence of activities required to develop implementation plans injected new teams 
and new bureaucratic structures into an already complex process for land claims negotiations. 
Karyn Armour was the former Chief Negotiator and Assistant Deputy Minister for Yukon 
Government from 2001 to 2014. She spoke about the rigidity and complexity of this evolving 
process: “Canada was always trying to fit our claim into specific boxes…They had such a rigid 
mandating system within the federal government” (IT28, Armour 2019). This is demonstrated by 





























(Source: modified from Canada 1989, 30) 
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The federal and provincial/territorial implementation planners and negotiators often had 
little prior knowledge and understanding of land claims and Indigenous issues and were entering 
into a process that had already been going on for several years. Involved from the Agreement in 
Principle stage onwards, the implementation teams had two main responsibilities: preparing for 
bilateral and/or trilateral implementation sub-agreements and advising claims negotiators on the 
feasibility and clarity of clauses for implementation that were contained within the Agreement in 
Principle (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 1989, 5). The process evolved over time, as 
participants on all sides learned about each other and the process. Lesley McCullough (2017) 
who was legal counsel for the Government of Yukon on several Final and Self-Government 
Agreements and Director of Policy for the Land Claims Secretariat and Deputy Minister of 
Justice described what implementation looked like in the early days:  
Implementation was definitely being anticipated but it was not a fully integrated 
process at all… We did discuss with line departments as we went along [about] 
the practicality of the provisions that were being presented to us and that we 
wanted to present (IT25, McCullough 2017). 
 
Implementation sub-agreements committed the negotiating parties to develop an implementation 
plan and were used to identify the agreed-upon processes that would be used during 
implementation negotiations (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 1989, 19). Sub-agreements, 
which had to be approved by the negotiating parties, formed part of the Agreement in Principle 
(Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 1989, guideline 4.1.5).  
Developed between the Agreement in Principle stage and the signing of the Final 
Agreement, implementation plans became the guiding template and structure for putting the 
modern treaties into action. During this stage, work continued on advising claims negotiators on 
the feasibility and clarity of clauses for implementation. Dave Joe, former chief negotiator and 
lawyer for the UFA and many of the Yukon First Nations agreements, explained, “We had 
another technical team that worked on the [implementation] plans. So, while we were engaged in 
the Final Agreements and the Self-Government Agreements, we also had a technical team of 
negotiators who were doing the actual plans” (IT12, Joe 2017). When asked how closely the 
main table negotiators worked with the implementation team, he responded, “They worked very 
closely with us…We needed the plans for the First Nations to ratify the Final Agreements and 
because the plans would inform the amount of money that would be paid for the boards and so 
on” (IT12, Joe 2017). Clarity around the costing of the different components of the Final 
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Agreements was of utmost importance in the implementation plans because the financial aspects 
of the plan were the contractually binding pieces that would ultimately result in a transfer of 
funds to the First Nations (IT12, Joe 2017).  
Throughout the process of negotiating the implementation plans, the federal and 
territorial governments conducted internal consultations with government departments that might 
be impacted by implementation of the agreements (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 1989, 
10; IT19, Robb 2016; IT24, Constable 2016; IT28, Armour 2019). Robb explained that all 
affected federal government departments had to be consulted and had to “agree on what was 
recommended in what is called an MC—Memorandum to Cabinet” (IT19, Robb 2016). To be at 
all meaningful, however, consultation with federal departments required civil servants to have 
some understanding of both Yukon context and the complexities of the agreement. It was here 
that federal efforts slowed to a crawl. Although efforts had to be made to consult the 
departments, there was not enough time to clearly educate and explain the Government of 
Canada’s obligations to departments nor to explain how it was going to implement its 
responsibilities. As Wayne Crutchlow, former federal implementation negotiator for the Yukon 
land claims, explained,  
We sought their consensus but in terms of sitting down with them and saying, 
“Well, do you understand this? Do you understand that? Could you please tell us 
what you’re going to do to invoke this provision? How many people will be 
involved? What are your costs? How many years will it take you, etc.?” That 
type of discussion that would require some form of in-depth analysis and a work 
plan budget, that was never done because the departments didn’t have the 
resources in most cases (IT18, Crutchlow 2016).  
 
This was an early, but in no way singular example, of where the carefully constructed flow 
diagrams and formal processes suffered from a severe absence of clear and precise information. 
Yukon First Nations had no capacity to conduct comparable consultations, one of the 
many asymmetries between the federal, territorial and First Nations governments. Internally 
within the First Nations and CYFN, there was limited capacity to consult. When asked what was 
taking place for Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in, Gerberding explained, “We had very limited technical 
capacity or expertise at the time” to consult internally (IT7, Gerberding 2020). As the negotiator 
recalled, the main structure of the band government at the time included the Chief and Council, a 
small division for health and social programs, and a community education liaison (IT7, 
Gerberding 2020). The small land claims department that was set up in the early 1990s included 
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a band resource officer and the land claims coordinator (IT7, Gerberding 2020). This one First 
Nation, with limited support from the Council of Yukon First Nations, was matched against the 
literally hundreds of federal employees and dozens of territorial officials operating in complex 
administrative units.   
As part of the negotiation and development of the implementation plans, each party 
nominated a representative to participate in an implementation planning working group (IPWG), 
which became the main negotiating table for the implementation plans and the pre-effective date 
planning. For the UFA and the first four Yukon First Nations Final Agreements, the First 
Nations decided to negotiate their IPWGs collectively, with one representative negotiating for 
them at the table. However, there was a caucus of First Nations representatives that the 
negotiator consulted with. For the subsequent Final Agreements, each First Nation was 
represented by their own negotiator at the implementation negotiation tables (IT24, Constable 
2016). 
In the UFA and each Yukon First Nation Final Agreement, “Chapter 28: Implementation 
and Training for Settlement Implementation” indicated that the federal and Yukon governments 
were each allowed to nominate one representative to the IPWG; Yukon First Nations were 
allowed to nominate two (Indian Affairs and Northern Development 1993b, 287). For the 
individual Yukon First Nation Final Agreement implementation plans, only one of the First 
Nation representatives could overlap with the UFA IPWG (DIAND 1993b, 287). This posed a 
constraint on the First Nations, as organizational human resource capacity was often limited. In 
each First Nation, the government competed with the school, health unit, business operations, 
federal and territorial governments, and the private sector for motivated and talented people. 
While the land claims unit could offer employees a chance to work at the centre of the nation-
building process, it also offered long hours, an overwhelming amount of work and less 
impressive pay and benefits than its federal and territorial counterparts. Outside of the IPWG, 
additional technical expertise could also be sought throughout the process, although, as already 
mentioned for the First Nations, access and time to seek out technical expertise was limited (IT7, 
Gerberding 2019). In addition to the IPWG, a separate working group, made up of 
representatives from the main negotiation table, was established to deliberate on detailed 
implementation matters and liaise with the IPWGs (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 1989, 
26).  
 75 
Once the UFA and the first four agreements were signed, the Parties to the agreements 
saw value in continuing to maintain a working group that would monitor and assess the 
implementation of the agreements. In 1994, an informal Implementation Working Group (IWG) 
was formed with representatives from CYFN, each Yukon First Nation that had signed an 
agreement, the Government of Yukon and the Government of Canada. Constable explained the 
importance of the IWG this way:  
There definitely needed to be an ongoing joint-party process and implementation 
committee because so much of the success of implementation was going to rest on 
relationships and the relationships needed to transition out of the negotiating 
phase into an implementation phase. If you didn’t have a venue to talk to one 
another, how were you ever going to do that? (IT24, Constable 2016) 
 
Although it has never had a formal mandate and, until 2015, had no terms of reference to guide 
its roles and responsibilities, the IWG had varying degrees of influence and success over the 
years. In some of the more recent modern treaties signed across Canada, the requirement for 
implementation committees is written directly into the agreement, with specific details outlining 
their responsibilities. However, this requirement was not included in the Yukon agreements. For 
many years, the purpose and responsibilities of the IWG were vague, and limited its ability to 
generate much authority. With the new terms of reference in place, many hoped that the IWG 
would have the status to more effectively drive implementation outcomes. 
Appended to each of the Final Agreements, the implementation plan was not considered 
to be an integral part of the agreement and therefore was not constitutionally protected (Indian 
and Northern Affairs Canada 1989, guideline 4.1.7). The plans were meant to be specific, time-
limited and detailed, yet flexible and not too prescriptive, allowing for, as the 1989 INAC 
Guidelines set out, amendments at three-year intervals: “Final implementation plans are not ‘set 
in stone’ but, on the other hand, should be rigid enough to hold various parties accountable” 
(Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 1989, 18). Intended to outline all of the commitments 
identified in a Final Agreement, the implementation plans established the obligations, 
institutional responsibilities, timelines, and the funding required to implement the agreement 
(Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 1989, guidelines 3.1).   
Yukon First Nations Final Agreement implementation plans all began with a few key 
provisions: interpretation of the plan; legal status of the plan; contents of the plan; 
implementation funding; implementation plan monitoring; implementation plan review; and 
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details on how to make amendments to the plan. Each implementation plan included specific 
provisions identified under implementation funding, which were the only elements that were 
contractually binding (DIAND 1993d, sec. 8). The remainder of the implementation plan, 
containing five Annexes (Activity Plans/Sheets; Commissions, Councils and Committees; 
Information Strategy; Economic Planning; and Coordination of Final and Self-Government 
Agreement Implementation) added up to about 400 pages of material, which was not 
contractually binding (DIAND 1993d).  
The bulk of the implementation plan was contained within Annex A: Activity Plans (or 
Activity Sheets), which described the implementation of selected provisions for each Final 
Agreement (DIAND 1993a, 13). Covering extensive detail from the Final Agreements, these 
check-box task sheets identified the following details for each activity: a specific project, the 
responsible party (or parties) for that project, the relevant participant/liaison, obligations being 
addressed, Final Agreement clauses referenced and/or a cross-reference, and finally, inclusion of 
a table breaking down specific activities, responsibilities and respective timelines. A sample 
activity sheet can be found in Appendix D. 
Interviewees from each level of government—Yukon First Nation, Federal and Yukon—
acknowledged the ineffectiveness of this “check-box” approach to implementation (IT17, former 
federal government employee 2016; IT18, Crutchlow 2016; IT7, Gerberding 2016; IT9, First 
Nation government employee 2017; IT24, Constable 2016; IT28, Armour 2019). Crutchlow 
maintained: 
These task sheets often didn’t really say much of substance. They often repeated 
what was in the Final Agreements and broke it down or parsed it out into: the 
First Nation will do this, Canada will do that, Yukon will do this. But they didn’t 
add any detail (IT18, Crutchlow 2016). 
 
As Karyn Armour asserted, the focus was much more on, “check, we’ve done that” rather than 
focusing on “how have we done that?” (IT28, Armour 2019). A Yukon First Nation government 
representative concurred:  
Canada has an implementation plan where they have a box that you, tick, tick, 
tick, ‘okay, that’s done’. In my experience, I thought that implementation was 
more about the spirit and intent of the agreements, and the agreements based on 
Together Today for Our Children Tomorrow… The other governments, they just 
want to check off the boxes, say it has been implemented, and move on to the next 
thing (IT9, First Nation government employee 2017).  
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Despite these concerns about the value of the “checkbox approach” several interviewees 
acknowledged the importance of the activity sheets for conducting implementation reviews. 
These reviews will be discussed later in this chapter.  
Major challenges affected the early implementation planning process, including the time 
constraints and pressures to complete agreements, and securing funding for implementation. 
Implementation planning was driven by a collective determination to complete the plans quickly. 
Many interviewees reflected on the low priority given to implementation planning, with efforts 
focused on completing the main table negotiations (IT18, Crutchlow 2016; IT19, Robb 2016; 
IT24, Constable 2016; IT28, Armour 2019; IT5, a Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in citizen 2016; IT7, 
Gerberding 2016; IT6, First Nation government employee 2016). Crutchlow argued, “There was 
no priority [given to implementation]. The only focus that we had, and I believe the focus of the 
government at the same time, was to develop a plan that the three parties could sign off on in 
order to meet our commitment” (IT18, Crutchlow 2016). He further contended that the 
negotiators of the implementation plans were constrained by what they were allowed to include 
in the plans (IT18, Crutchlow 2016). Robb suggested one reason for limiting the scope of the 
plans was to avoid being too prescriptive:  
We were in the era where Indian Affairs and the Government of Canada didn’t 
really want to be prescriptive Indian agents anymore for communities. Probably as 
much as the communities didn’t want to have somebody telling them from Indian 
Affairs what to do and when to do it (IT19, Robb 2016). 
 
Both the Yukon government and the federal government were negotiating 
implementation plans looking five years ahead (IT8, Crutchlow 2016). As Crutchlow contended, 
the focus of the implementation plans was not on “forecasting or foreseeing some of the issues 
down the road” (IT18, Crutchlow 2016). Many things were left to be dealt with in the future, for 
better or for worse. Crutchlow asserted,  
“I don’t think we fully understood what these agreements would look like ten 
years down the road… What our focus was always: what do we need to do to get 
the agreement? How far do we have to go in order to make sure that we get a 
signed agreement?” (IT18, Crutchlow 2016). 
 
Yukon First Nations, on the other hand, consistent with First Nations approaches to the 
19th century numbered treaties, were looking at implementation through a long-term lens. From 
the First Nations perspective, these agreements were meant to last seven generations, a key 
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consideration for implementation. The time constraints and pressures to sign and ratify the 
agreements, however, hindered the ability to focus on long-term implications and on long-term 
planning for implementation of the agreements (IT5, a Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in citizen 2016; IT18, 
Crutchlow 2016; IT7, Gerberding 2019).  
Because all parties attached great importance to the agreements, it is only natural that 
they felt pressure to complete the implementation planning and negotiations. First Nations were 
eager to put the negotiations behind them and to focus on self-government. Yukon and federal 
representatives, likewise, wanted to build on the foundation of the land claims agreements and to 
launch the new North. Speaking about the main table negotiators who had spent nearly twenty 
years on the Yukon claim and had “pride of penmanship”, Robb maintained that they were 
subject to “all sorts of pressures” and that “everybody wanted it approved as quickly as it could 
be” (IT19, Robb 2016).  
Reflecting on the implementation process and thinking back to the early years of 
negotiation and implementation planning in Yukon, Gerberding suggested, “there was a 
somewhat naïve belief that these commitments would just automatically be delivered…In 
retrospect, that seems very naïve but I think it was genuine… there were solemn promises made 
in these agreements and people simply expected those things to happen” (IT7, Gerberding 2019).  
He went on to explain that in hindsight, “agreements don’t just implement themselves” (IT7, 
Gerberding 2019). He argued, as did many other interviewees, that much more time and attention 
should have been given to implementation planning in those earlier years (IT7, Gerberding 2019; 
IT12, Joe 2017; IT5, a Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in citizen 2016; IT18, Crutchlow 2016; IT19, Robb 
2016; IT24, Constable 2016).  
Funding for implementation and implementation planning was of major concern for 
Yukon First Nations and the Government of Yukon. This was a remarkably complex issue 
connected to the broader issues of funding for land claims negotiations, monies advanced to the 
First Nations, and collective worry about mounting costs of completing a multi-decade 
agreement. Yukoners shared the concern. More than a few community members, most of whom 
knew little about the legal, financial and administrative stakes, complained about the expenses of 
the land claims “industry,” as shown in the large number of consultants and civil servants 
involved in an opaque process that few understood. A former federal government employee 
involved in the negotiations pointed out that there was implementation funding that was 
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specifically identified, in addition to the funding allocated for each Final Agreement. However, 
he added, “No doubt there were great issues about the adequacy of that money” (IT17, former 
federal government employee 2016). In April 1994, in the Yukon legislature, Tony Penikett, 
MLA for Whitehorse West and former Premier, asserted the following:  
I believe that legislation is not enough…It is the funding that gives life to these 
agreements. If we do not push enough resources behind these agreements, if we 
do not live up to our commitments and respect the promises that we make, the 
vehicle may stall. We will not build success, but further frustration and 
disappointment at a cost to all of us (Yukon 1994, 2314).  
 
 Yukon First Nations had very little money and resources for implementation planning 
and negotiations (IT7, Gerberding 2016; IT18, Crutchlow 2016). Discussing Tr’ondëk 
Hwëch’in’s experience, Gerberding stated, “We were very poorly resourced to conduct those 
negotiations. We didn’t have a full-time lawyer at the table. We had money to hire a lawyer for 
certain provisions, but we couldn’t afford to keep a lawyer at the table… It was totally under-
resourced and under-appreciated” (IT7, Gerberding 2016). Constable pointed out that the Yukon 
government’s approach “was to have the implementation plan stick as absolutely closely to the 
letter of the clause as we could, without adding bells and whistles. The fewer bells and whistles, 
the better because the bells and whistles were where the costs were” (IT24, Constable 2016). The 
Yukon government was so concerned with the cost and limited funding available for 
implementation that financial constraints had a significant impact on its approach to the 
negotiation of the implementation plans.  
Another constraint placed on the implementation planning process came in the form of a 
unilateral offer from the federal government in the spring of 1992 as a federal election 
approached. The Conservative government of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney imposed a hard 
date by which all those negotiating claims in both Yukon and Northwest Territories had to reach 
an agreement or the federal government would walk away. As Constable pointed out, the 
Government of Canada “had put an ultimatum on the table: either you take this deal, or we can’t 
promise you there’s going to be another one… So, there were a bunch of things that made it a 
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very sped up process at the very end” (IT24, Constable 2016).20 She went on to explain that for 
the Yukon government, “a lot of previous planning in terms of implementation activities had to 
just get thrown out the window” (IT24, Constable 2016).  
Each Yukon First Nation approached the implementation process differently. Having had 
the benefit of entering the negotiations after the first four Yukon First Nations had signed off on 
their agreements, Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in had a slightly different experience with implementation 
planning. By the time Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in’s agreements had been completed, six Yukon First 
Nations Final and Self-Government Agreements had been signed, in addition to the UFA. When 
asked what it was like working with new teams at the federal and territorial level, Gerberding 
offered these details: 
We ended up hiring Steven Mills to help us on the Tr’ondek Hwech’in side. 
Steven had worked on the Vuntut Gwichin agreement and he was becoming a 
consultant at the time. Al Jones was on the territorial side, Chris LaFleur and a 
few others were on the federal side. It was a lot less confrontational and it was 
pretty collegial, if I can describe it in that way (IT7, Gerberding 2019).  
 
Despite having the experience of negotiating several implementation plans ahead of Tr’ondëk 
Hwëch’in’s agreements, the implementation negotiators were still under very tight timelines to 
complete the Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in Implementation Plan. Once again, there was no time to look 
five to ten years down the road and consider what the longer-term impacts or implications might 
be. Gerberding indicated that, unlike the protracted negotiation of the Final Agreement, the 
implementation negotiations from start to finish were completed within one year (IT7, 
Gerberding 2019). Gerberding also acknowledged that everyone from all sides recognized that 
this was all new and that the process would evolve as it grew. 
The signatories to these agreements derived confidence from knowing that there would 
be opportunities to review and assess how well they were being implemented. As part of the 
implementation plans, the UFA and each Yukon First Nations Final Agreements were scheduled 
to be reviewed in the fifth and ninth years following their effective dates. Other later reviews 
 
20 The same federal tactic was repeated in 2002, when the last six Yukon First Nations 
agreements were being negotiated. An “end of mandate” date was set for Carcross/Tagish, 
Kluane, Kwanlin Dün, Liard, Ross River and White River First Nations. Kluane First Nation 
signed off on their agreement in 2003, followed by Carcross/Tagish and Kwanlin Dün First 
Nations in 2005. Liard First Nation, Ross River Dena Council and White River First Nation did 
not ratify their agreements before the mandate had expired.  
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would be conducted when the parties agreed to them (DIAND 1993d). The reviews were 
conducted by the Implementation Review Group (IRG), which had members delegated from the 
Implementation Working Group.  
Completed in 2000, the first five-year review assessed the UFA Implementation Plan and 
the first four Yukon First Nations Final Agreement implementation plans. This review assessed 
whether numerous obligations had been fulfilled: approximately 170 common obligations 
contained within each of the agreements, hundreds of specific obligations that were unique to 
each agreement, and approximately 80 obligations specific to the UFA (DIAND 2000, 7). The 
review found that in the first five years, substantial progress had been made in implementing 
these complicated and wide-ranging Final Agreements, identified positive changes across Yukon 
as a result of the agreements, and identified several successes (DIAND 2000, 5). Progress 
included establishing several key public boards, councils and committees; advancing renewable 
resource management and heritage program initiatives; and developing intergovernmental 
accords and protocols (DIAND 2000, 3). The review also identified implementation problems, 
including the ongoing challenge of inadequate implementation funding and unclear consultation 
protocols and policies (DIAND 2000). To ensure consistency with the recently negotiated 
Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in Implementation Plan, the reviewers proposed 56 amendments for the first 
four Final Agreement Implementation Plans. As the 2007 Review explained, because the 
Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in Implementation Plan was completed after the first four, they benefited from 
the learning experiences of the other Yukon First Nations (DIAND 2007, 32). At the time of the 
2007 Review, none of the 56 proposed amendments had been acted upon or implemented.  
At the time of the five-year review, all parties agreed to postpone the review of the Self-
Government Agreements to “coincide with the nine-year review of the Final Agreements” 
(DIAND 2000, 11). Little Salmon Carmacks First Nation and Selkirk First Nation, which had 
signed their agreements in 1997, and Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in which had signed in 1998, agreed to 
consolidate their five-year and nine-year reviews to coincide with the nine-year reviews of the 
first four Yukon First Nations (DIAND 2007, 9), allowing for “a single, coordinated review 
process” (DIAND 2007, 9). The 2007 Review, therefore, encompassed the nine-year review of 
the UFA Implementation Plan, as well as the review of the seven Yukon First Nations Final 
Agreement implementation plans, Self-Government Agreements and Self-Government 
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Agreement implementation plans. Concurrently, a review of the Financial Transfer Agreement 
was also being conducted. 
At the time of the 2007 Review, the implementation plans of the Yukon First Nation 
Final Agreements were the only ones in Canada required to determine if the plan’s provisions 
and implementation funding were adequate (DIAND 2007, 13). Although some land claim 
agreements signed in other parts of Canada stipulated that reviews were to be conducted by third 
party independent reviewers, the Yukon reviews were a collaborative undertaking carried out by 
the party representatives (DIAND 2007, 3). 
The 2007 Review process began in May 2003; however, due in large part to the federal 
government’s refusal to include the Self-Government Agreements, the review got off to a poor 
start. The first two years saw little progress made. Elizabeth Hanson, the former Regional 
Director General of INAC Yukon Region and former Director of Claims and Self-Government, 
Yukon Region, contended that there were often challenges from the federal government 
perspective in coordinating and aligning implementation of the Self-Government Agreements 
and the Final Agreements (IT21, Hanson 2020). Gerberding argued, “a review isn’t going to be 
meaningful if it doesn’t include a review of implementation of the Self-Government Agreements. 
The two agreements weave together the structure of implementation in Yukon” (IT7, Gerberding 
2020).  Eventually the federal government agreed to include the Self-Government Agreements 
and their implementation plans as part of the review.  
From the beginning, each of the parties understood and approached the review process 
differently. Allan MacDonald, Director General, Implementation Branch, INAC, indicated, “The 
reviews were not well thought out” (IT22, MacDonald 2020). At each level of government, “no 
one really approached them with the same objective that everybody else did” and this led to 
conflicts and delay (IT22, MacDonald 2020). The 2007 Review explained the differences this 
way: “From the perspective of the YFN and Yukon representatives, Canada’s representatives 
seemed to have little latitude to consider recommendations that would entail change from status 
quo implementation arrangements, particularly in respect of financial matters” (DIAND 2007, 
12). As discussed, when teams were finalizing the UFA and first four Final Agreements, funding 
levels were a serious concern for Yukon First Nations and the Government of Yukon. These 
parties believed that the funding being agreed to by the federal government did not accurately 
reflect the cost of implementing the agreements. Jim Harper has been working as a negotiator 
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and lawyer for CYFN and several Yukon First Nations since 1986. He maintained that when the 
federal government made its “take it or leave it” offer, Yukon First Nations had to choose 
whether to move ahead and acknowledge that the review process could inform the future or 
whether “to hold the line and cause a confrontation” (IT32, Harper 2020). As Harper explained 
it, they chose to move forward (IT22, Harper 2020). Thus, the Yukon government and Yukon 
First Nations accepted the offer with the understanding that the funding would be reviewed once 
they had experience implementing the agreements (DIAND 2007, 10). 
When it came time to beginning the review process, the federal government came at it 
with a different—and conflicting—approach. According to Constable, the federal government 
failed to honour the principles “under which the whole business had been set up in the first 
place”, arguing that the mandates being given to new federal government employees were not in 
line with what Yukon government was expecting (IT24, Constable 2016). In February 2005, at 
an Intergovernmental Forum, Yukon First Nations Chiefs, CYFN Grand Chief, Yukon Premier 
and the Minister of INAC finally agreed to commit to a more meaningful review process that 
included the review of funding adequacy (DIAND 2007, 12).  
Published on October 3, 2007, the review identified several key successes in the first ten 
years, finding that progress had been “extraordinary” (DIAND 2007, 8). On the other hand, the 
reviewers also called this progress “frustratingly slow”, indicating that many of the 
implementation problems had arisen because provisions were not being followed and obligations 
not being fulfilled. Two major concerns were inadequate funding, and federal policies and 
practices inconsistent with the agreements. All Parties to the agreements acknowledged that for 
the agreements to be fully implemented, federal government policies needed to be changed 
across the board (IT15, Strand 2017). It took the federal government nine years to respond to the 
need to review its fiscal policies, which it did by establishing the fiscal policy table in 2016. This 
new collaborative fiscal policy process brought together representatives from self-governing 
Indigenous governments and the federal government to redevelop the federal fiscal policy for 
how self-government is financed. However late in coming, the decision to develop a 
collaborative fiscal policy process is now being cited as a successful example of a renewed 
government-to-government relationship and of the federal government’s commitment to 
implementing the agreements (Nicol et al. 2019). As of January 2019, the Collaborative Federal 
Fiscal Policy for Self-Government was released, and federal negotiators are using the policy to 
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guide their work in negotiating new fiscal agreements and transfers of funds (Nicol et al. 2019, 
34). The policy reads: “Canada recognizes that implementing this new fiscal relationship 
requires systemic change within the federal government and the way it works with Indigenous 
Governments. This renewed fiscal relationship represents an important step in that direction” 
(Government of Canada 2019, para. 17). The details are still being worked out between the 
parties, so the overall results and impact of this new fiscal process remain to be seen.    
 Although it was fraught with tension, the 2007 Review concluded that there were reasons 
to support future reviews to ensure efficiency, effectiveness and accountability (DIAND 2007, 
35). Yukon First Nations representatives indicated that future reviews would reveal if the 
recommendations to address many of the issues identified in the 2007 review had been followed 
and if they were effective (DIAND 2007, 35). To date, no other reviews have been completed in 
Yukon, and there does not seem to be much appetite to begin the process again (IT7, Gerberding 
2020; IT20, Bradasch 2020). Further, there is some debate on the effectiveness of these reviews. 
As Eyford (2015) posited, “The periodic review process provides a forum for the parties to 
discuss the Final Agreement but does not compel them to re-negotiate existing terms or negotiate 
new provisions” (Eyford 2015, 74). Hanson pointed out that because no baseline data was 
established when these agreements were first negotiated, the reviewers have limited ability to 
review the effectiveness and impacts of the reviews (IT21, Hanson 2020). Although the 
reviewers can evaluate obligations attached to specific timelines and objectives in the check-box 
activity sheets, they have more difficulty determining if these agreements have improved the 
lives of residents from these Yukon First Nations communities.  
The implementation of modern treaties in Yukon and across the country has been plagued 
by many barriers and challenges, overshadowing these foundational accords’ many successes. 
Although the requirement for implementation planning in 1986 was well intentioned, there was 
little time to determine what success would look like in terms of process and structure. The 
federal government made an effort to develop guidelines for implementation in 1989, but as 
emphasized in this chapter, these guidelines produced a complex, rigid and formalized structure 





5.2 Calls for Change: Federal Implementation Policy, Structure and Process  
Apart from minor amendments made in 1993, the Federal Comprehensive Land Claims 
Policy (1986) went unchanged for a period of almost thirty years. Within this time, the federal 
government made mostly incremental changes to its approach to treaty implementation, with a 
few punctuations of larger shifts in process and structure. Over the past two decades, groups such 
as the Land Claims Agreements Coalition and the Senate Standing Committee on Aboriginal 
Peoples published several reports and discussion papers that evaluated and assessed the modern 
treaty process, and that called on governments to make changes to its land claims policy and 
approaches to treaty implementation (for example, see Senate Standing Committee on 
Indigenous and Northern Affairs 2018; Eyford 2015; Senate Standing Committee on Aboriginal 
Peoples 2008; Government of Canada 2007; Land Claims Agreements Coalition 2008). To gain 
a better understanding of how the government’s implementation structures and processes have 
evolved, it is useful to evaluate its direct and indirect responses to these calls for change. Table 
5.1 provides an overview of some of these key reports and papers, outlines their main focus and 
findings, and identifies the actions taken by the federal government to alter its approach to 
implementing modern treaties. The final column of the table provides a brief assessment of how 
effective these actions were. 
 
 




Key Focus/Findings Direct Government Actions Effectiveness of the Government Actions 
1986- Report of 
the Auditor 
General 
Recognized the government’s failure to meet its 
obligations in implementing the JBNQA and 
recommended all land claims be accompanied by 
implementation plans. 
1986- Development of the Federal 
Comprehensive Land Claims Policy (1986) which 
mandated the requirement of separate negotiated 
implementation plans 
 
Effective as a first step but needed 
more details.  
1989- Development of federal guidelines for 
implementation 
 
Needed a clearer understanding of 
goals and objectives, and more 
reflective of the realities on the 
ground. 
(n.d.) Development of the Land Claims Obligation 
System (LCOS)- an in-house federal 
implementation management tool for tracking 
progress and status on projects and activities   
 
Early management tool that proved 
to be ineffective in the long term. 
1998- Report of 
the Auditor 
General 
Highly critical of the federal government’s role in 
modern treaty implementation. Identified 
ineffectiveness of the Land Claims Obligation 
System (LCOS) management tool. 
 
No direct related actions taken 
Exemplifies the absence of 
government interest in bringing a 
resolution to Indigenous modern 
treaty implementation issues. 
2003- Report of 
the Auditor 
General 
Examined the implementation of the Gwich’in and 
Nunavut agreements. Key findings:  
- INAC’s role in overseeing federal 
responsibility needs to improve 
- INAC’s focus is on fulfilling the letter of 
the land claim and not the spirit 
- Implementation committees and 
arbitration panels are not effective 
- LCOS needs to be amended to track 
results  
 
2003- Development and release of the 
“Implementation of Comprehensive Land Claim 
and Self-Government Agreements: A Handbook 
for the use of federal officials” 
Marked change from how 
implementation had been broadly 
viewed and defined by the 
Government of Canada. 




paper, A New 
Land Claims 
Proposed development of a new land claims 
implementation policy that must include:  
- Recognition that agreements were signed 
with the Crown, not INAC 
No direct related actions tied to this report.  
 
Effectiveness not monitored by the 
government and was eventually 







- Canada must commit to meeting the 
objectives and obligations of the treaties 
- Implementation should be dealt with by 
senior-level officials across government 
- There must be an independent 
implementation review body that reports to 
Parliament 
2004/2005- Finalized the new Federal 
Implementation Obligation Monitoring System to 






LCAC released a document outlining ‘4 Points’ 
for a renewed relationship with the federal 
government and ’10 Fundamental Principles’ that 
should make up a new federal land claims 
implementation policy.  
 
No direct related actions taken. 
Exemplifies the absence of 
government interest in bringing a 
resolution to Indigenous modern 
treaty implementation issues. 
2007- Report of 
the Auditor 
General 
Examined the implementation of the Inuvialuit 
Final Agreement. Found that INAC had not: 
- followed through on developing an 
implementation plan, which they had agreed 
to do. 
- identified which obligations Canada was 
responsible for  
- developed mechanisms for monitoring 
progress 
 
No direct related actions taken. 
Exemplifies the absence of 
government interest in bringing a 
resolution to Indigenous modern 












A special study on the implementation of modern 
treaties in Canada. Four key recommendations 
made: 
- Canada should develop a modern treaty 
implementation policy based on the “Four-
Ten” 
- Canada should establish an independent 
commission to manage implementation  
- Canada should develop a working group of 
senior officials to review and establish 
guidelines for coordination of federal 
obligations and to establish mechanisms for 
reporting and monitoring on implementation 
- Canada should work with LCAC to appoint 
a chief federal negotiator to negotiate 
implementation funding 
 
2010- Development of the Treaty Obligation 
Management System (TOMS) to capture what 
Canada’s obligations were across all of 
government, who was responsible and the status 
of obligations (launched March 1, 2010) 
A much more sophisticated 
management system that still had 
many limitations, including no 
defined process for ongoing 
updates and management of 
TOMS. This limited the effectives 
of the tool. 
2011- Instituted a Federal Framework for the 
Management of Modern Treaties to improve 
coordination and decision-making between 
departments.  
Demonstrated a new commitment 
to implementation; however, it was 
still more of the same emphasis on 
the bureaucratic machinery of 
government. No direct change in 
the behaviour of government and 







and Intent: A 
Model 
Canadian 







Peoples and the 
Crown 
LCAC developed and endorsed a model modern 
treaty implementation policy. The model policy 
emphasized the importance of recognizing the 
spirit and intent of the agreements and the need 
for cooperation and commitment towards modern 
treaty implementation. 
2011- New set of Implementation Guidelines 
Demonstrated a new commitment 
to implementation and managing 
and coordinating responsibilities. 
However, the government was 
only committing to updating the 
machinery of government and did 
not demonstrate a commitment to 
changing what was happening on 
the ground within the provinces 
and territories and within 
Indigenous communities.  
2013- INAC 
Internal Audit 










Reviewed the role of INAC in coordinating 
federal modern treaty obligations. Found they had 
taken significant steps forward in managing and 
coordinating federal responsibilities. 
Recommendations included:  
- Formally defining roles and responsibilities 
for proactive monitoring of obligations 
- Developing structures for regular updates to 
TOMS 
- Develop orientation materials for the 
different caucuses and committees formed 
under the Implementation Management 
Framework 
2013- Canada agreed to participate in a working 
group with LCAC to examine common principles 
and to explore options for a “whole of government 
approach” to modern treaty implementation 
Demonstrated a shift towards 
committing to government-to-
government relationships, working 
collaboratively with modern treaty 
holders.   
2014- Appointment of Douglas Eyford, 
Ministerial Special Representative on Renewing 
the Comprehensive Land Claims Policy 
This was the first significant step 
towards the government’s 
commitment to renewing the land 
claims policy. 
 
2014- Interim policy released: Renewing the 
Comprehensive Land Claims Policy: Towards a 
Framework for Addressing Section 35 Aboriginal 
Rights 
First time the comprehensive land 
claims policy had been revised 
since 1986. Though, the policy 
development process was 
unilateral and did not demonstrate 
a commitment to co-development 
or working in partnership with 
Indigenous modern treaty holders. 
In addition, the commitment to 
developing a full policy beyond 
the interim policy was shallow and 













First step towards renewing Canada’s land claims 
policy. Found that federal government needs to:  
- Address the institutional barriers to making 
progress on treaty negotiations 
- Create a rights-informed approach to treaty-
making 
- Offer alternative reconciliation arrangements 
for those interested in pursuing something 
other than land claims 
- Improve federal implementation of 
agreements with Indigenous groups 
 
2015- Announcement of new “whole of 
government approach” to treaty implementation  
 
2015/2016- Cabinet Directive on the Federal 
Approach to Modern Treaty Implementation is 
issued, accompanied by a Statement of Federal 
Principles on Modern Treaty Implementation. 
 
This led to the establishment of:  
1. The Deputy Minister’s Oversight Committee  
 
2. Modern Treaty Implementation Office (May 
2016) 
 
The Directive also called for an update to the 
TOMS to include more qualitative data. This led 
to a decision to develop a brand-new system: The 
Modern Treaty Management Environment.  
 
These actions, taken together, 
demonstrated a significant shift 
away from emphasis on the role of 
INAC as the sole department 
responsible for implementing and 
overseeing land claims 
implementation. Acknowledged 
the “whole of government” 
responsibility to implementing the 
objectives of the agreements.  
 
Demonstrated that government 
was committed to implementation 
and repairing relationships. 
However, though there were bold 
promises made, they were weak on 
delivery. These direct actions have 
not necessarily resolved the bigger 
implementation challenges on the 
ground.  
 







Found that progress is being made in 
implementing the Labrador Agreement; however, 
there are still barriers that remain:  
- Conflicting interpretations of the obligations  
- Inadequate use of the government’s system 








Within the timeframe of this research (1986-2016), the Auditor General of Canada 
released five reports that critically assessed the federal government’s approach to modern treaty 
implementation (2015; 2007; 2003; 1998; 1986). The 1998 report represented the first time the 
Auditor General reviewed the government’s role in modern treaty implementation since it 
became a required component of the land claims negotiation process. This report was highly 
critical of the government’s role and commitment to meeting its treaty obligations (Government 
of Canada 1998). The 2003 report, on the Nunavut and Gwich’in land claims agreements, was the 
first to examine the experience of implementing northern land claims agreements. One of the key 
issues identified was how INAC defined successful implementation. The report criticized INAC 
for measuring success by holding events, activities and meetings rather than by evaluating results 
(Government of Canada 2003, 2). In its official response to the report, INAC “fundamentally 
disagree[d]” with the Auditor General’s view, (Government of Canada 2003, 2), arguing that 
success was defined “as fulfilling the specific obligations as set out in the agreements and plans” 
and not by measuring the outcomes (Government of Canada 2003, 2). In blatantly disregarding 
the bigger picture, long-term results, and the spirit and intent of these agreements, INAC 
demonstrated its inability to look beyond the letter-by-letter wording. 
Mounting concerns from Indigenous modern treaty holders across the country 
surrounding the federal government’s failure to implement land claims, led to the formation of 
the Land Claims Agreements Coalition (LCAC) in 2003. LCAC defined its role as ensuring “that 
comprehensive land claims (modern treaties) and associated Self-Government Agreements are 
respected, honoured and fully implemented” (Land Claims Agreements Coalition, n.d.). In 
November 2003, 350 people, including leaders representing all Indigenous groups who had 
signed modern treaties, policy makers and politicians, gathered in Ottawa for a two-day 
conference entitled, Redefining Relationships: Learning from a Decade of Land Claims 
Implementation. Following the gathering, participants delivered a joint statement calling on the 
federal government to co-develop a new land claims implementation policy in consultation with 
Indigenous governments and organizations. In 2004, LCAC released a discussion paper, “A New 
Land Claims Implementation Policy”, which outlined four key elements that they argued should 
be included in the new policy. These included: (1) recognition that the agreements were signed 
with the Crown in right of Canada, and not with INAC; (2) a commitment by Canada to achieve 
the broad objectives of the agreements as opposed to “mere technical compliance with narrowly 
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defined objectives”; (3) commitment to ensuring senior-level representatives in government 
would manage implementation; and (4) the establishment of an “independent implementation 
audit and review body” that is separate from INAC (Land Claims Agreements Coalition 2004, 2–
3).  
 Arguably the most significant point was the first element LCAC identified in the 
discussion paper: the importance of recognizing that the agreements are “between Aboriginal 
peoples and the Crown” (Land Claims Agreements Coalition 2004, 3). The paper explained that 
although this point had been clearly laid out in each agreement, the federal government treated 
the agreements “as though they were merely contracts with the Department of Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development, or with other departments in respect of particular matters” (Land Claims 
Agreements Coalition 2004, 3). These concerns were reinforced in several other reports (for 
example, see Government of Canada 2007; Senate Standing Committee on Aboriginal Peoples 
2008; Eyford 2015). INAC has always overseen the implementation of the agreements and 
managed the federal responsibilities by coordinating the actions of different government 
departments. However, without a clear, coordinated implementation strategy, it was challenging 
to manage each of the government departments involved in implementation to ensure they were 
informed of their responsibilities, and were being held accountable to their treaty obligations 
(Eyford 2015; Senate Standing Committee on Aboriginal Peoples 2008). Many government 
departments wrongly assumed that INAC was solely responsible for implementing the 
agreements (Senate Standing Committee on Aboriginal Peoples 2008, 21; Campbell, Fenge, and 
Hanson 2011). In addition, INAC did not hold sufficient authority to dictate responsibilities to 
other departments. As scholars Campbell, Fenge and Hanson (2011) argued, “modern treaties are 
between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown, not the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development—a “line department” with little authority in relation to, or leverage over, other 
government departments” (49). Before 2015, no centralized authority or governing body was in 
place to ensure government departments were engaging with the implementation process and 
fulfilling their departmental obligations. 
Regarding the second element, LCAC asserted that the broader objectives of the 
agreements—including social well-being, economic development, environmental sustainability, 
and protection of language and culture—aligned with the broader policy goals of the Canadian 
government. LCAC asserted that modern treaties should be seen as mechanisms for achieving 
 
 92 
these policy goals (Land Claims Agreements Coalition 2004, 13). To this end, LCAC 
recommended that the government develop and implement an evaluative framework to measure 
the success of the agreements against these broader objectives. LCAC suggested the data 
gathered using this framework could be used to measure and assess the implementation progress 
and could also be used to analyze the socio-economic impact of the existing agreements (Land 
Claims Agreements Coalition 2004, 17). This type of evaluation would provide more valuable 
information than the current implementation review processes explored earlier in this chapter. As 
the existing reviews had indicated, there was no understanding of the overarching impacts and 
outcomes that modern treaties have had on Indigenous communities and the regions in which 
they are signed. In 2008, LCAC released a policy document that revisited the importance of this 
element, highlighting the substantial overlap between the successful implementation of modern 
treaties and the federal government’s broader policy objectives (Land Claims Agreements 
Coalition 2008, 10). The coalition recommended that the government work with the Indigenous 
signatories to determine how to coordinate broader public policy processes with modern treaty 
implementation (Land Claims Agreements Coalition 2008, 10). 
Over fifteen years after the development of the federal implementation guidelines, in 2003 
the federal government released a handbook for federal officials called, “Implementation of 
Comprehensive Land Claim and Self-Government Agreements”. Intended to be used alongside 
the 1989 Guidelines, the new handbook captured the lessons learned and key principles and 
phases of implementation of Land Claims and Self-Government Agreements (Indian and 
Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) 2003, I.I). The introduction to the handbook stated that federal 
implementation practitioners should not use it as a prescriptive or rigid template but rather as a 
flexible set of guidelines to provide information and direction.  
The handbook demonstrated some significant lessons learned by the Government of 
Canada and was divided into five phases of implementation planning: (1) preparatory phase; (2) 
implementation planning and negotiation phase; (3) pre-effective date planning; (4) 
implementation management (post-effective date); and (5) renewal of implementation plans and 
other implementation documents (INAC 2003, 13).  The flow and sequencing of these phases is 





Figure 5.2 Internal Federal Government Phases of Implementation 
 
 
The handbook included details on expected interactions with the main table negotiators at the 
different preparatory, planning and negotiation phases. In addition, it included some minor details 
on periodic reviews and annual reports and evaluations—a level of clarity not seen in the original 
implementation guidelines.  
The fourth “implementation management phase” was a significant addition from the 1989 
Guidelines, whose focus on the post-effective date implementation was limited to the obligation 
to complete what was identified in the activity sheets. This new implementation management 
phase shifted away from the narrow scope of the previous guidelines and emphasized the 
importance of developing and maintaining the new relationship that emerged from signing 
modern treaties. Nowhere did the 1989 Guidelines speak to this new relationship. In fact, in the 
whole 50-page document, there was no reference to committing to, building, or maintaining 
relationships. This clearly affirms the criticisms and concerns from the LCAC and the Auditor 
General around neglect for the spirit and intent of the agreements. The new 2003 handbook on 
the other hand, demonstrated a marked change: the federal government finally recognized the 




importance of grounding implementation in these new treaty relationships. The challenge now 
was going to be fulfilling what they had identified as important in the pages of this handbook.    
 Over the next few years, LCAC continued to advocate for change to the federal 
government’s overarching approach to modern treaty implementation. In 2006, the coalition 
further developed the four elements outlined in its 2004 discussion paper, and created an 
additional ten fundamental principles that they believed should make up a new land claims 
implementation policy (see Appendix F)  (Land Claims Agreements Coalition 2006). Elaborating 
upon these principles, in 2008 LCAC released a “Model Canadian Policy on the Full 
Implementation of Modern Treaties.” This model implementation policy emphasized the 
importance of recognizing the spirit and intent of the agreements and accepting that 
implementation “takes forethought, cooperation, and above all, ongoing attention and 
commitment” (Land Claims Agreements Coalition 2008, 3). The platform gained traction, and in 
the interim report, “Honouring the Spirit of Modern Treaties: Closing the Loopholes”, the Senate 
Standing Committee on Aboriginal Peoples (2008) asserted that the Government of Canada 
should co-develop a modern treaty implementation policy based on the work already developed 
by LCAC.  
 Between 2010 and 2011 we began to see a shift in the government’s approach to, and 
overall intentions toward, treaty implementation, at least in their internal processes and policy 
documents. The Treaty Obligation Management System (TOMS) was launched in 2010, and 
although it would later come under criticism, this system was more sophisticated than earlier 
versions that had existed to track the federal government’s modern treaty obligations. In 2011, 
the federal government released, a “Federal Framework for the Management of Modern Treaties 
(Implementation Management Framework)”. This framework clearly indicated that the 
Government of Canada had heard some of the calls for change from LCAC, the Senate Standing 
Committee, and the Auditor General. In particular, the Framework document highlighted that 
“the federal Crown as a whole is accountable for fulfilling Canada’s obligations under modern 
treaties” (DIAND 2011, 4), one of the main points identified by LCAC (2004). The framework 
also identified a new senior-level steering committee, a direct response to a recommendation 
from the 2008 Senate Standing Committee report. 
In the same year, 2011, the federal government released a new set of implementation 
guidelines, which had not been redeveloped since 1989. The guidelines expressed the new 
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intentions of the government towards implementing the agreements: “the task for Canada is to 
implement agreements in a way that respects the overall goals and specific nature of these 
agreements. This means finding an approach to fulfilling Crown obligations that goes beyond 
doing the minimum required” (INAC 2011, 11). Although the Implementation Management 
Framework and the new set of implementation guidelines were an important step forward for the 
federal government, they still fell short of a specific implementation policy, and remained rooted 
in a bureaucratic process that further added layers of complexity to the implementation structures 
and processes.  
Demonstrating further openness to changing its approach to treaty implementation, in 
2013 INAC agreed to participate in a working group with LCAC to examine common principles 
and to explore options for a “whole of government approach” to modern treaty implementation. 
In July 2014, former INAC Minister Valcourt appointed Douglas Eyford as a Ministerial Special 
Representative on reviewing comprehensive land claims. This was intended to be a first step 
towards the government’s renewal of its comprehensive claims policy. That same year, INAC 
(2014) released an interim policy, “Renewing the Comprehensive Land Claims Policy: Towards 
a Framework for Addressing Section 35 Aboriginal Rights”. This interim policy was meant to be 
a starting point for renewing and redeveloping the land claims policy through consultations with 
Indigenous groups and key stakeholders. As previously mentioned, this policy had not been 
significantly amended since it was redeveloped in 1986.  
Over a six-month period, Eyford set out to review and evaluate the existing land claims 
policy and experience with implementation. His work included consulting with representatives 
from 14 of the 26 Indigenous groups who had signed modern treaties and reviewing written 
submissions from LCAC. The interim policy was also open for comments and feedback through 
an online portal. In April 2015, Eyford’s report, “A New Direction: Advancing Aboriginal and 
Treaty Rights” presented a thorough and critical assessment of modern treaties in Canada over 
the previous forty years, including several sets of recommendations. In the implementation 
section of the report, Eyford reaffirmed many of the recommendations made by the LCAC. He 
also asserted the importance of recognizing the spirit and intent of the agreements and forming an 
approach that can “adapt to new developments and changing circumstances” (Eyford 2015, 5).  
A significant difference between LCAC’s recommendations and Eyford’s concerns was 
whether the government should “adopt a stand-alone modern treaty implementation policy” 
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(Eyford 2015, 77). Eyford argued the unique nature of each of the treaties, and the range of 
obligations within each agreement, would complicate the ability to create a policy that “would be 
an effective mechanism to address the acknowledged difficulties with treaty implementation” 
(Eyford 2015, 77). Eyford suggested a more effective approach would create strategies and 
frameworks to manage and coordinate the internal departmental implementation activities 
(Eyford 2015, 78). Eyford provided several other recommendations focused on strengthening the 
government’s approach to implementing the agreements, including accountability measures, 
developing strategies for better management and coordination of internal departmental treaty 
obligations, and continued collaboration with LCAC.21 However, many of these 
recommendations further entrenched a complex bureaucratic system and did not get to the root of 
the implementation problems and concerns that LCAC, the Auditor General and the Senate 
standing committee had identified.  
The new interim policy and the process that was put in place to develop a new 
comprehensive claims policy was flawed in a few critical ways. First, the lead-in to the interim 
policy stressed that this policy was meant only to be a starting point to have “constructive 
dialogue” and to determine how to “work in partnership to renew the relationship between 
Aboriginals and non-Aboriginal Canadians” (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 
Canada (AANDC) 2014, opening section). Although Eyford engaged with over 100 
communities, the federal government created a unilateral process by asking for comments and 
feedback and stating that these would be “taken into consideration”. This approach immediately 
 
21 Eyford outlined six recommendations for improving implementation. These included:  
1. Canada should increase awareness, oversight, and accountability across departments about 
modern treaty obligations and improve internal structures for co-ordinating and fulfilling 
implementation activities.  
2. Canada should centralize responsibility for the coordination and oversight of modern treaty 
implementation in a central agency.  
3. Canada should continue to collaborate with the Land Claims Agreements Coalition to 
advance the parties’ shared objectives.  
4. Canada should ensure treaty provisions are interpreted and given effect in the manner 
intended by negotiators.  
5. Canada should develop a training program for federal officials whose responsibilities 
involve treaty implementation.  
6. Canada should, through the central agency responsible for the coordination and oversight 
of treaty implementation, file and annual report in Parliament about treaty implementation 




limited the ability for dialogue and ongoing co-development of the new claims policy and 
certainly did not demonstrate the federal government’s commitment to work in partnership with 
Indigenous peoples.  
Second, the new interim policy failed to respond to how much things had changed over 
the thirty-year period since the 1986 policy had been developed. During this time, there had been 
significant changes within government, within the tripartite relationships among the treaty 
signatories, and there had been important precedent setting court cases. In particular, there was no 
recognition of the most recent Tsilhqot’in case, which affirmed and established Indigenous land 
title. The new interim policy, much like the 1986 policy, was premised under the flawed 
conjecture that the crown has sovereignty and title, and that the pursuit for land claims starts with 
“an assumption that no rights exist at the beginning of the process” (Senate Standing Committee 
on Indigenous and Northern Affairs 2018, 17). This assumption not only contradicted the 
Tsilhqot’in ruling but also immediately defined the treaty relationship through a colonial lens that 
assumes Indigenous peoples did not have sovereignty and rights prior to the arrival of settlers.    
Finally, and of central importance to this discussion, after all of the calls for change, the 
section of the interim policy that focused on implementation was barely altered. Below is the 
section in its entirety from the interim policy:  
Final Agreements must be accompanied by implementation plans that set out the 
understanding of how obligations contained in the agreements will be fulfilled. The 
implementation plans are intended to ensure efficient and timely implementation of 
the various elements of settlement agreements. The Inherent Right Policy (1995) 
addresses requirements for implementation plans and financial arrangements where 
self-government is included in comprehensive land claim agreements (AANDC 
2014, 20). 
 
This section does not go beyond what was included in the 1986 policy. This was a missed 
opportunity for the Government of Canada on several fronts: first, to indicate that it was changing 
its approach to implementation, second, to refer to the importance of building the new 
government-to-government relationship highlighted in the 2003 handbook, third, to clarify its 
goals and objectives for implementation, and, finally, to establish its commitment to going 
beyond fulfilling the letter-for-letter obligations contained within the agreements.  
Once again, what could have been an opportunity to demonstrate a significant shift in 
both the overarching land claims policy and the Government of Canada’s approach to 
implementation resulted in a relatively incremental shift. However, on July 13, 2015, in response 
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to Eyford’s report and the momentous work and lobbying done by LCAC, INAC announced that 
the federal government was shifting its approach to implementing land claims and Self-
Government Agreements by developing a “whole of government approach to treaty 
implementation” (AANDC 2015). Amongst the new measures, the government announced it 
would be adopting were the establishment of a Deputy Minister’s Oversight Committee to review 
the federal government’s treaty obligations and implementation progress; the creation of a 
Modern Treaty Implementation Office (MTO) within the department; “adoption of a Cabinet 
Directive on the Federal Approach to Modern Treaty Implementation to define roles and 
responsibilities of federal departments”22; and the development of new tools and training for 
federal employees to assist them with meeting their obligations and responsibilities (AANDC 
2015). In its press release, INAC recognized that the work of LCAC and Douglas Eyford were 
influential in shaping the government’s new approach (AANDC 2015).  
The Government of Canada’s announcement in 2015 of its “whole of government 
approach” demonstrated a significant change in its view of the treaty relationship. No longer only 
between Indigenous peoples and INAC, the relationship was now between Indigenous peoples 
and the Crown. This new approach signified that the Government of Canada had listened to and, 
at least in part, responded to the calls for change. That said, all these new changes further 
entrenched implementation within the complex and intricate bureaucratic machinery of 
government, and, arguably, the government still had more power than Indigenous peoples to 
decide how implementation would be approached.  
In the book, Finding Dashaa, Stephanie Irlbacher-Fox (2010) drew on her own 
experience as a land claims negotiator in NWT, to critically examine self-government and 
Indigenous policymaking in Canada. She asked an important question: “Is it Indigenous peoples 
who need to change? Or might something else need to change?” (Irlbacher-Fox 2010, 1). She 
argues that, “agreements are not working well in part because Canada embarked on them without 
a clear policy guiding implementation, including no attention at all to preparing land claim 
members for taking on the technical and professional roles implementation required” (Irlbacher-
Fox 2010, 164–65). Reflecting on both the federal and territorial governments’ changing 
approach to treaty implementation, Gerberding asserted, “there was never a proper appreciation 
 




for how much internal change is required: a paradigm shift to implement [the agreements]” (IT7, 
Gerberding 2019). He argued that the “systemic change that is necessary to make these 
agreements work” still has yet to occur (IT7, Gerberding 2020). On the other hand, he stressed 
the importance of recognizing that “we’ve made incremental gains and we’re moving in the right 
direction,” adding, “this isn’t a bad news story. It’s a good news story in a way but the pace of 
change has been frustrating” (IT7, Gerberding 2020).  
5.3 More than a bystander: Yukon government and the modern treaty process 
From the beginning, the Government of Yukon pushed to have a seat at the land claims 
negotiation table (Whitehorse Star 1973b, 2). In 1979, a memorandum of understanding was 
signed between the federal and territorial governments, committing the Government of Canada to 
involving the Yukon government as a full party to the land claims negotiations (Cameron, Smyth, 
and Gomme 1991, 58). The process of Yukon inclusion unfolded slowly. 
Initially, the Yukon government was not accepted as an equal party at the table, despite 
being present at the discussions. Yukon First Nations had concerns about the Government of 
Yukon’s motivations and intentions and argued that the agreements should have remained 
bilateral between Yukon First Nations and the Crown. Former Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in Chief and 
Elder Angie Joseph-Rear explained why:  
Our negotiation was between the Government of Canada and us because it was the 
Queen that was supposed to take care of our land on our behalf but she took all the 
trees away. The talk was between the two [parties]: our people and the 
Government of Canada (IT4, Joseph-Rear 2016). 
 
Eventually, as their positions shifted, the Yukon First Nations and the Government of Yukon 
started working more closely together. As a former Yukon First Nations’ negotiator, Victor 
Mitander, explained in a 1986 interview with the Whitehorse Star: “CYI [Council for Yukon 
Indians] and the Yukon government had reached an agreement to assist each other in getting their 
priority issues settled and sidelining non-land issues” (Padgham 1986, 6). Much of the impetus 
for territorial engagement came from former Premier Tony Penikett, for whom reconciliation 
with First Nations was a central administrative and political priority. Premier Penikett, who 
worked hard to position Yukon within Confederation and fought for the right to aspire to 
provincial status and for constitutional equality, had excellent personal relationships with First 
Nations and shared their aspirations for a resolution of Indigenous rights (Penikett 2006). Former 
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Yukon Premier and long-time MLA, Piers McDonald, pointed out that until the 1980s, the Yukon 
government was perceived as “a drag on negotiations,” adding that subsequently “they were seen 
as more of an ally” of both the process and First Nations’ aspirations. For the most part, this 
revised relationship lasted through to implementation (IT30, McDondald 2020).  
Parallel to Yukon First Nations’ pursuit of land claims, the Government of Yukon was 
engaged in a long fight towards achieving two significant goals in pursuit of its own land claim: 
responsible government and the devolution of key Government of Canada powers to the territory. 
By the time that nine of the fourteen Yukon First Nations negotiated and signed their Final and 
Self-Government Agreements, Yukon had developed party politics (1978), been granted full (but 
less than secure) responsible government (1979) and had completed significant devolution 
processes (2003). In 2001, and coming into effect in 2003, Yukon Northern Affairs Program 
Devolution Transfer Agreement was signed, transferring responsibility for lands, water, forests, 
and minerals to the Government of Yukon (Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs 
Canada, n.d.). Ten years after the signing of the Umbrella Final Agreement, on 1 April 2003, the 
new Yukon Act came into effect, giving the Government of Yukon a range of province-like 
responsibilities and powers. The completion of devolution created substantial internal changes 
and complexities inside the Yukon administration, including adding 240 federal government 
employees who transferred to the Government of Yukon (CBC News 2003). 
Behind these macro-transitions, lay an extensive process of consultation, collaboration 
and, on occasion, contestation. Right from the pre-effective date planning stage, the Government 
of Yukon took the initiative to install implementation processes and structures. Key to this work 
was Duncan Sinclair, who was involved in land claims in many different roles throughout his 
career with the Government of Yukon. From 1993-1996, he was the Assistant Deputy Minister of 
Implementation and First Nations Relations. In this role, he was responsible for setting up the 
infrastructure and resources needed to meet the obligations laid out in the Final and Self-
Government Agreements (personal com., Sinclair 2020). He explained that the Land Claims 
Secretariat, located centrally within the Executive Council Office (ECO), oversaw and 
coordinated implementation. It was critical that the department was housed centrally within the 
ECO because it meant that the Premier was the minister responsible for modern treaties (IT29, 
Sinclair 2020).  
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After the signing of the UFA and the first four Yukon First Nations Final and Self-
Government Agreements, there was a two-year period before the agreements came into effect 
during which legislation was developed. This was an important period for internal capacity 
building for the Yukon government (IT24, Constable 2016; IT29, Sinclair 2020). The Land 
Claims Secretariat used this time to prepare the Yukon government departments to meet the 
necessary objectives and outcomes outlined within the implementation plans (IT24, Constable 
2016). The preparation included training for each Yukon government department and developing 
templates for Departmental Implementation Plans (DIP). Each department was required to 
complete a DIP, which involved identifying individual roles and responsibilities for 
implementation (IT29, Sinclair 2020; IT24, Constable 2016).  
The momentum for ensuring systems were in place to meet the requirements for 
implementation carried on through the early post-effective date period. During this time, an 
interdepartmental implementation committee was formed, which met monthly to discuss 
implementation matters. In addition, a database system was developed to keep track of the DIPs. 
Another system that was brought in had to do with Cabinet submissions. Any submission that 
related at all to the agreements or to Yukon First Nations more broadly had to be reviewed and 
signed-off on by the Land Claims Secretariat. In addition, internal training and education, such as 
a “Land Claims 101” workshop, was developed to ensure that new employees understood the 
land claims agreements. The training only provided a basic introduction and was infrequently 
updated (IT24, Constable 2016). Sinclair explained that because many of these systems and 
structures put in place in the early days were eventually neglected or collapsed, “some things got 
lost in terms of the rigor of the process” (IT29, Sinclair 2020). According to Sinclair, they 
collapsed because “focusing at such a level of detail just became non-productive” (IT29, Sinclair 
2020). As political mandates and focus began to change within the Government of Yukon, the 
early processes that ensured implementation was seen as central to the land claims agreements 
began to shift. 
The Yukon Land Claims Secretariat faced many of the same coordination and oversight 
challenges as INAC but with a much smaller staff complement, internal overlap and 
administrative complexity. In Sinclair’s words, in the beginning, “there was a very strong culture 
of respecting each other interdepartmentally but also understanding that while it was being 
collaborative, ECO was in charge in a way” (IT29, Sinclair 2020). This culture was a hold-over 
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from the Premiership of Tony Penikett, who took personal responsibility for the file, and was 
carried on by his successor, Premier Piers McDonald. This level of commitment did not continue 
under the Yukon Party, an organization formed from the remnants of the Progressive 
Conservative Party of Canada, elected in 1992, the year before the first four Final Agreements 
were signed. Premier John Ostashek, a rural, pro-business conservative, maintained the Yukon 
presence in the negotiations and implementation processes, but he did so with significantly less 
enthusiasm and concern about the empowerment of First Nations.   
After the first few years of implementation, partly because of the shift from the NDP 
government back to the Yukon Party, the land claims department endured substantial staff 
turnover. With the departure of some key people went the institutional memory and foundational 
understanding of the agreements. In addition, though they continued to have direct access to the 
Premier, whose enthusiasm was less than his predecessors, they had little authority to hold other 
departments accountable for implementing the agreements. Slowly, the role of the Land Claims 
Secretariat diminished, largely for territorial political reasons (IT29, Sinclair 2020). On one hand, 
this was troubling, as there were still certain departments that relied on the Land Claims 
Secretariat because they did not necessarily have the expertise (IT31, Hale 2020). On the other 
hand, “there were departments who thought they were subject matter experts and they had 
different internal departmental mandates towards [specific] chapters” that sometimes conflicted 
with the Land Claims Secretariat’s mandates (IT31, Hale 2020). Michael Hale, former Director 
of Implementation for the Government of Yukon, maintained that “most of the time, the land 
claims secretariat spent its time policing the other departments” (IT31, Hale 2020), which was an 
ineffective use of time and resources and led to many internal coordination challenges and 
conflicts.   
The internal challenges facing the Yukon government carried over into its relationship 
with the Government of Canada. Hale explained that while it was positive that the Government of 
Yukon had aligned so well with Yukon First Nations’ perspectives, they consistently caucused 
with the First Nations on almost all issues (IT31, Hale 2020). The symmetry of interests in 
Yukon contrasted with the First Nations-federal relationship, which was more fraught and 
adversarial with both the First Nations and Yukon Government. Hale asserted the “biggest 
problems with that were the feds had zero time for the Yukon government’s point of view 
because as far as they were concerned, we didn’t have a point of view. We enforced the First 
 
 103 
Nation point of view” (IT31, Hale 2020). In 2003, shortly after devolution was completed, there 
was a significant attitude shift internally. Hale argued that for the Yukon government, 
“devolution became the reason to take a bigger step in but also to challenge its own assumptions” 
(IT31, Hale 2020). For the Government of Yukon, devolution became a higher administrative 
priority than treaty implementation. Although the shift in its engagement caused a controversial 
reaction both internally and from Yukon First Nations, Hale and his team led the development of 
a mandate focused on specific Yukon government implementation issues, including coordination 
with devolution. At first, this focus on implementation negatively affected the relationship with 
First Nations, and it did not have an immediate impact on how the federal government perceived 
the Government of Yukon (IT31, Hale 2020). Hale maintained that it took two or three years to 
begin to see a real shift within the culture and mentality of departments and staff within the 
Yukon government, and also for the First Nations and federal governments to realize that the 
“Yukon government had a legitimate voice” (IT31, Hale 2020). He suggested that it took roughly 
from 2000-2009, when the Yukon Party was in power, save for a short-term Liberal interregnum 
in 2000-2002, for the Government of Yukon to begin to stand on its own two feet but they were 
finally being perceived as a real government, a substantial presence within Confederation, and an 
equal player within implementation.  
The overlap of two crucial territorial processes – the settlement and implementation of 
land clams and the devolution of federal powers to the Government of Yukon – made a difficult 
process more complicated, as did the transition from the pro-treaty New Democratic government 
to Yukon Party Premier John Ostashek. After the short-lived Liberal government, the selection of 
former NDP member Dennis Fentie, personally supportive of Indigenous rights, as Yukon Party 
leader in 2002, produced a shift in emphasis to the practicalities of land claims implementation.   
5.4 Conclusion 
When devolution was completed in Yukon, the Government of Yukon assumed many 
responsibilities that they struggled to manage in the initial transition period. In many ways, the 
Government of Yukon was navigating similar challenges to the newly formed Yukon First 
Nations’ governments. With the completion of the devolution agreements and the signing of the 
Yukon First Nations Final and Self-Government Agreements, the federal government sensed that 
its major work in Yukon had been completed. Transitioning from negotiation to implementation, 
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the Government of Canada viewed its role as limited to providing funding. Reflecting on this 
period, Hale argued:  
The federal representatives looked North, saw a devolved authority and self-
governing First Nations, and with that in place, they wiped their hands a few times 
and declared Yukon “done”. When the primary funder of a treaty takes that 
approach, implementation will necessarily fail. It left the Yukon government and 
First Nations trying to anchor to a federal government that was frantically 
paddling away from shore (IT31, Hale 2020).  
 
The federal government left the main responsibilities for implementing modern treaties to Yukon 
First Nations and the Government of Yukon. This abdication of responsibility presented a serious 
challenge, particularly given the First Nations' firm belief in the "honour of the Crown" as the 
foundation for the modern treaty. When one of the parties in a multiparty agreement steps away 
from its full responsibility for implementing an agreement, the very concept of the accord is 
thrown in doubt. Throughout the experience of implementing the agreements in the Yukon from 
1986-2016, this attitude and approach created significant barriers and challenges.  
After a generation of calls for action and change from LCAC, the Auditor General and the 
Senate Standing Committee, amongst others, much work remains to be done to bind the 
Government of Canada to fulfilling and honouring the spirit and intent of the agreements. The 
federal government’s announcement in 2015 indicated it was ready to make a greater 
commitment to the modern treaty relationship. However, to date, the policy that would replace 
the 1986 comprehensive land claims policy remains incomplete. Both the Yukon government’s 
transition under devolution and issues of implementation are parts of a large and complex 
relationship puzzle, the nuances of which shaped land claims implementation in the territory. 
In the opinion of people on all sides of the treaty process, a fundamental shift is needed in 
the federal government’s approach to modern treaty implementation. The effort must begin at the 
political level and move beyond bureaucracy and the growing asymmetry of capacity between 
federal, territorial and Indigenous governments. All three levels of government need to 
acknowledge the commitment required to implement these agreements. The federal and territorial 
governments’ rhetoric, as well as overarching approach to modern treaty implementation, has 
changed on paper. However, as Elizabeth Hanson questioned, are governments “prepared to go 
underneath and ask what that systematically means in terms of change?” (IT21, Hanson 2020). 
The federal and territorial governments need to affirm that government-government partnerships 
are at the core of treaty implementation. New approaches, policies and administrative 
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action should be co-developed to better reflect the realities on the ground within Indigenous 
communities. More than two decades after the signing of the agreements, the federal government 
has still not moved from its assumption of supremacy. 
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6. NAVIGATING INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS UNDER A MODERN 
TREATY 
In Yukon and across the country, there have been many modern treaty implementation 
success stories that have resulted in protection and preservation of Indigenous lands, languages, 
cultures and traditions. Land claims agreements have improved social well-being, economic 
development and environmental sustainability, not only in Indigenous communities but across the 
regions within which the agreements were signed. On the other hand, barriers and challenges 
have blocked implementation, often overshadowing the successes and positive benefits of these 
monumental agreements. At the root of many of these difficulties in Yukon are 
intergovernmental relations between the federal, territorial and Yukon First Nations governments. 
If land claims are to be implemented, good relations among the three levels of government are 
essential.   
The people and the relationships that are foundational to policy, decision-making and 
politics are often overlooked. In the study of public policy and intergovernmental relations, 
scholars tend to focus on policies, processes and structures, ignoring the human dimensions. A 
key element that led to the successful negotiation of the Yukon land claims agreements were 
relationships built on trust developed among individuals representing all three parties. However, 
overtime, throughout implementation, these relationships broke down. As this study shows, these 
developments resulted from changing governments, changing policies and changing priorities.  
Modern treaties were intended to redefine, strengthen and reaffirm Indigenous-
government relations at both the federal and provincial/territorial levels. Judy Gingell, former 
Commissioner of Yukon and former Grand Chief of the Council of Yukon First Nations, argued 
that "for us, the agreements represent a partnership and an understanding among governments—
Canada, Yukon and First Nations—about what our relationship is going forward” (Gingell 2017). 
“The First Principles Project: 40 @ -40°” also emphasized the importance and centrality of 
relationships to the land claims agreements:  
The Umbrella Final Agreement [UFA] is about relationships. The first Yukon 
relationship was of Yukon First Nations’ people with the land and water. As new 
peoples arrived, relationships diminished. The land claims process was intended to 
provide security for all Yukoners by affirming expectations and obligations of the 
relationship between people, and people with the land. It began a transformational 
journey for those involved in the negotiations that birthed the spirit of the UFA, 
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one where people worked together in respect, humour, and commitment. The road 
was mountainous with deep challenges and peak aspirations. Negotiating was 
hard. But the outcomes could not have been achieved without a struggle to 
overcome conflict and create a shared vision of inspiration and possibility (First 
Principles Project 2020, 8). 
 
The relationships built and trust established among the individuals on the ground were 
foundational to the successful negotiation of the Yukon land claims. When the Government of 
Canada, the Government of Yukon and Yukon First Nations returned to the negotiation table 
after the failed Agreement in Principle in 1984, they renewed their commitment to successfully 
negotiate an agreement. Barry Stuart, a former Chief Judge of the Territorial Court of Yukon and 
the Chief Negotiator for the Government of Yukon for the Umbrella Final Agreement, 
maintained that when the parties reconvened in 1987, they knew they had to build relationships 
founded on respect and trust: “We had to be able to understand each other. We had to negotiate as 
if this was a collaborative effort that could take us into a different future than the one we lived in” 
(IT27, Stuart 2020). Former Chief Federal Negotiator, Tim Koepke concurred, “We were talking 
about repairing a damaged relationship, starting fresh, working as partners, working 
collaboratively, working cooperatively [and] solving problems together” (IT16, Koepke 2016). 
Before the new set of negotiations began, representatives from the three parties gathered at 
Dezdeash Lake, two hours outside of Whitehorse, Yukon, for training from the Harvard 
Negotiation Project. This interest-based negotiation style was centered on taking a principled, 
mutually beneficial approach (Fisher, Ury, and Patton 2011) and on separating the people from 
the problems, a challenge in a small place like Yukon. This was another reason that establishing 
respectful relationships between the individuals at the table was critical to the success of the 
agreements. Former Premier Piers McDonald commented, “I think the relationship between the 
governments and First Nation communities needed to be strong in order for the UFA to be 
negotiated” (IT30, McDonald 2020).  The new approach to negotiations included meeting face-
to-face in Yukon as often as possible and prioritizing spending time in the communities. As 
Stuart explained, “The relationships we built after were significantly different than they were 
before the failed AIP…We started working together in a way that we had never worked together 
before” (IT27, Stuart 2020).  
Modern treaty implementation is often compared to two contrasting arrangements: a 
marriage and a divorce. McDonald explained that like a marriage, to be successful, 
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implementation of the land claims agreements requires commitment and continuous focus and 
work (IT30, McDonald 2020). It is often argued that both the Yukon and federal governments 
viewed the land claims agreements as a divorce settlement, rather than as a marriage. Seen 
through this lens, the relationships that were developed deteriorated. Many interviewees 
contended that between approximately 2003 to 2016, the intergovernmental treaty relationships 
in Yukon among all three levels of government broke down, significantly impeding 
implementation. Three broad trends, described below, contributed to the breakdown of these 
relationships: (1) continuity, capacity and understanding of the agreements; (2) the conflict 
between the spirit and intent of the agreements versus the letter of the law; and (3) dispute 
resolution and reliance on the courts. The following section provides an example of the 
breakdown of intergovernmental treaty relationships in Yukon that reveals these trends. The 
remainder of the chapter explores each of these trends and the impacts they have had on 
intergovernmental relations in a modern treaty context.  
6.1 Intergovernmental Collaborative Processes: The Peel Watershed Case  
Yukon First Nation Final Agreements contain a unique intergovernmental process for 
land use planning that is both collaborative and consultative. This process with the Yukon First 
Nations and the territorial government allows for significant contributions from First Nations, 
public governments, industry and the public. To date, only two regional land use plans have been 
completed in Yukon: the North Yukon Regional Land Use Plan and the Peel Watershed Regional 
Land Use Plan. The latter was a contentious process with significant implications for the 
relationship between the Government of Yukon and Yukon First Nations governments.  
The Peel watershed is an area of pristine wilderness covering 14% of Yukon. The area is 
of significance to several Yukon First Nations-- Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in, the First Nation of Na-Cho 
Nyäk Dun and Vuntut Gwitchin—as well as the Tetlit Gwich’in from the Northwest Territories, 
who also have traditional territory in Yukon. The area also has great potential for oil and gas, 
and, as of 2011, there were nearly 8,500 active mining claims in the watershed area (Bergner, 
Kruger, and Olynyk 2014). “Chapter 11: Land Use Planning” of the UFA and the Yukon First 
Nations Final Agreements contains provisions for establishing a consultative process for 
developing regional land use plans. (See Appendix H for the objectives of Chapter 11 and the 
approval process for regional land use planning.) The nature of the language used in these 
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agreements helps in understanding the complexity of the situation that arose with the Peel 
Watershed Regional Land Use Plan.  
To develop the regional land use plan for the Yukon portion of the Peel, the Peel 
Watershed Regional Planning Commission (the Peel Planning Commission) was established 
under the Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in, the First Nation of Na-Cho Nyäk Dun and Vuntut Gwitchin’s 
Final Agreements (Bergner, Kruger, and Olynyk 2014). In 2004, planning began for the Peel 
region, and after seven years of consultation with First Nations, government, industry and the 
public, the Peel Planning Commission submitted a Final Recommended Plan to the Yukon 
government in 2011. The plan recommended 80% of the area protected from development and 
20% open for mineral exploration.  
The Yukon Party, which held a majority in government, was known for being pro-mining 
and pro-resource development and was vocal in its opposition to the Final Recommended Plan 
for the Peel watershed and the process through which it was developed (Loeks 2013). The same 
year the Final Recommended Plan was submitted, 2011, Darrell Pasloski was elected Premier 
under a second Yukon Party majority. A key part of the Yukon Party’s election platform included 
finding a more balanced outcome for the Peel watershed plan that better supported all sectors of 
the economy. In 2012, the Government of Yukon announced they would be making 
modifications to the Final Recommended Plan and “unilaterally embarked on a second series of 
consultations and related activities” (Staples et al. 2013, 144). In September 2013, significant 
changes were made to the land designations and maps proposed in the Final Recommended Plan, 
based on a new set of guiding principles and management scenarios developed by the Yukon 
government (Jaremko 2017; Staples et al. 2013). These new designations and guiding principles 
were developed without consultation or input from the affected First Nations nor the Peel 
Planning Commission (Staples et al. 2013, 153). On October 23, 2013, the Yukon government 
announced it would be conducting public consultation on these new plans for up to four months, 
followed by consultation with Yukon First Nations. As this consultation process was taking place 
over the Christmas holidays, little time was left for public input. 
In January 2014, the Government of Yukon released a Peel Watershed Regional Land Use 
Plan (the Peel Land Use Plan) containing substantial modifications to the Final Recommended 
Plan presented by the Peel Planning Commission. In the Peel Land Use Plan, only 29% of the 
region was to be protected from development (Unrau 2014). This new plan disregarded the multi-
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year consultation process conducted by the Peel Planning Commission and demonstrated that the 
government was prioritizing economic and resource development. Further, in its interpretation of 
Chapter 11 of the Final Agreements, the Pasloski government neglected the significance of the 
modern treaty relationship. Rather than demonstrating commitment to government-to-
government relationships and the spirit and intent of the agreements, the Government of Yukon 
asserted its power to accept, reject or modify the Final Recommended Plan by interpreting the 
treaty based on its own interests and priorities. This assertion of power and unilateral approach to 
interpreting the agreements was the most significant action taken by any Yukon government to 
undermine the spirit and intent of the modern treaties.  
 In the same week that the Peel Land Use Plan was released, Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in and the 
First Nation of Na-Cho Nyäk Dun, along with two environmental groups—Canadian Parks and 
Wilderness Society and Yukon Conservation Society—announced they were taking the 
Government of Yukon to court for neglecting to follow the regional land use planning process set 
out in Chapter 11 of the Yukon First Nations’ Final Agreements. The Gwich’in Tribal Council, 
representing the Tetlit Gwich’in, intervened to support Yukon First Nations. In December 2014, 
the Yukon Supreme Court ruled that the Government of Yukon had violated the land use 
planning process and had “failed to honour the letter and spirit of its treaty obligations” (as cited 
in Jaremko 2017, 2). The ruling stated that although the territorial government had the final right 
to approve the land use plan, meaningful consultation with the affected First Nations was 
required and only minor modifications can be made to the Final Recommended Plan provided by 
the Peel Planning Commission (Jaremko 2017, 2). The Government of Yukon appealed the 
decision at the Yukon Court of Appeal. Although the ruling favoured the respondents, the 
judgement ruled that the Government of Yukon did not have to return as far as the initial Final 
Recommended Plan. Dissatisfied with the ruling, the First Nations and environmental groups 
filed to have the case heard by the Supreme Court of Canada (Joannou 2019). Knowing that there 
were more regional land use plans to be developed in Yukon, the First Nations were looking for 
greater certainty in the outcome of this court case. 
In 2016, a new Liberal Government was elected in Yukon under the leadership of Sandy 
Silver. Key to its election platform was a promise to fully implement the Final Recommended 
Plan, that guaranteed 80% protection of the Peel Watershed. The Supreme Court heard the Peel 
case in March 2017 and in December 2017, ruled in favour of the First Nations. In August 2019, 
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the final Peel Plan, outlining protection for 83% of the region, was signed by Premier Silver and 
Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in, First Nation of Na-Cho Nyäk Dun, Vuntut Gwitchin Government and the 
Gwich’in Tribal Council (Joannou 2019). 
 The Peel Watershed case exemplifies the importance of intergovernmental relationships 
for honouring the spirit and intent of the agreements and seeing them successfully implemented. 
Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in Chief Roberta Joseph, who has been involved in land claims in different 
capacities since the 1980s asserted,  
We just really want to be able to have our agreements followed, adhered to, 
honoured; to be able to move forward collectively, rather than separately. Using a 
unilateral approach doesn’t really accomplish the benefits that the agreements 
could bring to the Yukon and to the Yukon First Nations (IT14, Joseph 2017). 
 
Critical to the success of these agreements and to modern treaty relationships in Yukon is 
understanding that all three levels of government are striving to achieve the same goals for 
Yukon as a whole. Barry Stuart asserted, “If we are going to negotiate in good faith it means we 
have to implement in good faith” (IT27, Stuart 2020). It is natural that the different governments 
will have different objectives, interests and values. However, this does not mean that they cannot 
work together to strive for common goals and outcomes.  
6.2 Continuity, Capacity and Understanding of the Agreements  
All three levels of government were faced with a steep learning curve from the beginning 
of implementation, as this was brand new for everyone involved. The first three land claims 
agreements negotiated and signed in Canada did not require implementation planning nor did 
they include self-government. Although three other land claims agreements came into effect prior 
to the Yukon land claims—the Gwich’in Comprehensive Land Claim Agreement, Nunavut Land 
Claims Agreement, and the Sahtu Dene and Metis Comprehensive Land Claim Agreement—
none of these included standalone Self-Government Agreements. To a certain extent, after the 
signing of the UFA and the first four agreements, the Government of Canada, the Government of 
Yukon and Yukon First Nations governments all faced challenges with capacity and continuity, 
as well as training and understanding of the modern treaties.  
The loss of institutional memory and understanding of the agreements created an ongoing 
challenge for the federal and territorial governments, and to a lesser extent for the First Nations 
governments (IT6, a First Nation government employee 2016; IT8, Joe 2017; IT21, Hanson 
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2020; IT03, Josie 2016; IT14, Joseph 2017; IT17, former federal government employee 2016; 
IT29, Sinclair 2020). Several issues contributed to this challenge. Shortly after the agreements 
were signed, new teams were assigned to oversee implementation. With these new teams, 
continuity was often lost, as there was little overlap between the original negotiators, senior 
administrators and the civil servants who worked on the files post-effective date. These new 
implementation teams often had little knowledge of the cultural, historical, political and/or 
economic contexts of the agreements, nor did they understand the intent behind the chapters. As 
Duncan Sinclair contended, “What was important in there was that there be continuity of 
understanding about what the claim was about and why things were negotiated… because you 
can never write everything down perfectly” (IT29, Sinclair 2020). Over time, there had been 
constant turn-over of staff at both INAC and the Yukon government department charged with 
overseeing land claims.23 As Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in Chief Roberta Joseph pointed out, “There is too 
much of a narrow view by other governments because of the high turnovers, and their employees 
aren’t there long enough to be able to fulfill some of the issues” (IT14, Joseph 2017). Another 
concern that compounded this challenge was that the multiple federal and territorial departments 
tasked with meeting the agreements’ obligations all needed to be educated and trained on the 
history of the agreements and their responsibility for implementing them. This did not always 
happen, resulting in a significant lack of understanding and knowledge of the main principles that 
underlie the intent and context of the UFA and the Final and Self-Government Agreements.  
All three levels of government have wrestled constantly with adapting to their new 
responsibilities and to the new administrative capacities needed for implementation. Each level of 
government has unique challenges that have created barriers to maintaining continuity, building 
capacity and training employees on the context and content of the agreements. On the other hand, 
each has strengths in overcoming some of these barriers. The following sections provide 
examples of some of the strengths and barriers with regards to continuity, capacity and training 
that each level of government faced throughout implementation.  
 
23 The Land Claims Secretariat was created in 1973 and in 1995 (the effective date of the first 
four agreements) it was housed within the Executive Council Office, with the Premier as 
Minister. In 2000/01, the Secretariat was renamed the Land Claims and Implementation 
Secretariat. In 2005/06, the Secretariat expanded its scope and became the Land Claims and 
Implementation Secretariat/First Nations Relations. Most recently, in 2013, the Land Claims and 
Implementation Secretariat/First Nations Relations merged with Governance Liaison and 




6.2.1 From Indian Act Band to Self-Governing First Nation 
Yukon First Nations faced unprecedented challenges with administrative capacity and 
development. Prior to becoming self-governing under a Self-Government Agreement, Yukon 
First Nations were Indian Act bands predominantly governed by INAC. With limited 
responsibilities for administering their own programs and services, they had very little authority 
to make modifications or changes. Overnight, on the effective date of their Self-Government 
Agreements, Yukon First Nations ceased to be Indian Act bands and became self-governing 
Yukon First Nations with many of the same authorities and responsibilities as the territorial 
government. Howard Linklater (2016), has held several different political and administrative 
roles for the Vuntut Gwitchin Government since the 1980s, including being on Chief and Council 
and working as Director of Government Services. He spoke to the steep learning curve in 
transitioning from a “DIA government” (Indian Act band) to a self-governing First Nation. He 
explained that it took Vuntut Gwitchin Government at least ten years to make that transition 
“from the old DIA regime where we were institutionalized, and everyone was doing everything 
for us” (IT1, Linklater 2016). One of the major challenges, he argued, was overcoming the 
“institutionalized syndrome” that came with being a DIA government and the long history of 
residential and mission schools. The intergenerational impacts of the residential and mission 
schools are still very much being felt by Yukon First Nations communities. The work required to 
rebuild and regain trust with the federal government, in particular, after a long history of 
detrimental assimilationist policies, is still ongoing (IT1, Linklater 2016; IT15, Strand 2017; 
IT10, Chambers 2017; IT7, Gerberding 2017).   
Each Yukon First Nation government was effectively being built from the ground up and 
had immediate challenges coping with the new responsibilities. Most Yukon First Nation 
governments were modelled after the structure of western public governments, which required 
the creation and staffing of government departments to oversee the administration of lands and 
resources, education, health and social, housing, etc. and one of the biggest challenges here was 
human capacity. Each of these new departments needed to be staffed, and there was an ongoing 
challenge of recruiting and retaining employees to work within the First Nations governments, 
particularly those located in the more rural and remote communities. Following the guidance of 
its Elders, the Vuntut Gwitchin Government realized that right away it needed to focus on 
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education for its citizens and building capacity (IT1, Linklater 2016). The same key priorities 
were identified for both Champagne and Aishihik First Nations (IT8, Joe 2017) and Tr’ondëk 
Hwëch’in (IT5, a Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in citizen 2016). To build up their governments, each First 
Nation required “staff with expertise and skills needed to enable them to succeed” (Dacks 2004, 
678). Filling these positions within the First Nations governments required certain levels of 
technical and professional expertise. In addition, those elected to Chief and Council had a steep 
learning curve in many cases, to develop the western bureaucratic and political skills and 
understanding to work with the other levels of government, and to understand the intricacies of 
these intergovernmental relationships (Dacks 2004).  
Although Yukon First Nations governments have struggled with retaining and attracting 
citizens to work within their own governments, one of their major strengths has been the 
continuity of some key players who have been working with the First Nations governments for 
many years, some since the negotiation period. These individuals have an in-depth knowledge 
and understanding of the agreements and the intricacies of the bureaucratic processes and 
structures. They also know how to navigate evolving intergovernmental relations with the federal 
and territorial governments. Lawrence Joe, for example, is a Champagne and Aishihik First 
Nations citizen and former Director of Heritage, Lands and Resources for the Champagne and 
Aishihik First Nations government. He began working in land claims in 1989 and worked for his 
government until 2017. Joe explained that several Champagne and Aishihik First Nations citizens 
were involved from the negotiations straight through to implementation of the Final and Self-
Government Agreements (IT8, Joe 2017). This experience gave them institutional memory and 
understanding of the agreements. With few exceptions, this same long-term involvement did not 
occur at the other two levels of government. Joe argued, “We ended up with a group of people in 
the Yukon government and federal government that were responsible for implementing the treaty 
that didn’t understand the spirit and intent and what was meant by these agreements” (IT8, Joe 
2017). Many First Nations interviewees agreed that they were constantly faced with having to 
educate civil servants on the history, context and intent of the agreements.  
6.2.2 Government Capacity and Continuity Challenges 
 Parallel to the land claims agreements being signed, the Government of Yukon was 
navigating a rapid transfer of responsibility through the devolution process. Therefore, it was not 
surprising that from early on, the Land Claims Secretariat in the Yukon government faced 
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capacity challenges. Constable (2016) explained that the department “probably only had twenty 
people as their staff. The implementation staff was no more than four people. There was no way 
that those four people could be fully responsible for all of the obligations in those agreements” 
(IT24, Constable 2016). The Yukon government prioritized two significant pieces early on that 
contributed to building capacity and training. First, during the two-year period before the first 
four Yukon First Nations agreements came into effect, the Land Claims Secretariat was dedicated 
to working with all of the Government of Yukon departments to outline their roles and 
responsibilities for meeting the agreements’ objectives. Second, the Government of Yukon 
recognized that it needed to develop ongoing education materials for new employees to teach 
them about land claims (IT24, Constable 2016). A high-level land claims orientation package 
was put together, and the Staff Training Branch of the Public Service Commission developed a 
“Land Claims 101” workshop for new employees. When the workshop was first developed, it 
was an eight-day detailed overview of the land claims context, history and contents and was 
mandatory as part of the civil servant onboarding for all Government of Yukon employees (IT31, 
Hale 2020; IT24, Constable 2016). However, overtime, the workshop was shortened to a one-day 
training session that was no longer mandatory.  
Over the past two decades, concern has been raised that Yukon and federal government 
employees do not understand the core agreements. This concern was identified by several First 
Nations representatives and those in attendance at the First Principles Project gathering in 2020. 
These concerns were not commenting on the competency of these individuals but rather the lack 
of training and education around the history of the land claims and the departmental 
responsibilities for implementing the individual objectives. Understanding the intent behind each 
of the chapters is critical to avoiding misinterpretation. Hale asserted the importance of having a 
clear understanding of the intent of the treaties: “Yukon government staff don’t truly understand 
what they are giving away by turning their heads from the details of the treaties… You need to 
know the details, so that when you are going beyond those obligations, you understand the steps 
you are taking” (IT31, Hale 2020).  
Lawrence Joe explained that it was the junior and frontline staff that lacked understanding 
of the agreements, rather than the Deputy Ministers and Assistant Deputy Ministers (IT8, Joe 
2020). He argued that during the negotiations, First Nations had compromised to maintain future 
relationships with the other governments. Ultimately, however, these compromises were not 
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worth the losses because the First Nations had to constantly rebuild relationships with the new 
and often inexperienced federal and territorial staff. For example, Joe pointed out that one of the 
longest ongoing challenges had been with allocation of Yukon First Nations’ traplines (IT8, Joe 
2020). According to section 16.11.3 of the UFA and Yukon First Nations Final Agreements, 
“Each Yukon First Nation’s Traditional Territory shall be approximately 70 percent held by 
Yukon Indian People and Aboriginal people who are beneficiaries of Transboundary Agreements 
and approximately 30 per cent held by other Yukon residents” (UFA 185). The draft UFA was 
amended to include 16.11.4, which recognized that six Yukon First Nations exceeded the 70% 
allocation at the time of negotiation. The amendment stated that Yukon First Nations Final 
Agreements would address these exceptions. Joe asserted, “this section was added to ensure that 
First Nations would not have to give up their traplines in order to achieve a Final Agreement. 
Unfortunately, this could have been drafted more clearly” (IT8, Joe 2020). Yukon First Nations 
have been trying to resolve this issue since the 1990s. However, as Joe argued, because of 
changing governments and the consistent turnover of staff dealing with this issue, “they make up 
their own understanding and interpretation of the agreements in different ways” making it 
difficult to come to a resolution (IT8, Joe 2020).  
In January 2020, the First Principles Project gathering took place in part to respond to this 
lack of knowledge and understanding of the agreements. Former Premier Tony Penikett 
observed, “the fewer people there are to defend the UFA when necessary, the greater the risk for 
future generations intentionally or unintentionally eroding its standing and effectiveness” (Butler 
2020, 17). In an earlier discussion, Penikett used the example of the Peel watershed conflict to 
emphasize that members of the Government of Yukon did not understand the agreements:  
The Peel River conflict was an interesting example of people in government not 
understanding that at the heart of the land claims and self-government is the notion 
of power-sharing between Indigenous and Settler populations… I don’t see that 
kind of ethos around. I don’t see that kind of ethic in place (IT26, Penikett 2017).  
 
To breakdown the power imbalance that historically existed between the federal, territorial and 
First Nations in Yukon, it is critical that each of the Parties to the agreements are committed to 
the government-to-government relationships that are foundational to these treaties. The high turn-
over of staff working on land claims files and their limited training and education on land claims 
and Indigenous-government relations means that few government officials remain who 
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understand the agreements. This, in turn, diminished the centrality of the treaties to the Yukon 
government-Yukon First Nations relationship.  
 After devolving responsibilities to the Government of Yukon, the federal government 
drastically reduced its physical presence in Yukon. It minimized the size, capacity and role of the 
regional INAC office, which was a significant loss. With increasing centralization in Ottawa, a 
growing physical and psychological distance arose between the decision-makers and those on the 
ground in Yukon (Penikett 2020). As former Premier Penikett contended, “There is a huge 
psychological problem in the federal government. They just don’t understand the people who live 
in the North” (IT26, Penikett 2020). Michael Hale expressed similar concerns: “Ottawa-driven 
implementation necessarily reduces local interests and pushes efforts toward a more centralized, 
uniform outcome, which is antithetical to community-based treaty making” (IT31, Hale 2020). 
This disconnect is compounded by the high levels of turnover within the senior administration of 
the federal government, and in particular within INAC. A former federal government employee 
involved in the negotiations asserted, “I don’t think the federal government does a particularly 
good job in bringing new people up to speed…We usually got people at the Ottawa end of 
implementation who had never done anything like this at all. I think it is endemic to the federal 
system and maybe it is to all bureaucracies” (IT17, former federal government employee 2016). 
As these comments indicate, the challenges the Government of Yukon faced with continuity also 
occurred in Ottawa, where federal civil servants had little understanding of the land claims 
agreements and the political and cultural contexts and the history rooted in these treaty 
relationships.  
The successes of land claims negotiations can be largely attributed to the relationships 
and the trust built by the teams on the ground in Yukon. When negotiations started up again in 
1987, most members of the federal land claims team were based in Yukon, including the 
Associate Chief Federal Negotiator, Tim Koepke (who would later become Chief Federal 
Negotiator). Elizabeth Hanson pointed out, “We believed the agreements had been successfully 
negotiated because the bulk of the [federal] team lived in Yukon and knew the importance of 
making the agreements work” (IT21, Hanson 2020). However, the importance of local input was 
not carried over to members of the federal implementation negotiation team, who were 
predominantly based in Ottawa. Hanson argued that there was a fundamental difference in 
perspective between those working for the federal government in Yukon and those based in 
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Ottawa: “We felt that having people here responsible for implementing with a federal lens would 
hopefully see three levels of government work to put in place the cooperative governance 
arrangements necessary” (IT21, Hanson 2020). Much of this cooperation was lost when the 
federal government downsized its local team post-devolution and faced ongoing challenges with 
turnover of the senior administrators in Ottawa.  
Critical to the success of intergovernmental treaty relationships and implementation of the 
agreements is retaining federal government employees in the regional offices who have an in-
depth understanding of the agreements and Yukon more broadly. Several interviewees from all 
three Parties to the agreements spoke to the significance of some of the key local long-term 
regional office employees such as Robin Bradasch, former Director of Governance, Yukon 
Region for Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada. A citizen of the Kluane 
First Nation, Bradasch first became involved with Yukon land claims as a researcher in 1994, 
becoming Chief Negotiator and Director of Lands, Heritage and Governance for Kluane First 
Nation in 1997. Bradasch led the successful negotiation of the Kluane First Nation Final and 
Self-Government Agreements, signed in 2003. In 2005, she joined the federal government and 
worked in land claims implementation with INAC for the following fifteen years. The importance 
of having experienced federal employees with clear understanding of the politics, culture and 
intricacies of the agreements and the intergovernmental relations in Yukon is critical. It 
essentially comes down to the importance of the individual players involved in these 
relationships and the implementation process. Having people at the table like Bradasch who have 
garnered much respect and trust from the communities and all levels of government is key to 
successful intergovernmental relations. No matter how well intentioned they may be, when the 
key decision makers are located in Ottawa and spend little time directly in the communities 
building relationships, this creates a significant barrier to developing trust and can impede the 
progress of implementation.   
6.2.3 Changing Governments and Changing Priorities 
One of the biggest challenges with intergovernmental treaty relations in Yukon has been 
navigating changes in governments and leadership at all three levels—First Nations, Yukon and 
Canada. Although each Party to the agreements had different reasons for negotiating land claims, 
at the time of negotiation, all three had a common goal to see the agreements successfully 
negotiated. Throughout implementation, the objectives and mandates of each level of government 
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have not always aligned. Leslie McCullough argued, “Everyone had a common objective at the 
time [of negotiation] so that made it somewhat easier to work together. I think now, governments 
and First Nations do not always have the same objectives and priorities” (IT25, McCullough 
2020). The changing government mandates and objectives of each government depended on the 
views of the individuals that were in power. Each leader’s goals and priorities often influenced 
their approach to Indigenous-government relations and the prioritization of land claims 
implementation.  
As federal and territorial governments transitioned, significant ideological shifts held the 
potential for major disruption. However, some transitions were smooth at the political level, 
while disruption lay at the senior administration level, particularly with federal administrators. 
Below are a series of tables that outline the individual leaders of Champagne and Aishihik First 
Nations, Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in and Vuntut Gwitchin Government, the Government of Canada and 
the Government of Yukon between 1986-2016. Alongside the Canadian Prime Ministers are the 
political parties they represented and their Ministers of Indigenous Affairs. Alongside the Yukon 
Premiers are their political party affiliations, along with the Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) for 
Land Claims (and in later years, Aboriginal Relations).24 The following section provides brief 
profiles and assessments of a few key leaders and their approach to the intergovernmental treaty 
relationships in Yukon.  
 
Table 6.1 Champagne and Aishihik First Nations Chiefs (1986-2016) 
Term Chief 
1980-1998 Paul Birckel 
1998-2002 Bob Charlie 
2002-2006 James Allen 
2007-2010 Diane Strand 





24 In the Government of Yukon, the Premier has always been the Minister responsible for the 
Executive Council Office, which houses the Land Claims Secretariat and Aboriginal Relations 
department. The ADM of these departments reported to the Deputy Minister of ECO, who 
reported directly to the Premier.  
 
 120 
Table 6.2 Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in Chiefs (1986-2016) 
Term Chief 
1984-1987 Hilda Pohlmann 
1987-1990 Angie Joseph 
1990-1998 Steve Taylor 
1998-2008 Darren Taylor 
2008-2014 Eddie Taylor 
2014-Present Roberta Joseph 
 
Table 6.3 Vuntut Gwitchin Government Chiefs (1986-2016) 
Term Chief 
1985-1998 Alice Frost 
1988-1990 Roger Kyikavichik 
1990-1996 Robert Bruce Jr 
1996-1997 Chief Randall Tetlichi (resigned in ’97) 
1997-1998 Chief Marvin Frost (appointed Chief) 
1998-2010 Joe Linklater 
2010-2012 Norma Kassi 
2012-2014 Joe Linklater 
2014-2016 Roger Kyikavichik 
2016-2018 Bruce Charlie 
 
 
Table 6.4 Canadian Prime Ministers and Ministers of Indigenous Affairs (1986-2016) 
Term Prime Minister Party Minister 
1984-1993 Brian Mulroney 
Progressive 
Conservative 
Doug Firth (1984) 
David Crombie (1984-1986) 
Bill McKnight (1986-1989) 
Pierre Cadieux (1989-1990) 
Tom Siddon (1990-1993) 
Pauline Browes (1993) 
1993-1993 Kim Campbell 
Progressive 
Conservative 
Ron Irwin (1993-1997) 
Jane Stewart (1997-1999) 
Bob Nault (1999-2003) 
Andy Mitchell (2003-2004) 
Andy Scott (2004-2006) 
1993-2003 Jean Chrétien Liberal Party 
2003-2006 Paul Martin Liberal Party 
2006-2015 Stephen Harper Conservative Party 
Jim Prentice (2006-2007) 
Chuck Strahl (2007-2010) 
John Duncan 2010-2013 
Bernard Valcourt (2013-2015) 





Table 6.5 Yukon Premiers and ADMs of Land Claims/Aboriginal Relations (1986-2016) 
Term Yukon Premier Party ADM 
1985-1992 Tony Penikett 
New Democratic 
Party 
Gerry Piper (Apr.1986- Mar.1988) 
Vacant (Aug.1988- Apr.1989) 
Tim McTiernan (Nov.1989- Apr.1996) 1992-1996 John Ostashek Yukon Party 
1996-2000 Piers McDonald 
New Democratic 
Party 
Randy Brandt (Jul.1997-Jan.1999) 
Florian Lemphers (Sept.1999-
Sept.2000) 
2000-2002 Pat Duncan Liberal Party Karyn Armour (Apr.2001-Aug.2014) 
Michael Hale (Jul.2014-Mar.2015) 
Stephen Mills (Mar.2015-Nov.2015) 
Allan Jones (Nov.2015-Nov.2016) * 
2002-2011 Dennis Fentie Yukon Party 
2011-2016 Darrell Pasloski Yukon Party 
2016- Sandy Silver Liberal Party Brian MacDonald (Nov.2016-present) 
* Acting ADM 
 
Yukon First Nations Chiefs were living and breathing the land claims agreements every 
day in their communities. Significant ideological shifts within the transitions from one Chief to 
another were rare. Different Chiefs had different approaches to working with the other levels of 
government, and some were certainly more receptive than others. However, they all saw the 
value and necessity of seeing these agreements fully implemented and knew of the importance of 
maintaining intergovernmental treaty relationships. In the three Yukon First Nations governments 
examined in this study, several long running Chiefs had extensive histories of involvement with 
land claims. For example, former Champagne and Aishihik First Nations’ Chief Paul Birckel, 
who negotiated and signed the Final and Self-Government Agreement, was Chief for eighteen 
years. Prior to being elected as Chief, Birckel was the Executive Director of the Council for 
Yukon Indians from 1975-1980, playing a key role in the early years of the UFA negotiations.  
One of the more well-known Yukon First Nations Chiefs, the late former Vuntut 
Gwitchin Chief Joe Linklater, is highly regarded for the intergovernmental work he did. Linklater 
was Chief for fourteen years over a sixteen-year period (1998-2010 and 2012-2014), a critical 
time for the post-effective date implementation of Vuntut Gwitchin Government’s Final and Self-
Government agreements. In an interview in 2011, Linklater said that he ran for leadership 
because he saw the importance of being involved in self-government and because his Elders told 
him he needed to run for Chief. As he explained, the Elders taught their citizens “if they’re going 
to be involved in something, then they’re going to be involved in it in a big way” (Perry 2016). 
Linklater played an instrumental role in several intergovernmental affairs initiatives. For 
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example, he signed the first Yukon regional land use plan: The North Yukon Regional Land Use 
Plan, co-developed between Vuntut Gwitchin Government and the Government of Yukon. He 
also fought hard to protect the Porcupine Caribou herd, a primary food source, whose calving 
grounds are located on the traditional territory of the Vuntut Gwitchin. Recognizing the declining 
numbers of Porcupine Caribou, Linklater was instrumental in developing the “Harvest 
Management Plan for the Porcupine Caribou Herd in Canada” (First Nation of NaCho Nyäk Dun 
et al. 2010)(2010). This plan brought together the Government of Canada, the Government of 
Yukon, the Government of Northwest Territories, First Nation of Na-cho Nyak Dun, Gwich’in 
Tribal Council, Inuvialuit Game Council, Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in and Vuntut Gwitchin Government.  
Although this was a fractious process at times, the plan was a remarkable demonstration of 
intergovernmental relations and co-management and is one of the only management plans in 
Canada that has thresholds for harvesting.  
Many Yukon First Nations governments have been led by successive family members; 
thus, passing on a firm understanding of the context and content of the agreements and more 
importantly the intent. For example, current Champagne and Aishihik First Nations Chief Steve 
Smith is the son of former Chief Elijah Smith who led Yukon First Nations Chiefs to Ottawa with 
Together Today for our Children Tomorrow in 1973. Chief Steve Smith grew up surrounded by 
the land claims negotiations. In describing the respect and understanding that Chief Smith has for 
the land claims, Lawrence Joe said, “He is a land claims kid. He doesn’t really know an 
environment that was before the land claims. He has a pretty solid understanding of what we tried 
to accomplish [with the agreements]” (IT8, Joe 2020). This in-depth understanding of both the 
importance and spirit and intent of the agreements is critical to how they are implemented.  
The approach to and priority of these intergovernmental treaty relations at the federal 
government level also depended on the historical, political and economic contexts. For example, 
several land claims agreements were being negotiated across Canada against the backdrop of the 
1990 Oka Crisis on the Kanesatake Mohawk reserve in Quebec, when Brian Mulroney was Prime 
Minister under a Progressive Conservative government. The Kanesatake were protesting the 
expansion of the nearby Oka Golf Course, which if approved would be built on their unceded 
traditional territory, including the existing location of their cemetery. The protests escalated to a 
78-day stand-off between the Kanasatake, Quebec provincial police and the RCMP. Eventually 
the arrival of the Canadian Army put an end to the blockades and protests (Marshall 2013). Then 
 
 123 
federal Minister of INAC, Tom Siddon, believed the Oka Crisis was critical in dismantling 
barriers and resolving challenges facing the land claims process (Valiante and Rakobowchuk 
2015). In response to Oka, Prime Minister Mulroney established the Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) in 1991, with the aim of systematically investigating Canada’s 
relationship with Indigenous peoples. In the summer following the Oka Crisis, Mulroney wrote to 
the Premiers of Northwest Territories and Yukon, committing to completing the land claims 
negotiations. In one letter he wrote, “the federal government is determined to create a new 
relationship among Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians based on dignity, trust and respect” 
(Barrera 2015). Between 1990-1993, the Mulroney government removed the cap on the number 
of claims that could be negotiated at one time across the country, tabled the new British 
Columbia treaty process, and signed off on the UFA and the first four Yukon First Nations Final 
and Self-Government Agreements.  
Stephen Harper, who was also Prime Minister under a Conservative government, made 
two key contributions to furthering Crown-Indigenous relations. He issued a formal public 
apology for the Indian Residential School system in 2008 and was the first Prime Minister to 
endorse the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). On the 
other hand, along with his Minister of Indigenous Affairs, he is renowned for his adversarial 
approach to Indigenous relations and intergovernmental modern treaty relations in particular. In 
2009, at a G20 meeting, Harper undermined his previous apology by saying that Canada has “no 
history of Colonialism”. It also cannot be overlooked that Idle No More, the largest Indigenous-
led social protest movement in Canadian history, arose during Harper’s leadership. As 
Indigenous legal scholar Pam Palmater (2015) asserted, “in ten short years, Canadian Prime 
Minister Stephen Harper has set the relationship with First Nations back a hundred years” (para. 
1).   
 The Harper Government was known for its focus on economic and resource development. 
When Harper was Prime Minister, these priorities often had significant detrimental impacts on 
the intergovernmental relationships with Indigenous governments and communities across the 
country. A prime example of this is Bill S-6, which the Harper Government introduced in June 
2014. Bill S-6 proposed amendments to the Yukon Environmental and Socio-economic 
Assessment Act (YESAA), which sets out the processes for environmental and socio-economic 
assessments for all projects conducted in Yukon. YESAA was developed as part of an obligation 
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outlined in “Chapter 12: Development Assessment” in the UFA and Yukon First Nations’ Final 
Agreements. Many Yukon First Nations governments argued that the proposed changes to 
YESAA violated their land claims agreements and undermined the spirit and intent of the Act. In 
October 2015, Little Salmon-Carmacks First Nation, the Teslin Tlingit Council and Champagne 
and Aihshik First Nations filed a lawsuit against the proposed amendments. Teslin Tlingit 
Council Chief Carl Sidney argued that “the amendments through Bill S-6 undermine or weaken 
Yukon’s development assessment process and our role as Yukon First Nation governments” 
(Thomson 2015). Champagne and Aishihik First Nations Chief Steve Smith contended that the 
lawsuit “happened in part because we were not respected as being legitimate governments and as 
partners of this great confederation” (Thomson 2016). At the time that Bill S-6 was being tabled, 
Minister of Indigenous Affairs Bernard Valcourt was cited claiming that Yukon First Nations 
were not “real governments”  (CBC News 2014a), disregarding the government-to-government 
relations that were intended to flow from the Final and Self-Government Agreements. The same 
month the lawsuit was filed, a federal election was underway, and Justin Trudeau ran on an 
election promise to repeal the amendments. With the election of Prime Minister Trudeau on 
October 19, 2015, the lawsuit was set aside.  
Premier Pasloski was in full support of Bill S-6 and the proposed amendments, arguing 
that it would create “certainty” for the mining industry and broader Yukon economy (CBC News 
2014b). As demonstrated in the Peel Watershed example, Pasloski’s prioritization of resource 
development and relationships with industry often came at the expense of the modern treaties and 
the Yukon government-First Nations relations. Pasloski was raised in Saskatchewan, a Prairie 
province that has much different historical treaty relationships from Yukon. His apparent lack of 
understanding of the land claims agreements and the importance of centering these within the 
government’s mandates, priorities and policies was detrimental to the territorial government’s 
long-term relations with Yukon First Nations. Pasloski’s approach was markedly different from 
many other former Yukon Premiers—with the exception perhaps of John Ostashek—who largely 
valued strong intergovernmental treaty relations, regardless of their political ideologies.  
In 1984/85, there was a growing argument being put forward by a number of Yukoners, 
led by politicians Dan Lang and Willard Phelps, that the Yukon government needed a position at 
the land claims negotiation table to represent and protect the interests of ‘white’ Yukoners. This 
attitude shifted significantly with the election of Tony Penikett and the New Democratic Party in 
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1985. For the first time in Yukon’s political history, there was substantial Indigenous 
representation on the government side in the legislature. Four out of eight MLAs in Premier 
Penikett’s Cabinet were Indigenous. Penikett was also a strong proponent of the land claims 
agreements and argued that “there was a public interest in having a treaty and resolving these 
land claims” for all Yukoners (IT26, Penikett 2020). Penikett worked hard to prioritize the 
successful negotiation of the UFA and first four Yukon First Nations Final and Self-Government 
Agreements. He lost the election in 1992, shortly before signing off on the agreements.  
When John Ostashek was elected Premier in 1992 under a Yukon Party minority 
government, many feared he would choose not to sign-off on the agreements. A rural Yukon big 
game outfitter from a Prairie treaty context, Ostashek was well known for vociferously opposing 
the land claims agreements and advocating for non-Indigenous rural Yukoners who wanted 
assurance that their own interests were being protected in the land claims negotiations. Several 
Ministers in Ostashek’s Cabinet were also known for their opposition to Yukon First Nations’ 
political aspirations and for their staunch resistance to land claims. With the election of Premier 
Ostashek and the Yukon Party, many feared that after years of negotiations, all the progress could 
be wiped away. However, in a resounding demonstration of how important these agreements 
were to all Yukoners and to intergovernmental relations with the federal government, Ostashek 
signed off on the UFA and first four agreements. Despite this move, Ostachek became known 
from being adversarial towards Yukon First Nations throughout his term. Although significant 
progress was made during the Yukon Party’s term in negotiating the Selkirk and Little Salmon 
Carmacks First Nations Final and Self-Government Agreements, no other agreements were 
completed and signed-off on under the Ostachek government.     
The late Denis Fentie was elected Premier under a Yukon Party majority government in 
2002. Fentie was born in Alberta and raised in Watson Lake, a rural conservative community in 
southeast Yukon that is located within the traditional territory of the Kaska First Nation. Fentie, 
who started his career as an NDP MLA, was said to be a very pragmatic politician and knew the 
value of establishing strong intergovernmental relations with Yukon First Nations (IT21, Hanson 
2020; IT29, Sinclair 2020). Although Fentie supported mining and resource development, he also 
saw the importance of balancing development with honouring the modern treaties. Throughout 
his time as Premier, he worked closely with the Kaska First Nation to try and negotiate a 
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successful land claim. In addition, he established the Yukon Forum, an intergovernmental forum 
that brought together all Yukon First Nations leaders and the Government of Yukon. 
Individual leaders can have a profound effect on intergovernmental relationships and 
modern treaty implementation. These relationships reflect the commitment and priorities of the 
individual Prime Ministers, Yukon First Nations Chiefs and Yukon Premiers; they also reflect the 
alignment of priorities across the levels of government. In Yukon, the transition from one 
government to the next and, often, shifts in political ideologies have not necessarily impeded 
progress on modern treaty implementation, nor have they been the root cause of the breakdown in 
intergovernmental treaty relationships. In 2016, an ideal alignment of objectives occurred with 
the leaders who were in place at all levels of government.25 These leaders demonstrated 
commitments to, and prioritization of, implementing the land claims agreements, improving the 
damaged intergovernmental treaty relationships and honouring the spirit and intent of the 
agreements in Yukon.  
6.3 Spirit and Intent Versus the Letter of the Law 
Honouring the spirit and intent of the treaties means recognizing the reciprocity, respect 
and commitment made between governments when the agreements were first negotiated. 
Reference is sometimes made to honouring the spirit and intent of treaties as opposed to simply 
recognizing the word-for-word obligations as outlined in the texts of the Final and Self-
Government Agreements. Reports from the Auditor General, the Land Claims Agreements 
Coalition and the Senate Standing Committee on Aboriginal Peoples have accused the federal 
government of neglecting to look beyond the letter of the law to truly implement the intent that is 
at the heart of these modern treaties. Similar concerns have been raised about the Government of 
Yukon’s narrow approach to treaty implementation. In the view of a long-time Yukon First 
Nation government employee, implementation is all about fulfilling the spirit and intent of the 
agreement: “these agreements were made with a specific spirit and intent there, the original 
negotiators, the Elders, the Chiefs, the officials, all of the other people that were involved all of 
 
25 The leaders in place in 2016 included: Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, Premier Sandy Silver, 
Grand Chief Peter Johnson, Champagne and Aishihik First Nations’ Chief Steve Smith, Tr’ondëk 
Hwëch’in Chief Roberta Joseph, and Vuntut Gwitchin Government Chief Bruce Charlie.  
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the way through for 20+ years, had an intent, and we have to honour that” (IT11, Yukon First 
Nation government employee 2017). Elder Angie Joseph-Rear explained, 
…In the beginning, [the spirit and intent] sounded like, yes, we agree. All three of 
us. That’s why we shook hands and exchanged gifts and words. It’s in spirit. And 
along the way, as First Nations people, we will interpret it as, yes, we trust you 
that will continue, we have to. Implementation is a further negotiation, further 
devolution, and part of the agreement…It’s not what is happening (IT4, Joseph-
Rear 2016). 
 
Conflicting approaches to implementing modern treaties is often attributed to 
interpretation difficulties and conflict between fulfilling the letter of the law versus upholding the 
spirit and intent of the agreements (Papillon 2008; AANDC 2013; Asch 2014; Senate Standing 
Committee on Aboriginal Peoples 2008; Government of Canada 2015). The government 
approaches implementation as a contractual obligation; viewing its roles as complete once the 
agreement has been signed (Senate Standing Committee on Aboriginal Peoples 2008, 13). 
Further, the federal and territorial governments have been criticized for very narrowly 
interpreting what they are obligated to implement. The Yukon government demonstrated its 
narrow focus in the Peel Watershed when it interpreted the meaning of consultation and the 
process for regional land use planning. Another example raised by several interviewees involves 
the “shall” clauses in the agreements (e.g., “Government shall consult with the affected First 
Nation” (DIAND 1993b, 48)) and the “may” clauses in the agreements (e.g., “A Yukon First 
Nation and Government may agree to exchange Crown Land for Settlement Land…” (DIAND 
1993b, 84)). At the time of negotiation, the difference between these two simple words was 
fervently debated, and hours were spent deciding on which term to use for a single clause. The 
federal and territorial governments believed that all parties were bound to implementing the 
clauses that said, “shall”. The “may” clauses, on the other hand, were not seen as binding. 
Gerberding contended, “Canada and the Yukon have taken the view that really the only 
obligations are to the “shall” clauses and then only narrowly (IT7, Gerberding 2016). The “may” 
clauses are just so much as a pipe dream.” Many Yukon First Nations governments believed that 
the parties should have “a genuine willingness to consider whatever the “may” clauses said might 
be done” (IT7, Gerberding 2016) and commitment to look beyond a single word and 
acknowledge the broader objectives of the agreements. 
Interviewees indicated that neither the federal nor territorial civil servants were mandated 
to implement the spirit and intent of the agreements, the argument being that “spirit and intent” 
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cannot be defined or measured. Civil servants within both governments are, on the other hand, 
mandated to fulfill their obligations contained within the clauses of each of the chapters. Based 
on these perspectives, it seems clear that the civil servants were authorized to implement the 
treaties as written and not to rely on the value and imprecise concept of the “spirit and intent” of 
the treaties, which however, were fundamentally important to the Yukon First Nations. 
Paralleling the experience of the historic treaties, First Nations believed that underlying these 
agreements was a spirit and intent to honour the agreements beyond the black and white letter-
for-letter wording in the clauses of the agreements. 
Further, First Nations representatives have asserted that one the most significant 
challenges throughout implementation has been the federal and territorial governments’ narrow 
focus on the substantive clauses in the agreements at the expense of the overarching objectives 
(IT15, Strand 2017; IT7, Gerberding 2016). At the beginning of several chapters in the Final 
Agreements, are a series of objectives. Former Champagne and Aishihik First Nations Chief 
Diane Strand addressed the challenges her government has faced with the interpretation and 
implementation of its agreements: “the objectives of the chapter are something that is near and 
dear to us, and this is why, in our way of thinking, that would be our treaty” (IT15, Strand 2017) 
Using the example of “Chapter 13: Heritage”, Strand pointed out that its objectives are “very 
spiritual, that is something that is coming from within; it’s part of the land, it’s part of who we 
are, looking at all four elements”, adding, “Disregarding those objectives and just looking at the 
substantive clauses, is really disheartening” (IT15, Strand 2017). The objectives of these chapters 
signify the original intent behind fighting for land claims: achieving self-determination and 
protection of land, language and culture for today and for future generations. To meet the 
objectives in the Final Agreement chapters, modern treaties need to be viewed as “living 
documents” that change and adapt as contexts and priorities of the signatories change (Papillon 
2008, 15). Political Science scholar Martin Papillon (2008) suggested, “Treaties must evolve and 
adjust to changing realities on the ground” (15). It is fundamentally important that all Parties to 
the Yukon agreements—the Government of Canada, the Government of Yukon and Yukon First 
Nations governments—consider the overarching objectives of the chapters and not simply what 





6.4 Dispute Resolution and Reliance on the Courts 
Multiparty agreements, land claims or otherwise, are complex documents subject to 
differences of opinion and interpretation. Mechanisms to resolve difference are essential. With a 
multiparty agreement that took nearly twenty years to negotiate, compromises were certainly 
made and the Parties to the agreements could not possibly anticipate every issue that might arise. 
When the UFA was negotiated, land claims agreements were relatively new in Canada, and 
unforeseen developments were expected throughout implementation. With changing governments 
came changing objectives, priorities and mandates, which inevitably led to disputes.  
When intergovernmental conflicts related to the Final and Self-Government Agreements 
arise in Yukon, the parties can turn to the courts or to dispute resolution mechanisms. At the time 
of negotiation, Yukon First Nations fought hard for the inclusion of a dispute resolution chapter 
in the UFA, despite opposition from the federal government. Yukon First Nations saw the 
importance of building a process that respected their traditional ways of resolving issues and not 
just the adversarial process that is built into the court system (First Principles Project 2020, 8). 
The dispute resolution process is founded on trusting and respectful relationships and 
accommodates different capacities for people to participate in the process, including community 
members. “Chapter 26: Dispute Resolution” in the UFA and Yukon First Nations Final 
Agreements outlines processes and mechanisms that allow the parties to resolve disputes by 
mediation or arbitration. The two objectives of this chapter are as follows:  
26.1.1.1 to establish a comprehensive dispute resolution process for resolving 
disputes which arise out of the interpretation, administration or implementation of 
Settlement Agreements or Settlement Legislation; and  
 
26.1.1.2 to facilitate the out-of-court resolution of disputes under 26.1.1, in a non-
adversarial and informal atmosphere (DIAND 1993b, 271).  
 
The Dispute Resolution Board (DRB), established under article 26.5.4.6 of the UFA and 
Yukon First Nation Final Agreements, comprises three members jointly appointed by the Parties 
to the agreements—the Government of Yukon, Yukon First Nations governments and the 
Government of Canada. The DRB establishes the rules and procedures for the mediation and 
arbitration processes (Yukon Dispute Resolution Board 2019). The intent of the DRB is to 
facilitate “an out-of-court, non-adversarial alternative dispute resolution process to resolve 
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disputes arising from the interpretation, administration or implementation of the settlement 
agreements and legislation” (Yukon Dispute Resolution Board n.d., 1) 
Unlike court proceedings, the two main dispute resolution mechanisms outlined in 
Chapter 26—mediation and arbitration—are intended to be informal and non-adversarial. The 
DRB states that “mediation is a negotiation process moderated by an independent and impartial 
facilitator, the mediator”(Yukon Dispute Resolution Board 2019, 3). Mediation allows the parties 
to find and develop a process that works for everyone. In a cross-cultural environment, this 
approach can be much more valuable than formalized western-centered court proceedings. 
Arbitration, on the other hand, “is an adjudication process presided over by an independent and 
impartial arbitrator whose role is very similar to that of a judge in a court. Unlike the public 
courts, however, arbitrations are generally not open to the public” (Yukon Dispute Resolution 
Board 2019, 3). Ultimately, the decision of an arbitrator is binding; although, arbitration is seen 
to be much more flexible than public courts and, like mediation, it allows the parties to adapt the 
process to meet the needs of the case (Yukon Dispute Resolution Board 2019, 3).  
Anticipating differences of interpretation during implementation, the Parties to the 
agreements were determined to include a dispute resolution chapter in the UFA. As a former 
federal government employee involved in the negotiations indicated,  
Sometimes you get agreement by elevating the language to the level of generality 
that both parties can say they agree to, even though they may have different 
understandings of what it is. We knew that this was going to happen, so we set out 
mediation and arbitration provisions” (IT17, former federal government employee 
2016).  
 
Unfortunately, the dispute resolution chapter was written out in formal and legalistic language 
and is often interpreted in a strict way. Consequently, with few exceptions, since the signing of 
the Yukon land claims agreements, the dispute resolution chapter has almost never been used 
(IT27, Stuart 2017; IT26, Penikett 2020; IT25, McCullough 2020). 
There are contrasting perspectives on why dispute resolution mechanisms have been 
underused and why the Parties to the agreements have chosen to turn to the courts when conflicts 
have arisen. Several First Nations representatives at the First Principles Project gathering argued 
that the federal and territorial governments see things in black and white or “win versus lose” and 
would rather turn to the courts for resolution (pers. notes from First Principles Project 2020). 
Stuart argued that not all problems can easily be broken down into black and white legal contexts 
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(IT27, Stuart 2020). On the other hand, there are times that reliance on the courts is required to 
assert certainty and to set precedence for the future (IT25, McCullough 2020). We saw a clear 
example of this with the Peel Watershed court case when it was escalated to the Supreme Court 
of Canada. Aware there would be more regional land use planning processes in future, Yukon 
First Nations wanted certainty that they would not end up back in the courts over conflicts in 
interpreting “Chapter 11: Land use Planning”. Other critical court cases, such as the Calder 
case26 and Beckman v. Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation27, have set precedent for land claims 
and Aboriginal rights more broadly.  
Lesley McCullough argued that although there have been some significant court cases, in 
the bigger picture and compared to other parts of the country, there has not been a reliance on the 
courts or the dispute resolution mechanisms in Yukon (IT25, McCullough 2020). She further 
argued that the absence of the use of dispute resolution in Yukon does not necessarily indicate 
that intergovernmental relations have broken down (IT25, McCullough 2020), adding, “I don’t 
feel disappointed that governments disagree and don’t necessarily take advantage of the formal 
dispute resolution provisions. It’s an excellent tool but I also think we need to respect 
governments to decide which tool is the best tool to be used at the time” (IT25, McCullough 
2020). In addition, McCullough pointed out that the land claims agreements and these 
intergovernmental treaty relations are relatively new. They are less than thirty years old. She 
 
26 R v. Calder (the Calder case) was ruled on in 1973. The case involved the Nisga’a Nation from 
Northern BC, who were suing the Government of British Columbia, seeking a declaration that 
title to their lands had never been lawfully extinguished. The case was lost in the Supreme Court 
of British Columbia, as well as the Court of Appeal of British Columbia. At the Supreme Court 
of Canada, six out of seven of the judges were split in their decision on whether Nisga’a title to 
the land had been extinguished. The seventh judge tipped the balance on a procedural point and 
the case was lost for the Nisga’a. However, for the first time in history, six out of seven judges 
ruled that Aboriginal title existed in Canadian law. This was the first time the Supreme Court of 
Canada acknowledged that Indigenous peoples had title to their land before Europeans arrived in 
North America.  
27 Beckman v. Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation was an instrumental case examining the 
Crown’s duty to consult Yukon First Nations within the context of a modern treaty. This was the 
first Supreme Court decision to examine the duty to consult within this context. On November 
19, 2010, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the Crown had met their duty to consult even 
though they had not met with the First Nations in person. They had met the duty through 
consideration of written submissions. Though the Little Salmon Carmacks First Nation lost this 
case, the discussion and judgement included important language around the definition of the duty 
to consult and its application. In addition, it laid out important implications for third party’s duty 
to consult with First Nations.  
 
 132 
argued that it will take time for the parties to navigate these new relationships and new processes, 
and, in time, the dispute resolution mechanisms will be used (IT25, McCullough 2020).  
Former Government of Yukon Chief Negotiator Barry Stuart, who has spent decades 
working in restorative justice and alternative dispute resolution (ADR), argued that the 
negotiators did not go far enough with Chapter 26: “There wasn’t enough time spent on it… We 
didn’t recognize the importance of following up on so many aspects that were part of the 
implementation of this chapter” (IT27, Stuart 2020). According to Stuart, the Chiefs, territorial 
and federal government leaders, and other key people in the territory needed training to be able to 
do ADR and to understand the benefits this process could bring to maintaining respectful 
intergovernmental relations while resolving disputes (IT27, Stuart 2020).   
Dispute resolution acknowledges and uses traditional values and processes. If used 
properly, it could be an invaluable tool for rebuilding relationships and trust amongst 
governments. Several participants at the First Principles Project gathering spoke to the need to 
strategically educate each of the parties on what dispute resolution and mediation entail and when 
it is appropriate and beneficial to use these processes in place of relying on the courts (pers. notes 
from First Principles Project 2020). McCullough suggested that “the dispute resolution chapter 
could support the government-to-government relationships in the long term” (IT25, McCullough 
2020). However, the parties need to have confidence in the process and need to see it as a valid 
process to turn to.  
Mediation and arbitration are only valuable mechanisms if there is a will from both sides 
to work together to resolve the dispute. As political scientist Gerald Baier contends, “when courts 
are relied upon to resolve intergovernmental disputes it is a clear sign that governments have 
either run out of opportunities and patience for negotiation or have taken entrenched positions 
that do not allow them to compromise with one another” (2020, 91). Currently, 
intergovernmental disputes that arise in Yukon are primarily being resolved in the court systems, 
perhaps because the negotiators underestimated what was required for the alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms to be used: strong relationships, trust and shared interests between the 
parties. As a result, all Parties to the agreements have fallen back on relying on the courts to 





6.5 Conclusion  
The intergovernmental treaty relationships in Yukon deteriorated between the period of 
approximately 2003 and 2016. This chapter explored three broad trends that contributed to the 
breakdown of these relationships: (1) continuity, capacity and understanding of the agreements; 
(2) the conflict between the spirit and intent of the agreements versus the letter of the law; and (3) 
dispute resolution and reliance on the courts. To successfully implement these agreements, all 
parties must have political will and good faith. Several interviewees said that 2016 was a critical 
turning point in Yukon, with new leaders at all levels of government. A Yukon First Nation 
government employee contended, “I think we’re at a really interesting point in history right now 
in terms of being able to maximize our agreements and actually achieve what I call spirit and 
intent of the agreement because of the political will at both levels of government” (IT9, Yukon 
First Nation government employee, 2017). As governments struggle with diverse priorities and 
mandates, instrumental to successfully negotiating these agreements are improved government-
to-government relationships and an acknowledgement of a common overarching goal to honour 
the spirit and intent of the agreements.  
To understand the modern treaty implementation successes and to overcome the barriers, 
two things are needed: first, a sound knowledge of the policies, processes and structures that are 
in place to facilitate implementation, and second, an understanding of the relationships and the 
individuals who are putting these agreements into action. Lesley McCullough stated, “We always 
have to be aware of the relationships. The relationship is in and of itself an objective [of the 
agreements]” (IT25, McCullough 2020). These two key pieces to modern treaty implementation 




7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION: CONCEPTUALIZING MODERN TREATY 
IMPLEMENTATION  
Government processes, including something as crucial as treaty implementation, occur in 
the midst of a constant swirl of policy issues, program and policy changes, elections, regime 
changes, administrative turnover, and other political and governmental challenges. The study of 
public policy always requires two key elements: the development and formation of policy, and 
the implementation of policy. Implementation, however, is often overlooked. American historian 
Paul Prucha once wrote, “a policy can be fully understood only by watching it unfold in 
practice” (Prucha 1971, 15). Treaties in and of themselves are not public policy instruments in 
the limited sense of the concept; they are higher level agreements between governments. The 
public policy implementation literature contributes to the understanding of modern treaty 
implementation, as well as the complex nature of multiparty intergovernmental relationships 
created through treaties. On the other hand, the nature of the implementation literature also 
emphasized the challenge of conceptualizing a regional study of treaty efforts. Due to the 
complexity and cross-cultural elements of land claims agreements, it rarely works to try and fit 
them into the existing theoretical and conceptual frameworks. The agreements are also accords 
between Indigenous peoples, the Government of Canada, and a sub-national government or 
governments, and multiparty arrangements have attracted little scholarly attention.  
The dissertation addressed two key issues: how have the partners in the negotiation of a 
modern treaty managed the transition from negotiation to implementation, and what does this 
transition reveal about the modern treaty process in Canada? This study examined the experience 
of negotiating and implementing modern treaties in Yukon between 1986 to 2016. More 
specifically, it sought to understand the experience of negotiating and implementing the 
Umbrella Final Agreement, as well as the Final Agreements of the Champagne and Aishihik, 
Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in, and Vuntut Gwitchin First Nations.  
After a failed Agreement in Principle in Yukon in 1984, the Government of Canada 
suspended land claims negotiations while they reviewed their existing negotiation policy. In 
1986, the Government of Canada released a revised comprehensive land claims policy, which 
outlined an intricate, complex, and multi-layered approach to modern treaty negotiations in 
Canada. Implementation planning was included as a requirement of land claims negotiations for 
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the first time. This set the path towards the successful negotiation of the Umbrella Final 
Agreement and the first four Yukon First Nations Final and Self-Government Agreements, 
signed in 1993. A significant transitional year occurred across all levels of government in Yukon 
in 2015-2016. Justin Trudeau had been recently elected Prime Minister under a new Liberal 
majority government at the end of 2015. The next year saw the election of a new Grand Chief of 
the Council of Yukon First Nations, Peter Johnston, and there was a new Liberal government 
elected in Yukon, under the leadership of Sandy Silver. In their elections, all three of these 
political leaders made significant commitments to honouring the land claims agreements and re-
igniting the intergovernmental treaty relationships that are central to these agreements. Jim 
Harper explained that he observed much more progressive approaches to implementation under 
the leadership of Premier Silver and Prime Minister Trudeau (IT32, Harper 2020). He pointed 
out that “it was pretty clear the Trudeau government was prepared to make significant 
commitments, policy change, statements of political will, [and] new funding on an ongoing 
basis” (IT32, Harper 2020). This marked a significant shift from the repeated breakdown of 
relationships and increasing barriers to modern treaty implementation that had characterized the 
previous twenty years.  
The close examination of the experience of negotiating and implementing land claims 
agreements in Yukon during this time period (1986-2016) reveals that all Parties to the 
agreements made a significant commitment to seeing these modern treaties successfully 
negotiated. However, there was a clear disconnect between the negotiation phase and putting 
these agreements into action. This study examined two key topics related to modern treaties that 
explain some of the more significant barriers and challenges to implementation. The first topic, 
modern treaty implementation policies, processes and structures was the focus of Chapter 5. 
Analysis of how these processes and structures developed and evolved over time, particularly at 
the federal and territorial government level revealed the complex nature of these multiparty 
agreements. A Yukon First Nation representative described the potential Yukon holds in 
demonstrating to the rest of the country “how this [treaty] relationship could work” (IT9, Yukon 
First Nation government employee 2017). However, the reviews of implementation progress in 
Yukon concluded that one of “the biggest challenges to implementation was that other 
governments weren’t willing to change their policies and practices to embrace self-government” 
(IT9, Yukon First Nation government employee 2017). Since the signing of the James Bay and 
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Northern Quebec Agreement in 1975, the forty-five years of modern treaty implementation in 
Canada (twenty-eight years in Yukon) witnessed only slow and incremental changes to these 
policies and approaches to modern treaty implementation. Political and policy promises were 
rarely translated into substantive action.  
The completion of land claims processes did not occur in isolation. While Yukon First 
Nations negotiated their way into Confederation, the Government of Yukon sought to restructure 
its relationship with the federal government. These parallel processes, both fundamentally 
important to Yukon governance, intersected in many important respects. Devolution of land and 
governance rights to the Government of Yukon transformed fundamentally the political and 
administrative options available to Yukon First Nations. In addition, it resulted in a lengthy 
period of time where both the Government of Yukon and Yukon First Nations were struggling to 
build capacity and navigating this new intergovernmental reality in Yukon. Duncan Sinclair 
explained, “We needed to move to a whole new place around cooperation and collaboration and 
respect, and [to] new ways of doing business” (IT29, Sinclair 2020).  
Foundational to many of the modern treaty implementation barriers and challenges in 
Yukon are the intersection of intergovernmental relations between the federal, territorial and 
Yukon First Nations governments. These intergovernmental relationships were the second topic 
examined in this study and was the focus of Chapter 6. Central to the success of modern treaty 
negotiations in Yukon were the relationships built between the individuals on the ground at all 
three levels of government. These relationships were founded on trust, respect and a shared 
commitment to seeing the agreements successfully negotiated. Throughout implementation, 
these relationships have unravelled overtime as a result of changing governments, changing 
policies and changing priorities. Sinclair pointed out, “I think it really came down to the 
relationships and individual people either having the political will or not having the political will. 
We saw a period of time there where the relationships certainly broke down quite significantly 
[in Yukon]” (IT29, Sinclair 2020). Chapter 6 identified three key trends that have contributed to 
this breakdown of relationships throughout implementation: (1) continuity, capacity and 
understanding of the agreements; (2) conflict between honouring the spirit and intent versus the 
letter of the law; and (3) dispute resolution and reliance on the courts to settle outstanding and 
unresolved conflicts.  
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The time period of this study (1986-2016) observed significant shifts in the prioritization 
of Indigenous-government relations and the centrality of modern treaty relationships between 
governments in Yukon. This resulted in strained relations between Yukon First Nations 
signatories and their government partners at the federal and territorial level. This study described 
a disconnect between the political desire to honour the treaties and a commitment to meeting the 
administrative obligations impeded in the agreements. Though there has been a shift in the 
political will towards honouring the obligations and responsibility to seeing these agreements 
fully implemented, there has also been a sense of resistance and only incremental change within 
the bureaucracy itself. This phenomenon is observable within the federal public service, but 
similar concerns emerged within the Government of Yukon.  
A “whole of government” responsibility is required to see these agreements fulfilled. Jim 
Harper asserted, “There is a need to make sure that departments understand. It is not just a 
political mandate at Cabinet level. It is not just a mandate for the Aboriginal Relations division. 
It’s a mandate for the government as a whole” (IT32, Harper 2020). A sense of urgency is being 
emphasized—from former negotiators at all three levels of government, as well as Indigenous 
modern treaty holders and implementation staff—for the need to better educate and train public 
servants about the content, contexts and intent of the land claims agreements, as well as the 
responsibilities across the different departments within government. This need is not unique to 
the federal government but is seen as a requirement for all Parties to the agreements. Former 
Premier Tony Penikett stressed this issue is “system wide: federal, provincial, perhaps even at 
the First Nation-level, this is a problem. People don’t know their own history, they’re not 
interested in their own history, [and] they don’t have any mastery of the issues” (IT26, Penikett 
2020).  
Greater efforts need to be made to ensure that new and current public servants within all 
governments have a concrete understanding of the intent and meaning of each of the chapters of 
the agreements. Further, junior and senior public servants working on modern treaty 
implementation within the federal and territorial governments demonstrate a lack of sufficient 
training to understand the unique cultural, political, social and historical contexts of the Yukon. 
This can be explained by consistent turnover and regular introduction of new faces within the 
public service, as well as a lack of attention to the need for regular opportunities for learning. 
Training must be routine, ongoing and reflect the current condition. Without this foundational 
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understanding, it is difficult to move beyond the black and white obligations and truly explore 
and execute the spirit and intent of the agreements. There will be no effective, honest and 
meaningful implementation of Yukon land claims without an ongoing commitment to a shared 
understanding and political will at all levels of government to seeing these agreements 
successfully implemented. This commitment must also be inclusive of the need to recognize and 
honour the centrality of the treaties to First Nations-government relations in Yukon. 
7.1 Lessons for public policy theory and practice  
This study outlined several policy implications and lessons for public policy theory and 
practice. First: it is crucial that leaders, decision makers and civil servants not underestimate the 
importance of implementation, which needs to be recognized as important as the negotiations 
themselves. Implementation planning cannot simply be seen as a ‘check-the-box’ requirement to 
getting agreements completed. Implementation planning should be an integral part of the 
negotiation process of land claims agreements. A longer-term view, beyond a narrow vision of 
five to ten years post-agreement, is required. Part of this process should involve preparing for, 
and anticipating, implementation reviews that are built into the implementation plans. Reviews 
ensure efficiency, effectiveness and accountability (DIAND 2007, 35). During the 
implementation planning phase, frameworks and baseline indicators and data need to be 
established in order to accurately assess implementation successes, impacts and outcomes. 
During review periods, it is necessary to be able to evaluate and track objectives, and also to 
measure the effectiveness of the agreements. It is important to examine what is not working in 
implementation but also to be able to formally evaluate and monitor the successes and outcomes 
of these agreements at the community level.  
Second: it is critical to have a clear understanding of the original goals and intent for 
negotiating a modern treaty. Modern treaty implementation will be judged against these 
standards. In Yukon, the original intent of the treaties for Yukon First Nations included cultural 
preservation, self-determination and protection of lands and resources. William Josie, who has 
held multiple different political and administrative roles within Vuntut Gwitchin Government 
since the mid-1990s, explained, “our objective was to take control of our territory. We want to 
run our own affairs, our own lives, our own community” (IT3, Josie 2016). Speaking on behalf 
of Champagne and Aishihik First Nations, Lawrence Joe stated, “I think our mandate was to 
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have as much influence and as much power over decisions that affect us… We want to protect 
our land, protect the water, protect the fish, protect the ability to live as Aboriginal people” (IT8, 
Joe 2017).   
For the Government of Yukon, the intent and objective for wanting a seat at the table was 
initially one of opposition to the agreements but this turned into a strategy to building pathways 
to reconciliation and successful co-existence in Yukon, ultimately paving the way for 
development. Speaking to the original intent of the federal government’s involvement in land 
claims negotiations, Tim Koepke stated, “Canada wanted to discharge its outstanding 
constitutional obligations for settling claims, and it wanted to, as part of that, promote legal 
certainty to lands and resources” (IT16, Koepke 2016). Ultimately, the original intent for the 
Government of Canada was to obtain certainty by removing claims to the land and paving the 
way for economic development in the North.  
This understanding should have been evident from the long, and largely unsatisfactory, 
history of treaty-making in Canada. Broken promises factor prominently in these crucial treaty 
relationships. Indeed, lessons learned from some of the earlier modern treaties to be signed in 
Canada, and more recent changes to government policies, processes and mandates played 
important roles in the successful negotiation of modern treaties in Canada. In addition, these 
mechanisms emphasize the importance of implementation in the modern treaty process. We now 
need to see this exhibited in more direct and substantive action. In 2014, we saw the Government 
of Canada committed to the development of an interim land claims policy to replace the much-
outdated 1986 comprehensive land claims policy. To date, further development to move beyond 
an interim policy has stalled. 
Third: implementation staff at all levels of government require a clear understanding of 
the foundational historical, political, social, and economic contexts that are foundational to these 
agreements. Public servants working in direct implementation roles and those who have more 
indirect responsibilities to implementing specific obligations in the agreements must have a clear 
understanding of the intent behind each of the chapters. With a few exceptions, no one working 
in implementation today was involved in the original negotiation of the land claims agreements 
in Yukon. This lack of institutional memory has serious implications. Without a clear 
understanding of the history and the intent of these agreements, there is significant risk of 
misinterpreting what was intended and placing further strain on the intergovernmental treaty 
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relations. This also creates further risk of future court challenges over interpretation of the 
agreements.  
Finally, Indigenous peoples are the co-creators of these major agreements. This level of 
multiparty co-development had not occurred in Canada; the Yukon set a precedent for multiparty 
intergovernmental agreements. Modern treaties laid the foundations for multilevel government 
and intergovernmental policy development in Yukon and across the country. Political science 
scholar Martin Papillon conducted extensive research on multilevel governance and 
intergovernmental relations. In reference to co-policy development between Indigenous groups 
and public governments, Papillon argues, “their scope and effectiveness also vary considerably. 
While some processes lead to successful collaboration and innovative policies, others produce 
little more than time-consuming meetings with little to show for it” (Papillon 2020, 415). 
Additionally, public governments have not yet employed policy co-development from a 
perspective that sees all parties as equal partners and that truly embraces the possibilities for 
integrating both western and Indigenous worldviews into policy development. Even after forty-
five years of taking Indigenous issues more seriously, the process of seeing these things through 
an Indigenous worldview is still lacking. A significant gap exists within the co-development and 
implementation of policies that bridge western and Indigenous worldviews and ways of 
knowing. Though this study did not explicitly look at this, it is an important area of study that 
needs to be examined and could have important policy implications in the future.  
7.2 Suggestions for future academic research  
There is limited scholarly work on land claims implementation in Canada. The broader 
field of policy implementation research is also an oft-neglected area of public policy scholarship. 
This study contributes to a growing need for applied and academic research centering on policy 
implementation, and more specifically on modern treaty implementation and intergovernmental 
treaty relations. It is important to recognize, however, the growing momentum that has been 
building around academic research centered on modern treaty implementation. In 2014, the Land 
Claims Agreements Coalition Research Group was established to gather evidence to assist policy 
and decision makers in improving modern treaty implementation. In 2015, the Modern Treaty 
Implementation Research Project, led by Stephanie Irlbacher-Fox, brought together researchers 
from across Canada to work alongside modern treaty practitioners to partner on a six-year Social 
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Sciences and Humanities Research Council Partnership Grant. This project will play a critical 
role in producing a diversity of understandings of modern treaty implementation. In addition to 
this work, in 2017, Chris Alcantara developed an “an analytical framework for studying the 
politics of intergovernmental relations in the implementation of modern treaties in Canada” 
(Alcantara 2017, 329). A key area of research could build off Alcantara’s work through an 
application of this framework. 
This dissertation analyzed the experiences of modern treaty implementation by 
examining three Yukon First Nations Final Agreements. There have not been uniform 
experiences across modern treaty holders in Canada, and it will be important to continue this 
research through an inter-jurisdictional study in other parts of the country to assess whether there 
are similar barriers and challenges that are being experienced within implementation of modern 
treaties and the relationships amongst the Parties to the agreements. In addition, there are unique 
barriers and challenges that arise when implementing specific chapters of the agreements. There 
has been further interest identified in Yukon for conducting analysis of the experience of 
implementing individual chapters of the Yukon Final and Self-government Agreements, such as 
Chapter 22: Economic Development Measures.  
Future research should be conducted around multilevel governance, expanding on some 
of the existing work by scholars such as Martin Papillon and Chris Alcantara (Papillon 2020; 
2008; Papillon and Juneau 2015; Alcantara and Morden 2019; Alcantara and Nelles 2014). In a 
recent book chapter authored by Papillon (2020), he explores “the relationship between 
Indigenous peoples and Canadian federalism” (415). Papillon speaks to the impactful changes 
that have occurred in Canada’s recent history regarding multi-level governance and 
intergovernmental relations with Indigenous organizations and governing authorities (397). On 
the other hand, he asserts that, “these changes are more incremental than transformative in 
nature. They do not alter the fundamental power structures in Canadian federalism, nor do they 
recast what remains a profoundly unequal relationship built on colonialism” (Papillon 2020, 
397). Building on some of the discussions in this dissertation, research should continue to be 
conducted around the asymmetry of power between governments—federal, provincial/territorial 
and Indigenous—and should seek to explore how we can create fundamental changes to these 
unequal relationships.  
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Expanding on the discussion of multilevel governance, future research could also 
examine policy co-development. Questions for framing this research could try to determine if co-
development of policies works. It is also difficult to know how to move beyond consultation and 
collaboration at the policy development stage to collaboration at the implementation stage. 
Lastly, it is useful to determine what lessons can be drawn from other intergovernmental 
relations case studies, including non-Indigenous, sub-national government examples. 
Finally, there is a need to expand the study on implementation and specifically 
implementation of multi-party agreements. The multiparty component adds a very different layer 
of complexity to implementation and intergovernmental relations. This study situates instead 
within a growing body of scholarship within the field of public policy, intergovernmental 
relations and multilevel governance. 
While conducting this research, gaps emerged that will be critical to better understanding 
the barriers and challenges to modern treaty implementation and intergovernmental treaty 
relations in Yukon and further beyond. For example, an in-depth examination of the experience 
of devolution was beyond the scope of this thesis. The process of devolution, which involved 
political and administrative capacity being transferred to the Yukon Territorial Government was 
taking place simultaneously with the Yukon land claims process. An important research topic 
should examine how Yukon political development, and more specifically devolution, impacted 
modern treaty implementation.  
Another gap is the need to identify whether there has been incremental lesson learning 
done in Yukon through implementation of the last three agreements that were negotiated and 
signed: Kluane, Kwanlin Dün, and Carcross/Tagish First Nations. A research question should 
consider the lessons learned throughout the implementation of the first eight Yukon First Nations 
agreements that were applied to these later ones and assess the degree to which this learning 
changed the implementation experience. More broadly, this could be applied to some of the more 
recent agreements signed in Canada, such as the Tsawwassen First Nation and the Tla'amin 
Nation Final Agreements in British Columbia. It is important to learn the degree to which the 
northern experience of treaty-making affected negotiations in southern Canada.  
This study showed how fixation on negotiation underestimates the enormous amount of 
work needed to be done through implementation. It also demonstrated the critical importance of 
the micro-level impacts on implementation of relationship building and the key roles that a small 
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number of individuals played in the process. Within the study of public policy and 
intergovernmental relations, the people at the centre of these processes can be just as important 
as the macro-level factors. Understanding the relationship dynamics and the influence of key 
individuals is even more important in the North when we think about the politics of smallness. 
Coates (2014) explained, the politics of smallness “shows that the webs of connections and 
personal histories, for better or worse, shape electoral processes, administrative systems, and 
decision-making in areas with small populations” (24). The size of the political environment and 
the interconnected networks between all the Parties to the agreements in Yukon has had a direct 
impact on the course of land claims implementation. We cannot underestimate the importance of 
the politics of smallness to understanding the dynamics of land claims implementation in Yukon 
and across the North.  
7.3 Conclusion   
On a cold weekend in January 2020, forty people gathered in a room at the Kwanlin Dün 
Cultural Centre in Whitehorse, Yukon. It was the third day in a row that the weather was below 
40 degrees Celsius and people had travelled in from several Yukon communities as well as from 
outside of the territory. This group represented a significant number of the original federal, 
territorial and Yukon First Nations leaders and negotiators involved in the negotiation of the 
Yukon First Nations Umbrella Final Agreement between 1973-1993. Recognizing a lack of 
understanding of the original spirit and intent of the land claims agreements amongst present-day 
leaders and public servants at all levels of government, these individuals came together to try and 
capture on paper the original intent behind the negotiation of each of the chapters of the Yukon 
land claims agreements. The disconnect between understanding the original meaning and intent 
of the objectives of the agreements played a significant role in the breakdown of relationships 
and led to significant barriers to implementation of both the Final and Self-Government 
Agreements in Yukon. This gathering confirmed the necessity for having a greater appreciation 
of the key transition from spending more than twenty years negotiating an agreement to 
implementing the agreement (First Principles Project 2020).   
Politics played an influential role in determining the pace at which implementation 
occurred over the years and whether implementation and intergovernmental treaty relations were 
even seen as a priority. Many of the key barriers and challenges to implementation are tied to the 
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political decision-makers in power at the time. Funding remained one of the most central issues. 
The lack of appropriate funding for both implementation planning and implementation itself 
created ongoing challenges for Indigenous treaty signatories. In addition, despite these being 
government-to-government agreements, the imbalance of power between governments and the 
asymmetry of capacity within each level of government persists. This predominantly 
disadvantaged the Indigenous governments who are Parties to these agreements. Finally, the 
experience of implementation planning in Yukon, challenged the federal, provincial and 
territorial governments to adopt a more long-term vision of the Indigenous-government 
relationships. Public governments are driven and constrained by political mandates and election 
cycles. First Nations, on the other hand, live with these agreements every day, and emphasize the 
importance of having a vision of how these agreements will operate and benefit citizens for the 
next seven generations.   
As Tim Gerberding stressed, a fundamental transformation in cultural perspective and 
concepts of governance is required across all three levels of government if these agreements are 
to be successfully implemented (IT7, Gerberding 2019). This fundamental shift would need a 
system-wide change within the federal and territorial governments with regards to 
implementation, how they view their roles and responsibilities, and the importance of moving 
beyond specific and technical obligations.  
This transformation appears to have occurred in Yukon through the period of 1973-1993.  
Yukoners’ cultural, social and political thinking and perspectives changed dramatically, as did 
First Nations-government relations within the territory. Difficulties emerged thereafter. After the 
signing of the agreements, the transformation slowly degraded through difficulties with 
implementation and changes in the individuals in power. Michael Hale argued that “it is very 
hard for public government to cede power. So, immediately after finalizing an agreement, it slips 
into clawing back any power [and] authority that was ceded” (IT31, Hale 2020).   
The Yukon was a fractured territory in the 1970s, characterized by polarizing viewpoints 
between Yukon First Nations and non-First Nations citizens. In the experience of most First 
Nations peoples, racism and discrimination were deeply ingrained in the North. In addition to 
this, Yukon First Nations struggled with the detrimental impacts of colonization, including the 
disruptive impacts of the advent and imposition of the modern welfare state. In a letter to the 
editor in the Whitehorse Star written in 1972, Margaret Joe, Vice President of the Yukon 
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Association of Non-Status Indians (YANSI) wrote, “…Being an Indian and being stepped on, 
discriminated against, and slandered all your life, only we know what a great fight we have 
ahead of us. Sitting back and accepting things as they are is all in the past” (Joe 1972, 8).   
When the Yukon Indian Brotherhood (later known as the Yukon Native Brotherhood and 
later still as the Council for Yukon First Nations) was formed in 1968, they became a critical 
voice fighting for Yukon First Nations’ rights and for improved social conditions. This rise of 
political mobilization was further empowered with the formation of YANSI in 1971. Momentum 
coalesced around the pursuit of a land claims settlement. When Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau 
accepted the Yukon Native Brotherhood’s proposal for a claims settlement in 1973, there was 
immediate backlash within the territory. The public media identified this as a “white political 
backlash” from the segment of Yukon citizens who opposed the pursuit of a Yukon First Nations 
land claim (“Lloyd Barber and Mr. Buchanon Response in CBC Radio Interview” 1975). The 
extent of this racism was so shocking to the broader public that it received coverage in the 
Toronto Star. In a feature article published in The Star on October 20, 1975, Frank Jones wrote, 
“the Land-Claim Negotiations…have exposed the ugly reality of racism on which much northern 
development has been based” (1975). 
If the situation looked dire in the mid-1970s, with strong divisions between First Nations 
and non-First Nations peoples, the following two decades saw remarkable changes in Yukon 
political culture. In comparatively short order, the Government of Yukon gained responsible 
government under Prime Minister Joe Clark. They also secured a seat at the negotiating table in 
1979, negotiating a promising but ultimately failed Agreement in Principle in 1984 and, in the 
wake of a breakdown in the talks, revitalized relationships. With active participation from the 
Yukon government, particularly under Government Leader Tony Penikett, the new approach 
focused on interest-based negotiations. Negotiators moved out of Ottawa and focused on 
spending more time in Yukon communities. What had long been seen as a First Nations 
enterprise was increasingly understood as a Yukon-wide process, promising stability and benefits 
to the whole territory. At a press conference in February 1992, Premier Penikett stated, 
I see this as a major step in the process of decolonization in the territory. At the 
end of the day, at the end of negotiations, I think everyone will say that Yukoners 
on the whole have gained more ability to take control over their lives” (Tobin 




When the UFA and the first four Yukon First Nations Final Agreements finally came in 1993, 
almost all Yukoners hailed the settlement for what it truly was: a major act of reconciliation by 
First Nations and non-First Nation Yukoners, and between Yukon First Nations and the Crown.  
 The same level of fundamental transformation in cultural perspective and concepts of 
governance did not occur within the federal government. Such a transformation is critical to 
seeing these agreements successfully implemented. All Parties to the agreements—the 
Government of Canada, the Government of Yukon, and Yukon First Nations governments—will 
need to commit to re-establishing relationships and recommit to the intent that underpinned the 
negotiation of the agreements. As Judy Gingell avowed, “if we are going to succeed together as 
governments, there has to be a willingness to remain open minded, explore all of the options and 
be prepared to do things differently” (Gingell 2017). This would include committing to an 
interest-based approach, taking the time to develop trusting relationships, spending time in the 
communities, and working together collaboratively and cooperatively to develop policies and 
structures at the federal and territorial levels that support the success of modern treaty 
implementation. Allan MacDonald, Director General, Implementation Branch for the 
Government of Canada, argued we need to be able to shift the thinking beyond seeing 
implementation as a contractual obligation. He explained, “That to me is the end game: when we 
stop talking about implementation of a contract…and start talking about the fulfillment of an 
intergovernmental relationship that has constitutional weight behind it” (IT22, Macdonald 2020). 
He went on to assert that modern treaties “create a different relationship than the Indian Act 
relationship and that is the perspective we need to take. It’s going to continue, it’s going to 
evolve, it’s going to grow, it’s going to be strong” (IT22, Macdonald 2020). 
 At the time of negotiation, the key to success was trust and commitment to building 
relationships and to envisioning shared common values and interests in seeing these agreements 
successfully negotiated and signed. To achieve system-wide change would require a commitment 
from all Parties to the agreements and across all departments internally within each government 
to re-establishing the vision of shared common values and interests. As Prairies folk often say, 
“We are all treaty people.” Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples alike have a stake in seeing 
these agreements successfully implemented in accordance with their original intent, which 
covered cultural preservation, Indigenous self-determinations, and the protection of lands and 
resources, in addition to successful coexistence and establishing pathways to reconciliation. 
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This study demonstrated the importance of prioritizing modern treaty implementation, 
especially during the planning process. The people involved in decision-making roles and on the 
ground, and the relationships between both the individuals and at the government-to-government 
level are instrumental to the successful implementation of these agreements. The people are the 
centre of these modern treaties. This must include the people who fought for land claims through 
Together Today for Our Children Tomorrow, the people who sat at the negotiation tables for 
twenty years to get successful agreements in Yukon, the people who are working to put these 
agreements into action today, and the beneficiaries of the agreements for the next seven 
generations. The human dimension of policy development cannot be neglected, as are the 
intricacies of these intergovernmental relations. These relationships, as Yukon experience says, 
are just as important as having the structures, policies, and processes in place.  
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POSTSCRIPT 
In 2018 I began teaching in the Indigenous Governance Degree (IGD) program at Yukon 
College (now Yukon University). This is the first made in Yukon undergraduate degree, that was 
built in partnership with all fourteen Yukon First Nations. The IGD “aims to build northern 
leadership capacity by providing students with the values, knowledge and skills to work 
collaboratively within the unique governance landscape of the North” (Yukon University n.d.). 
One of the major impetus for developing this degree program was to be able to teach the rest of 
Canada the successful story of modern treaty making and First Nations self-government that has 
taken place in Yukon.  
 In the Fall 2020 semester, I was teaching a first-year course entitled, “Indigenous 
Governance and Modern Treaty Making in Canada”. The main focus of this course is to 
introduce students to the evolution of Indigenous governance and modern treaty making in 
Canada from pan-Canadian perspectives, with a particular focus on Yukon First Nations’ 
experiences. In the last week of the course, students were asked to reflect on the question, “what 
does the future of Indigenous governance look like to you?”. To prepare the students for 
responding to this, I filmed short interviews with three former land claims negotiators as well as 
two senior-level IGD students, asking them to respond to the same question. These interviews 
were then presented to the students in the class. I was so impressed with the responses given by 
the two IGD students. Both of these students are “children of the land claims”—they have 
predominantly grown up in a post-land claims world and are children and grandchildren of 
Indigenous leaders who have played important roles in the negotiation and implementation of 
modern treaties in northern Canada. They both spoke to the significance of the land claims 
agreements and the possibilities that these agreements could create if properly implemented.  
Fittingly, the only way to truly understand the experience of treaty implementation, is to 
listen to first-hand perspectives of the next generation of Yukon First Nations leaders, who have 
distinctly grown up in a modern treaty world. Colesen Ford is a young twenty-year old First 
Nation leader and is a third-year student in the IGD program at Yukon University. He was born 
and raised in Yukon and comes from a long lineage of First Nations leaders. Below is an 
introduction to his family lines, followed by his response to the question, “What does the future 
of Indigenous governance look like to you?” 
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My great, great, Grandmother Louise George (Killer Whale Clan, Kluckwan, 
Alaska), daughter of Klanott (Chief George) and Aagé (Kitty Chief) of Dyea 
Alaska; Kaash (Skookum Jim) was Louise George’s Uncle which was referenced 
by Alice Lee. Furthermore, declarations from Angela Sidney, Johnny Johns and 
Kitty Smith state Aagé was born in Tagish. After the death of her husband she 
brought Louise George back to Tagish; staying there for a while then moving up to 
40 mile by Dawson. Louise stayed in Tagish and was raised by her aunt 
Gus’duteen. 
 
I never thought of myself as a land claims baby… There really is an entire 
generation of Indigenous people who don’t know anything else other than land 
claims, and don’t resonate with [the] Indian Act or Department of Indian Affairs. I 
think that really is a testament to show how far we’ve come already and 
demonstrates the spirit and intent of Indigenous decision-making systems.  
 
My name is Colesen Ford. I am the Kluane First Nation Youth Councillor. I am 
from Burwash Landing. I am Wolf and Killer Whale Clan. I am a senior in the 
[IGD] program…  
 
Land claims are a very powerful tool, but majority of the land claims are not 
implemented. I will talk specifically in the context of my First Nation. Kluane 
First Nation is one of the smallest First Nations in Yukon, if it isn’t the smallest, 
but our Final Agreement gives us the power to be on the same level as other 
Indigenous governments who have larger population bases… Moving forward, to 
truly actualize the vision that the negotiators of the land claims agreements had, it 
is going to be a continued path to education.  
 
You hear it lots when you’re talking about Together Today for our Children 
Tomorrow, and what kind of connotations that has. The Final Agreements that the 
First Nations in Yukon hold and in other places in Canada, they are really binding 
agreements not just between the First Nations and the State but also between other 
people who live and reside on those territories, and it affects all of those 
relationships. I can foresee in the future, less conflict between Indigenous peoples 
and the State. In Yukon, I think we’re at a really big turning point and we have 
been here for a while. It doesn’t matter if you’re Indigenous in Yukon or you’re 
non-Indigenous, it really depends on your skillset. For Indigenous people, a large 
part of that is having this wealth and knowledge connected to the land, which is 
really invaluable to every industry. 
 
There are not very many entirely Indigenous people anymore and we have to begin 
to recognize that. We are Indigenous but we are also Canadian. The Final 
Agreements aren’t about creating a better world for Indigenous peoples, it is about 
creating a better world for everyone (IT33, Ford 2020).  
 
An entire generation of Yukoners have now grown up in a modern treaty context and this 
next generation shows the promise of being the ones to reignite the transformation that occurred 
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in Yukon between 1973-1993. These are the “children of tomorrow” that Elijah Smith and the 
Yukon Native Brotherhood sought to build a future for when they wrote the foundational 
document, Together Today for Our Children Tomorrow. All Parties to the land claims 
agreements need to continue to work together to honour the spirit and intent of the land claims 
agreements through implementation and to strive towards rebuilding the relationships that were 
foundational to these agreements. This will lead to achieving the future that the negotiators from 
all three levels of government worked so hard for through the negotiation of the Yukon land 
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APPENDIX A: CHRONOLOGY OF YUKON LAND CLAIMS HISTORY 
1898 Klondike Gold Rush brings thousands of people to Yukon 
1900-1902 Chief Jim Boss petitions the Government of Canada to settle a claim to protect 
Yukon First Nations land and people 
1960s Yukon First Nations political mobilization 
1968 Formation of Yukon Native Brotherhood (YNB) 
1969 White Paper is released 
1971 Formation of Yukon Association of Non-Status Indians (YANSI) 
1973 Chief Elijah Smith and a delegation of Yukon First Nations leaders present a 
land claim statement, Together Today for Our Children Tomorrow to Prime 
Minister Pierre Trudeau in Ottawa  
1973 The Calder Case 
1973 Prime Minister Trudeau releases the comprehensive claims policy  
1973 The Council of Yukon Indians (CYI) is formed to negotiate land claims (YNB 
and YANSI continue to exist) 
1974- 1979 Preliminary bilateral land claims negotiations  
1979 The Government of Yukon joins the negotiations 
1980 YANSI and YNB amalgamate with CYI to become one umbrella organization 
representing status and on-status Yukon First Nations 
1984 Agreement in Principle is completed and rejected by Yukon First Nations 
during ratification 
1989 New Agreement in Principles for the UFA is signed and ratified 
1993 UFA Final Agreement Signed 
Champagne and Aishihik Final and Self-Government Agreements signed 
First Nation of Na-cho Nyak Dun Final and Self-Government Agreements 
signed 
Teslin Tlingit Council Final and Self-Government Agreements signed 
Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation Final and Self-Government Agreements signed 
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1995 CYI adopts a new constitution and is renamed the Council for Yukon First 
Nations 
1997 Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation Final Agreement Final and Self-
Government Agreements signed 
Selkirk First Nation Final and Self-Government Agreements signed 
1998 Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in Final and Self-Government Agreements signed 
2002 Ta’an Kwach’an First Nation Final and Self-Government Agreements signed 
2003 Kluane First Nation Final and Self-Government Agreements signed 
2005 Kwanlin Dün First Nation Final and Self-Government Agreements signed 
Carcross/Tagish First Nation Final and Self-Government Agreements signed 
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APPENDIX B: RESEARCH METHODS 
 
This appendix provides additional information that was used to support the methods and research 
design for this study. This section includes: (1) a complete list of interviewees, (2) the participant 
consent form, and (3) the semi-structured interviewee guides that were initially developed to be 
used with representatives from each level of government: Yukon First Nations, Government of 
Yukon, and Government of Canada. Please note that to support the constructivist grounded 
theory approach, these interview questions were intended to be flexible and were modified after 
each round of coding and analysis. 
 
1. Interviewees, coding and level of government representing 
 
The table below identifies each of the individuals interviewed for this dissertation research. Each 
interview was given the opportunity to consent to be named or request to remain anonymous. A 
coding identifier was assigned to each interviewee to account for those who wished to remain 
anonymous.  
 
Table B.1 Interviewees 
Coding Full Name (if permission granted) Level of Government 
IT1 Howard Linklater Yukon First Nations 
IT2 Stanley Njootli Sr. Yukon First Nations 
IT3 William Josie Yukon First Nations 
IT4 Angie Joseph-Rear Yukon First Nations 
IT5 Anonymous Yukon First Nations 
IT6 Anonymous Yukon First Nations 
IT7 Tim Gerberding Yukon First Nations 
IT8 Lawrence Joe Yukon First Nations 
IT9 Anonymous Yukon First Nations 
IT10 Shadelle Chambers Yukon First Nations 
IT11 Anonymous Yukon First Nations 
IT12 Dave Joe Yukon First Nations 
IT13 Angie Wabisca Yukon First Nations 
IT14 Roberta Joseph Yukon First Nations 
IT15 Diane Strand Yukon First Nations 
IT16 Tim Koepke Government of Canada 
IT17 Anonymous Government of Canada 
IT18 Wayne Crutchlow Government of Canada 
IT19 Barrie Rob Government of Canada 
IT20 Robin Bradasch Government of Canada 
IT21 Elizabeth Hanson Government of Canada 
IT22 Allan Macdonald Government of Canada 
IT23 Anonymous Government of Canada 
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IT24 Catherine Constable Government of Yukon 
IT25 Lesley McCullough Government of Yukon 
IT26 Tony Penikett Government of Yukon 
IT27 Barry Stuart Government of Yukon 
IT28 Karyn Armour Government of Yukon 
IT29 Duncan Sinclair Government of Yukon 
IT30 Piers McDonald Government of Yukon 
IT31 Michael Hale Government of Yukon 
IT32 Jim Harper Yukon First Nations 
IT33 Colesen Ford Yukon First Nations 
IT34 Robert Bruce Junior Yukon First Nations 
IT35 Peggy Kormendy Yukon First Nations 
IT36 Percy Henry Yukon First Nations 
IT37 Ronald Johnston Yukon First Nations 
IT38 Lynn Hutton Yukon First Nations 
IT39 Michael Durham Yukon First Nations 
IT40 Stephen Walsh Yukon First Nations 
IT41 Chuck Hume Yukon First Nations 
IT42 Shakir Alwarid Government of Yukon 
IT43 Brian McGuigan Government of Canada 
 








2. Participant Consent         
The following was the original participant consent form. Note the title of the dissertation changed 
overtime.                        
 
Participant Consent Form  
   
You are invited to participate in a research study entitled: “From Negotiation to 
Implementation: First Nations Modern Treaties in the Yukon, 1993-2016.” 
       
Researcher(s): Rhiannon Klein, PhD Candidate, Johnson-Shoyama Graduate School of Public 
Policy, University of Saskatchewan, 867-334-9933, rhiannon.klein@usask.ca  
 
Supervisor: Dr. Ken Coates, Johnson-Shoyama Graduate School of Public Policy, University of 
Saskatchewan, 306-966-5136, ken.coates@usask.ca  
 
Purpose(s) and Objective(s) of the Research:  
This research project will explore the transition from negotiation to implementation of 
Comprehensive Land Claims Agreements in the Yukon. The study of the implementation process 
in the Yukon provides an opportunity to identify initial expectations and to explore the impact of 
the different motivations. It also permits the identification of the achievements and implementation 




You are invited to participate in a one-on-one interview, at an agreed upon time and location. The 
interview will involve questions related to your experience with the negotiation and 
implementation of comprehensive land claim agreement(s) in the Yukon. With your permission, 
the interview will be audio- recorded and written notes will be taken during the interview. The 
recording is to accurately record the information you provide, and will be used for transcription 
purposes only. If you choose not to be audiotaped, only notes will be taken. If you agree to being 
audiotaped but feel uncomfortable at any time during the interview, the recorder can be turned off 
at your request. You can also choose to stop the interview at any time. Please feel free to ask any 
questions regarding the procedures and goals of the study or your role. 
 
Potential Risks:  
This interview involves minimal risk to you. Your participation is voluntary and you have the right 
to withdraw at any time. The researcher will make every effort to preserve the confidentiality of 
the interview. The researcher will try to ensure your identity is protected in the ways described 
below. If for some reason the researcher wishes to quote you in some way that might reveal your 
identity, your permission will be sought beforehand.  
 
Potential Benefits:  
Participating in this study of the implementation process in the Yukon provides an opportunity to 
identify initial expectations and to explore the impact of the different motivations of the 
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negotiating parties. It also permits the identification of the barriers and political/administrative 
challenges that have slowed implementation.  
 
The complete implementation of modern treaties will strengthen the relationships that have been 
built between First Nations signatories, Yukon Government and Government of Canada. In 
addition, it will allow the First Nation governments to realize the objectives that brought them to 
the negotiations in the first place: increasing capacity for governance and ensuring protection of 
their lands and resources.  
 
Confidentiality:  
Your identity will be protected through the use of a pseudonym and/or number code in place of 
your name and any identifying information will be removed from transcripts. Your consent forms 
will be stored separately from the transcripts, so that it will not be possible to associate a name 
with any given set of responses.  
 
The research conclusions will be published in a variety of formats, both print and electronic. These 
materials may be further used for purposes of conference presentations or publication in academic 
journals. In these publications, the data will be reported in a manner that protects confidentiality 
of participants, your name will not appear in any publications without prior consent. In principle, 
actual names will not be used; however, leaders whose position involves speaking on behalf of 
their organization may be asked if certain comments they have made can be attributed to them by 
name in publications. Any communication of these results that has potential to compromise 
confidentiality will not proceed without your approval. 
 
Storage of Data: 
In accordance with the university guidelines, the transcript and audiotaped files will be securely 
stored (separate from the consent form) in the care of the researcher for a minimum of five years.  
 
Right to Withdraw:  
Your participation is voluntary and you can answer only those questions that you are comfortable 
with.  You may withdraw from the research project for any reason, at any time without explanation 
or penalty of any sort. Upon withdrawal, all the data that you wish to have deleted will be. Your 
right to withdraw data from the study will apply until September 1, 2020 when results have been 
compiled and assessed. After this date, it is possible that some form of research dissemination will 
have already occurred and it may not be possible to withdraw your data. 
 
Follow up:  
Communities will be provided with a summary report of the research findings. You will also have 
access to an electronic copy of the full PhD dissertation. 
 
Questions or Concerns:   
For any additional questions or concerns, please contact the researcher using the information at the 
top of page 1. 
 
This research project was approved on ethical grounds by the University of Saskatchewan 
Research Ethics Board on April 1, 2016.  Any questions regarding your rights as a participant may 
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be addressed to that committee through the Research Ethics Office ethics.office@usask.ca (306) 
966-2975. Out of town participants may call toll free (888) 966-2975. 
 
 
Consent to Participate: 
I have understood the above description. I consent to participate in the study understanding that I 
may withdraw this consent at any time. A copy of this consent form has been given to me for my 
records. I also understand that I will have the opportunity to review the transcript of this interview.  
 
_____________________________  _____________________________  
Participant Name    Researcher’s Name  
 
_____________________________  _____________________________ 
Participant Signature     Researcher’s Signature  
 
_____________________________  _____________________________ 
Date       Date 
 
 
I grant permission to be audio recorded:     YES:_____ NO:_____ 
 
I grant permission to have my organization or First Nation’s name used:  YES:_____ NO:_____ 
 
I wish to remain anonymous:       YES:_____ NO:_____ 
 
You may quote me and use my name:      YES:_____ NO:_____ 
 
You may credit me in the results of the study:    YES:_____ NO:_____ 
 




If you wish to obtain an electronic version of the summary report or PhD dissertation, please 
include your email address below. Your email address will be kept confidential and will not be 
used for any other purpose. 
 
___________________________________________________    
Email Address     
 
ORAL CONSENT 
I have read and explained this Consent Form to the participant before receiving the participant’s 
consent, and the participant had knowledge of its contents and appeared to understand it. In 
addition, consent may be audio recorded. 
 
     
Name of Participant  Researcher’s Signature  Date 
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3. Semi-Structured Interview Guides 
 
 #1: First Nation Government 
 
NOTE: The following interview guide includes all possible questions to be asked to respondents 
representing a Yukon First Nation government. A selection of these will be asked, depending on 
the participant’s experience with the negotiation and/or implementation of the Final Agreements. 




I. Brief self-introduction 
 
II. Brief introduction to the project 
 
Background: This is the research project for my PhD dissertation entitled, “From 
Negotiation to Implementation: Aboriginal Modern Treaties in the Yukon, 1993-2013.” 
The focus of the project was decided upon through discussions with several Yukon First 
Nations’ representatives, and individuals who had been involved in modern treaty 
negotiations in the Yukon on behalf of the Federal and Territorial governments. I wanted 
to ensure that I selected a topic that would be beneficial to Yukoners, and that could 
contribute to better understanding the successes and challenges faced by implementing 
modern day treaties.  
 
The purpose of this project is to answer two main questions: How have the partners in the 
negotiation of a modern treaty managed the transition from negotiation to implementation? 
And what does this transition reveal about modern treaties in Canada?  
 
There are four general topics that we will discuss today: 
• The post-signing implementation process (mostly focused on the first 5 years) 
• Capacity building for implementation of the treaty (at all levels of government) 
• Interpretation difficulties and the impact of divergent motivations and expectations 
• Management, by the First Nations’, federal and territorial governments, of third 
party relationships affected by the agreements 
 
The specific focus of the research is on the implementation of Chapter 22: Economic 
Development measures.  
 
The time frame for the research focuses on the first 20 years after the UFA and the first four 
Final Agreements were signed (1993-2013).  
 
Interviews- over the next six months, I will be interviewing approximately 50 people from 
Yukon First Nation’s Governments, Yukon Government, and the Government of Canada. 
Participants will include past and present Yukon First Nations' Chiefs, administrators, 
economic development officials, implementation staff, negotiators, and key community 
stakeholders. From the territorial and federal government, participants will include 
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negotiators, treaty implementation staff, representatives from the economic development 
departments, and additional key stakeholders. 
 
Reporting Back- Participants and communities will be provided with an electronic copy of 
the full PhD dissertation, as well as a summary report. I will also return to the Yukon in the 
Spring/Summer of 2018 for a series of community presentations to report back on the 
findings of the project.  
 
III. Consent Form 
 






• Can you please start by telling me your name, which First Nation you are a member of 
(or work for) and how you have been involved with modern treaties in the Yukon? 
 
• Before we get into the specific questions, can you tell me what “implementation” means 
to you? How would you define or explain implementation?  
 
II. The post-signing implementation process (mostly focused on the first 5 years) 
 
• How would you describe the overall implementation process of [First Nation’s] Final 
Agreement during the first five years? 
 
• What protocols or processes were envisioned or planned out in advance for 
implementing the Final Agreement (e.g. joint implementation committees—structure, 
representation, frequency of meetings)? 
o Did you draw lessons from the experience of other modern treaty implementation 
processes [in the Yukon or outside of the Yukon]? If so, did you try to mitigate past 
problems or look for alternate solutions?  
o Has traditional knowledge been integrated into the implementation process? If so, 
can you provide an example?  
 
• Are you aware of any specific implementation protocols or processes that the Federal 
government had planned out in advance?  
o If yes, what did these consist of? 
o If no, move on to next question. 
 
• Are you aware of any specific implementation protocols or processes that the Yukon 
Government had planned out in advance?  
o If yes, what did these consist of? 
o If no, move on to next question. 
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• Can you identify any specific implementation successes that occurred in the first five 
years?  
 
• Can you identify specific challenges or barriers to implementation that occurred during 
the first five years? 
 
• If you could go back, what would you have done differently during the transition from 
the signing of the Final Agreement to the beginning of implementation?  
 
III. Capacity building for implementation of the treaty 
 
• To what degree was your First Nation ready, at the time of signing, to implement the 
agreement?  
o Was there any training available to First Nations’ staff?  
 
• What were the major challenges in the area of capacity building? 
o Do these challenges still exist?  
 
• Was there, and does there continue to be, enough money to implement the agreement? 
o If not, what did [First Nation] do to address these challenges? 
 
• Did the Government of Canada and the Yukon Government have people in place that 
had an understanding of First Nations’ conditions and culture to support the 
implementation process?  
 
• Did the Government of Canada and Yukon Government have enough employees to 
ensure the implementation of the agreement? 
 
IV. Interpretation difficulties and the impact of divergent motivations and expectations 
 
• In each of the negotiations, the tripartite teams (First Nation, Yukon Government, 
Federal Government) entered into the agreements with different intentions, objectives 
and expectations. Can you explain the initial intentions, objectives and/or expectations 
for negotiating a Final Agreement from the perspective of your First Nation? 
o Do you think these objectives have changed during the transition from 
negotiation to implementation? If so, how have they changed? 
 
• How would your First Nation perceive the initial intentions, objectives and/or 
expectations of the Yukon Government? 
o Do you think these have changed during the transition from negotiation to 
implementation? If so, how have they changed? 
 
• How would your First Nation perceive the initial intentions, objectives and/or 
expectations of the Federal Government? 
o Do you think these have changed during the transition from negotiation to 
implementation? If so, how have they changed? 
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• Conflicting interpretations of the agreements have been identified as an ongoing issue. 
What have been some of the main challenges or barriers of these divergent 
interpretations?  
o Do you foresee there being any specific solutions to resolving these? 
 
• Another discussion that often takes place around implementation challenges is the 
conflict between fulfilling the letter of law (the literal interpretation of the words but 
not necessarily the intent of those who wrote them) versus recognizing the spirit and 
intent of the agreements.   
o How do you understand the concept of the “spirit of the agreements”? 
 
o Do you feel this is being honoured throughout the implementation of the 
agreements? 
§ Please give an example where you feel this has been the case. 
§ Please give an example where you feel this has not been the case. 
 
o Do you feel that the Governments are honouring the letter of the agreements? 
§ Please give an example where this has been the case. 
§ Please give an example where this has not been the case. 
 
 
V. The mobilization of economic development elements of the agreements (Chapter 22) 
 
Chapter 22 includes 3 main objectives. I will go through each of these objectives with you.  
 
1. To provide Yukon Indian People with opportunities to participate in the Yukon 
economy.  
 
• During the implementation of this chapter, do you feel this objective has been met?  
o If yes, how? Can you give specific examples of how it has been implemented? 
o If not, what have been some of the barriers/challenges to implementing this 
objective? 
§ Despite these challenges, can you identify any specific examples of 
successes in implementing this objective?  
 
2. To develop economic self-reliance for Yukon Indian People. 
 
• How would you define or interpret “economic self-reliance”? What does this 
include? 
• During the implementation of this chapter, do you feel this objective has been met?  
o If yes, how? Can you give specific examples of how it has been implemented? 
o If not, what have been some of the barriers/challenges to implementing this 
objective? 
§ Despite these challenges, can you identify any specific examples of 
successes in implementing this objective?  
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3. To ensure that Yukon Indian People obtain economic benefits that flow directly from 
the Settlement Agreements. 
 
• During the implementation of this chapter, do you feel this objective has been met?  
o If yes, how? Can you give specific examples of how it has been implemented? 
o If not, what have been some of the barriers/challenges to implementing this 
objective? 
§ Despite these challenges, can you identify any specific examples of 
successes in implementing this objective?  
 
• To what degree, if any, has Indigenous Traditional Knowledge been recognized and 
included in the economic development and management processes?  
 
• Chapter 22 identifies a number of places where economic benefits were expected to 
flow to First Nations. Can you tell me, in general and with examples where appropriate, 
how the governments have done in each of these areas? 
o Economic development agreements 
o Economic development corporations 
o Access to employment contracts 
o First right of refusal for government contracts 
o Yukon asset construction agreements* 
o Economic Development Funds* 
*These are unique to the last four Final Agreements that were signed 
 
VI. Management, by the First Nations’, federal and territorial governments, of third 
party relationships affected by the agreements 
 
• When the modern treaties were signed, critics worried about the likely impact of the 
agreements on third party interests. With reference to your First Nation, how have third 
party interests been affected by the Final Agreement? 
o Can you describe your third party relationships at the time the agreement was 
being negotiated? 
o Can you describe your third party relationships when the signed agreement was 
first being implemented?  
o How have these relationships evolved? What has worked and have there been 
any challenges? 
 
• Within your government-First Nation relationships with the federal and Yukon 
Government, how are concerns with third party interests addressed and managed?   
 
• Do your relations with industry differ from those with Federal and Yukon government? 
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VII. General Questions 
 
• How would you define successful or complete implementation?  
o Is there an end goal that would mean Chapter 22: Economic Development 
Measures has been fully implemented?  
o Is there an end goal that would mean the Final Agreement has been fully 
implemented?  
 
• Is there anything else you would like to add before we conclude?  
 
• Are there any individuals you think I should speak to as part of my research on the 
transition from negotiation to implementation of modern day treaties in the Yukon? 
 
• Are you aware of any archival or existing documents, reports etc. that you think might 
contribute to this project?  
 
• Would you be willing to do a follow-up interview by telephone over the next few 
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Guide #2: Yukon Government 
 
NOTE: The following interview guide includes all possible questions to be asked to participants 
responding on behalf of Yukon Government. A selection of these will be asked, depending on the 
participant’s experience with the negotiation and/or implementation of the Final Agreements. No 




I. Brief self-introduction 
 
II. Brief introduction to the project 
 
Background: This is the research project for my PhD dissertation entitled, “From 
Negotiation to Implementation: Aboriginal Treaties in the Yukon, 1993-2013.” The focus 
of the project was decided upon through discussions with several Yukon First Nations’ 
representatives, and individuals who had been involved in modern treaty negotiations in the 
Yukon on behalf of the Federal and Territorial governments. I wanted to ensure that I 
selected a topic that would be beneficial to Yukoners, and that could contribute to better 
understanding the successes and challenges faced by implementing modern day treaties.  
 
The purpose of this project is to answer two main questions: How have the partners in the 
negotiation of a modern treaty managed the transition from negotiation to implementation? 
And what does this transition reveal about modern treaties in Canada?  
 
There are four general topics that we will discuss today: 
• The post-signing implementation process (mostly focused on the first 5 years) 
• Capacity building for implementation of the treaty (at all levels of government) 
• Interpretation difficulties and the impact of divergent motivations and expectations 
• Management, by the First Nations’, federal and territorial governments, of third 
party relationships affected by the agreements 
 
The specific focus of the research is on the implementation of Chapter 22: Economic 
Development measures.  
 
The time frame for the research focuses on the first 20 years after the UFA and the first four 
Final Agreements were signed (1993-2013).  
 
Interviews- over the next six months, I will be interviewing approximately 50 people from 
Yukon First Nation’s Governments, Yukon Government, and the Government of Canada. 
Participants will include past and present Yukon First Nations' Chiefs, administrators, 
economic development officials, implementation staff, negotiators, and key community 
stakeholders. From the territorial and federal government, participants will include 
negotiators, treaty implementation staff, representatives from the economic development 
departments, and additional key stakeholders. 
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Reporting Back- Participants and communities will be provided with an electronic copy of 
the full PhD dissertation, as well as a summary report. I will also return to the Yukon in the 
Spring/Summer of 2018 for a series of community presentations to report back on the 
findings of the project.  
III. Consent Form 
 






• Can you please start by telling me your name, in what capacity you have been involved 
with modern treaties in the Yukon, and which agreements you have been involved with 
negotiating and/or implementing? 
 
• Before we get into the specific questions, can you tell me what “implementation” means 
to you? How would you define or explain implementation?  
 
II. The post-signing implementation process (mostly focused on the first 5 years) 
 
• What protocols or processes did the Yukon Government envision or plan out in advance 
for implementing the Final Agreement (e.g. joint implementation committees—
structure, representation, frequency of meetings)? 
 
o Did you draw lessons from the experience of other modern treaty implementation 
processes [in the Yukon or outside of the Yukon]? If so, did you try to mitigate past 
problems or look for alternate solutions?  
 
• Are you aware of any specific implementation protocols or processes that the Federal 
government had planned out in advance?  
o If yes, what did these consist of? 
o If no, move on to next question. 
 
• Are you aware of any specific implementation protocols or processes that [First 
Nation(s)] had planned out in advance?  
o If yes, what did these consist of? 
o If no, move on to next question. 
 
• Can you identify any specific implementation successes that occurred in the first five 
years?  
 
• Can you identify specific challenges or barriers to implementation that occurred during 
the first five years? 
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• If you could go back, what would you have done differently during the transition from 
the signing of the Final Agreement to the beginning of implementation?  
 
 
III. Capacity building for implementation of the treaty 
 
• To what degree was the Yukon Government ready, at the time of signing, to implement 
the agreement?  
 
• In regards to implementation, what were the major challenges in the area of capacity 
building for the Yukon government? 
o Do these challenges still exist? 
 
• Did the Yukon Government have people in place that had an understanding of First 
Nations’ conditions and culture to support the implementation process?  
o Was there specific training available for this? 
 
• Did the Yukon Government have enough employees to ensure the implementation of the 
agreement? 
o Which Yukon Government departments were in charge of implementing the 
agreements? Has this changed over the past twenty years? 
 
• Did the Government of Canada have enough employees to ensure the implementation of 
the agreement? 
o Do you feel they have the capacity today? 
 
• Do you think the Yukon First Nations’ that you negotiated with had the capacity to 
implement agreements when they were first signed?  
o Do you feel they have the capacity today? 
o Are there any supports in place to assist the First Nations with capacity building 
(i.e. training)? 
 
IV. Interpretation difficulties and the impact of divergent motivations and expectations 
• In each of the negotiations, the tripartite teams (First Nation, Yukon Government, 
Federal Government) entered into the agreements with different intentions, objectives 
and expectations. Can you explain the initial intentions, objectives and/or expectations 
for negotiating a Final Agreement from the perspective of Yukon Government? 
o Do you think these objectives have changed during the transition from 
negotiation to implementation? If so, how have they changed? 
 
• How would the Yukon Government perceive the initial intentions, objectives and/or 
expectations of the First Nation you were negotiating with? 
o Do you think these have changed during the transition from negotiation to 
implementation? If so, how have they changed? 
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• How would the Yukon Government perceive the initial intentions, objectives and/or 
expectations of the Federal Government? 
o Do you think these have changed during the transition from negotiation to 
implementation? If so, how have they changed? 
 
• Conflicting interpretations of the agreements have been identified as an ongoing issue. 
What have been some of the main challenges or barriers of these divergent 
interpretations?  
o Do you foresee there being any specific solutions to resolving these? 
 
• Another discussion that often takes place around implementation challenges is the 
conflict between fulfilling the letter of law (the literal interpretation of the words but 
not necessarily the intent of those who wrote them) versus recognizing the spirit and 
intent of the agreements.   
o How do you understand the concept of the “spirit of the agreements”? 
 
o Do you feel this is being honoured throughout the implementation of the 
agreements? 
§ Please give an example where you feel this has been the case. 
§ Please give an example where you feel this has not been the case. 
 
o Do you feel that the federal government is honouring the letter of the 
agreements? 
§ Please give an example where this has been the case. 
§ Please give an example where this has not been the case. 
 
V. The mobilization of economic development elements of the agreements (Chapter 22) 
 
Chapter 22 includes 3 main objectives. I will go through each of these objectives with you.  
 
4. To provide Yukon Indian People with opportunities to participate in the Yukon 
economy.  
 
• During the implementation of this chapter, do you feel this objective has been met?  
o If yes, how? Can you give specific examples of how it has been implemented? 
o If not, what have been some of the barriers/challenges to implementing this 
objective? 
§ Despite these challenges, can you identify any specific examples of 
successes in implementing this objective?  
 
5. To develop economic self-reliance for Yukon Indian People. 
 
• How would you define or interpret “economic self-reliance”? What does this 
include? 
• During the implementation of this chapter, do you feel this objective has been met?  
o If yes, how? Can you give specific examples of how it has been implemented? 
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o If not, what have been some of the barriers/challenges to implementing this 
objective? 
§ Despite these challenges, can you identify any specific examples of 
successes in implementing this objective?  
 
6. To ensure that Yukon Indian People obtain economic benefits that flow directly from 
the Settlement Agreements. 
 
• During the implementation of this chapter, do you feel this objective has been met?  
o If yes, how? Can you give specific examples of how it has been implemented? 
o If not, what have been some of the barriers/challenges to implementing this 
objective? 
§ Despite these challenges, can you identify any specific examples of 
successes in implementing this objective?  
 
• Chapter 22 identifies a number of places where economic benefits were expected to 
flow to First Nations. Can you tell me, in general and with examples where appropriate, 
how you feel the Yukon Government has done in each of these areas? 
o Economic development agreements 
o Economic development corporations 
o Access to employment contracts 
o First right of refusal for government contracts 
o Yukon asset construction agreements* 
o Economic Development Funds* 
*These are unique to the last four Final Agreements that were signed 
 
 
VI. Management, by the First Nation, federal and territorial governments, of third party 
relationships affected by the agreements 
 
• When the modern treaties were signed, critics worried about the likely impact of the 
agreements on third party interests. How have third party interests been affected by the 
Final Agreement?  
o Can you describe your third party relationships at the time the agreement was 
being negotiated? 
o Can you describe your third party relationships when the signed agreement was 
first being implemented?  
o How have these relationships evolved? What has worked and have there been 
any challenges? 
 
• Within the relationships between the Yukon Government and the Yukon First Nations, 
how are concerns with third party interests addressed and managed?   
 
• Do your third party relationships in the Yukon differ from those with the federal and 
First Nations’ governments? If so, how?  
VII. General Questions 
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• How would you define successful or complete implementation?  
o Is there an end goal that would mean Chapter 22: Economic Development Measures 
has been fully implemented?  
 
o Is there an end goal that would mean a Final Agreement has been fully 
implemented?  
 
• Is there anything else you would like to add before we conclude?  
 
• Are there any individuals you think I should speak to as part of my research on the transition 
from negotiation to implementation of modern day treaties in the Yukon? 
 
• Are you aware of any archival or existing documents, reports etc. that you think might 
contribute to this project?  
 
• Would you be willing to do a follow-up interview by telephone over the next few months? 
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#3: Government of Canada 
 
NOTE: The following interview guide includes all possible questions to be asked to participants 
responding on behalf of the Government of Canada. A selection of these will be asked, depending 
on the participant’s experience with the negotiation and/or implementation of the Final 




I. Brief self-introduction 
 
II. Brief introduction to the project 
 
Background: This is the research project for my PhD dissertation entitled, “From 
Negotiation to Implementation: Aboriginal Modern Treaties in the Yukon, 1993-2013.” 
The focus of the project was decided upon through discussions with several Yukon First 
Nations’ representatives, and individuals who had been involved in modern treaty 
negotiations in the Yukon on behalf of the Federal and Territorial governments. I wanted 
to ensure that I selected a topic that would be beneficial to Yukoners, and that could 
contribute to better understanding the successes and challenges faced by implementing 
modern day treaties.  
 
The purpose of this project is to answer two main questions: How have the partners in the 
negotiation of a modern treaty managed the transition from negotiation to implementation? 
And what does this transition reveal about modern treaties in Canada?  
 
There are four general topics that we will discuss today: 
• The post-signing implementation process (mostly focused on the first 5 years) 
• Capacity building for implementation of the treaty (at all levels of government) 
• Interpretation difficulties and the impact of divergent motivations and expectations 
• Management, by the First Nations’, federal and territorial governments, of third 
party relationships affected by the agreements 
 
The specific focus of the research is on the implementation of Chapter 22: Economic 
Development measures.  
 
The time frame for the research focuses on the first 20 years after the UFA and the first four 
Final Agreements were signed (1993-2013).  
 
Interviews- over the next six months, I will be interviewing approximately 50 people from 
Yukon First Nation’s Governments, Yukon Government, and the Government of Canada. 
Participants will include past and present Yukon First Nations' Chiefs, administrators, 
economic development officials, implementation staff, negotiators, and key community 
stakeholders. From the territorial and federal government, participants will include 
negotiators, treaty implementation staff, representatives from the economic development 
departments, and additional key stakeholders. 
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Reporting Back- Participants and communities will be provided with an electronic copy of 
the full PhD dissertation, as well as a summary report. I will also return to the Yukon in the 
Spring/Summer of 2018 for a series of community presentations to report back on the 
findings of the project.  
 
III. Consent Form 
 






• Can you please start by telling me your name, in what capacity you have been involved 
with modern treaties in the Yukon, and which agreements you have been involved with 
negotiating and/or implementing? 
 
• Before we get into the specific questions, can you tell me what “implementation” means 
to you? How would you define or explain implementation?  
 
II. The post-signing implementation process (mostly focused on the first 5 years) 
 
• What protocols or processes did the federal government envision or plan out in advance 
for implementing the Final Agreement (e.g. joint implementation committees—
structure, representation, frequency of meetings)? 
 
o Did you draw lessons from the experience of other modern treaty implementation 
processes [in the Yukon or outside of the Yukon]? If so, did you try to mitigate past 
problems or look for alternate solutions?  
 
• Are you aware of any specific implementation protocols or processes that the Yukon 
government had planned out in advance?  
o If yes, what did these consist of? 
o If no, move on to next question. 
 
• Are you aware of any specific implementation protocols or processes that the Yukon 
First Nations had planned out in advance?  
o If yes, what did these consist of? 
o If no, move on to next question. 
 
• Can you identify any specific implementation successes that occurred in the first five 
years?  
 
• Can you identify specific challenges or barriers to implementation that occurred during 
the first five years? 
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• If you could go back, what would you have done differently during the transition from 
the signing of the Final Agreement to the beginning of implementation?  
 
 
III. Capacity building for implementation of the treaty 
 
• To what degree was the Government of Canada (GOC) ready, at the time of signing, to 
implement the agreement?  
 
• In regards to implementation, what were the major challenges in the area of capacity 
building for the federal government? 
o Do these challenges still exist?  
 
• Did the GOC have people in place that had an understanding of First Nations’ 
conditions and culture to support the implementation process?  
o Was there specific training available for this? 
 
• Did the GOC have enough employees to ensure the implementation of the agreement? 
 
• What was the specific role for INAC (formerly AANDC) during implementation?  
o How did other GOC departments support INAC? 
o Aside from INAC, which departments were most involved in implementation?  
 
• Did the Yukon Government have enough employees to ensure the implementation of 
the agreement? 
o Do you feel they have the capacity today? 
 
• Did the Yukon First Nations’ that you negotiated with, have the capacity to ensure the 
implementation of the agreements when they were first signed?  
o Do you feel they have the capacity today? 
o Are there any supports in place to assist the First Nations with capacity building 
(i.e. training) 
 
IV. Interpretation difficulties and the impact of divergent motivations and expectations 
• In each of the negotiations, the tripartite teams (First Nation, Yukon Government, 
Federal Government) entered into the agreements with different intentions, objectives 
and expectations. Can you explain the initial intentions, objectives and/or expectations 
for negotiating a Final Agreement from the perspective of the GOC? 
o Do you think these objectives have changed during the transition from 
negotiation to implementation? If so, how have they changed? 
 
• How would the GOC perceive the initial intentions, objectives and/or expectations of 
the Yukon Government? 
o Do you think these have changed during the transition from negotiation to 
implementation? If so, how have they changed? 
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• How would the GOC perceive the initial intentions, objectives and/or expectations of 
the First Nation you were negotiating with? 
o Do you think these have changed during the transition from negotiation to 
implementation? If so, how have they changed? 
 
• Conflicting interpretations of the agreements have been identified as an ongoing issue. 
What have been some of the main challenges or barriers of these divergent 
interpretations?  
o Do you foresee there being any specific solutions to resolving these? 
 
• Another discussion that often takes place around implementation challenges is the 
conflict between fulfilling the letter of law (the literal interpretation of the words but 
not necessarily the intent of those who wrote them) versus recognizing the spirit and 
intent of the agreements.   
o How do you understand the concept of the “spirit of the agreements”? 
 
o Do you feel this is being honoured throughout the implementation of the 
agreements? 
§ Please give an example where you feel this has been the case. 
§ Please give an example where you feel this has not been the case. 
 
o Do you feel that the GOC is honouring the letter of the agreements? 
§ Please give an example where this has been the case. 
§ Please give an example where this has not been the case. 
 
V. The mobilization of economic development elements of the agreements (Chapter 22) 
 
Chapter 22 includes 3 main objectives. I will go through each of these objectives with you.  
 
IV. To provide Yukon Indian People with opportunities to participate in the Yukon economy.  
 
• During the implementation of this chapter, do you feel this objective has been met?  
o If yes, how? Can you give specific examples of how it has been implemented? 
o If not, what have been some of the barriers/challenges to implementing this 
objective? 
§ Despite these challenges, can you identify any specific examples of 
successes in implementing this objective?  
 
V. To develop economic self-reliance for Yukon Indian People. 
 
• How would you define or interpret “economic self-reliance”? What does this 
include? 
• During the implementation of this chapter, do you feel this objective has been met?  
o If yes, how? Can you give specific examples of how it has been implemented? 
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o If not, what have been some of the barriers/challenges to implementing this 
objective? 
§ Despite these challenges, can you identify any specific examples of 
successes in implementing this objective?  
 
VI. To ensure that Yukon Indian People obtain economic benefits that flow directly from the 
Settlement Agreements. 
 
• During the implementation of this chapter, do you feel this objective has been met?  
o If yes, how? Can you give specific examples of how it has been implemented? 
o If not, what have been some of the barriers/challenges to implementing this 
objective? 
§ Despite these challenges, can you identify any specific examples of 
successes in implementing this objective?  
 
• Chapter 22 identifies a number of places where economic benefits were expected to 
flow to First Nations. Can you tell me, in general and with examples where 
appropriate, how you feel the Government of Canada has done in each of these 
areas? 
o Economic development agreements 
o Economic development corporations 
o Access to employment contracts 
o First right of refusal for government contracts 
o Yukon asset construction agreements* 
o Economic Development Funds* 
*These are unique to the last four Final Agreements that were signed 
 
 
VI. Management, by the First Nation, federal and territorial governments, of third party 
relationships affected by the agreements 
 
• When the modern treaties were signed, critics worried about the likely impact of the 
agreements on third party interests. How have third party interests been affected by the 
Final Agreement?  
o Can you describe your third party relationships at the time the agreement was 
being negotiated? 
o Can you describe your third party relationships when the signed agreement was 
first being implemented?  
o How have these relationships evolved? What has worked and have there been 
any challenges? 
 
• Within the relationships between the GOC and the Yukon First Nations, how are 
concerns with third party interests addressed and managed?   
 
• Do your third party relationships in the Yukon differ from those with the Yukon and 
First Nations’ governments? If so, how? 
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VII. General Questions 
 
• How would you define successful or complete implementation?  
o Is there an end goal that would mean Chapter 22: Economic Development Measures 
has been fully implemented?  
 
o Is there an end goal that would mean a Final Agreement has been fully 
implemented?  
 
• Is there anything else you would like to add before we conclude?  
 
• Are there any individuals you think I should speak to as part of my research on the transition 
from negotiation to implementation of modern day treaties in the Yukon? 
 
• Are you aware of any archival or existing documents, reports etc. that you think might 
contribute to this project?  
 
• Would you be willing to do a follow-up interview by telephone over the next few months? 





APPENDIX C: “GUIDELINES: COMPREHENSIVE LAND CLAIMS IMPELEMNTATION PLANS” OVERVIEW OF 
ALIGNMENT OF IMPLEMENTATION PLANNING FUNCTIONS 
 
 
Table C.1 Alignment of Implementation Planning Functions 















Obtaining commitments of 
native, provincial/territorial and 
federal parties to undertake 
specific activities pursuant to 
signature of the Final 
Agreement and/or AIP. 
Preparing for discussion bilateral or 
tripartite sub-agreements or 
implementation.  
 
Conducting AIP clause by clause 
review as drafts become available. 
 
Advising claims negotiators on the 
practicality and clarity of clauses 
and the acceptability of AIP 
agreements re: implementation. 
 
Providing operational 
advice to implementation 
negotiators on the 
practicality and clarity of 




policy advice and/or 
policy development 
support. 
 Preparing Memoranda to 
Cabinet including the 
incorporation of implementation 
material.  
Acting as advisors to SADM and 
claims negotiators on 
implementation matters. 
 
Obtaining sign-off of the sub-
agreement on implementation by 
the negotiating parties or delegating 
this responsibility to the claims 



















 Briefing staff of the 
Implementation Directorate in 
the interpretation of, strategy 
behind and nuances of 
agreement clauses.  
Presenting sub-agreements on 
implementation to the 
Comprehensive Claims Steering 
Committee. 
  
 Renegotiating or re-editing 
where considered feasible and 
practical, prior to submission of 
the AIP to Cabinet, clauses 
where the Implementation 
Directorate have identified as 
impractical or unclear re: 
implementation.  
Assisting the claims negotiators in 
the preparation of Memoranda to 
Cabinet re: implementation matters.  
Assisting the claims negotiators in 
the preparation of implementation 
funding estimates.  
 
  
 Circulating to staff of the 
Implementation Directorate 
draft of AIP sub-agreements as 
they become available.  
Attending caucus and working 
group sessions of claims 





Commencing and/or completing 
activities and processes in 
accordance with terms of the 
AIP (e.g. land selection). 
Identifying and resolving financial 
transfer issues.  
 
Developing implementation plans 
to accompany Final Agreement 
proposals to Cabinet.  
 
Conducting in consultation with the 
native parties and federal 
government a Final Agreement 
clause by clause review. 
Advising implementation 
negotiators on the 








Sitting on committees 




policy advice and/or 

































 Advising claims negotiators on the 
practicality and clarity of 
agreement clauses and the 




  Attending caucus and working 
group sessions of claims 





 Providing for the identification of 
legislative regimes that apply to the 
settlement area, their impact, and 
specification of activities necessary 
to change existing 
provincial/territorial and /or Canada 
legislation and regulations to 
implement the Final Agreement.  
Representing their interest 
on implementation caucus 
group(s) and observing at 




















Coordinating the preparation of any 
RIAS to accompany the 
Memoranda to Cabinet for approval 
of the Final Agreement.  
 
Coordinating the activities of 
implementation negotiation and 
support teams and reviewing 





 Reviewing existing program 
authorities and procedures and 
conducting inter/intra departmental 
consultations to identify necessary 
accommodations in existing 




 Preparing Memorandum to 
Cabinet including the 
incorporation of implementation 
material. 
 
Acting as Advisor(s) to Deputy 
Minister and SADM, DIAND on 
implementation matters. 
  
 Drafting instruction for new 
legislation and legislative 
amendments on comprehensive 
claims and related matters. 
Advising claims negotiators on any 
potential inconsistencies between 
comprehensive claims settlements 
and what has been concluded 




















  Consulting with all parties to 
incorporate input to the 
implementation plans including, if 
necessary, giving briefings and 
holding sessions with regional 
representatives of other federal 








 Formalizing of commitments in 
implementation plans by native, 
provincial/territorial and federal 
parties.  
 
Assisting the native parties in 
implementation funding and 
training matters including the 
identification of existing training 
programs. 
 
Coordinating and/or developing 
within DIAND the operational and 
administrative practices and 
procedures to come into effect on 







 Assisting other government 
departments in the development of 
operational and administrative 




























into effect on signing of the Final 
Agreement.  
 
Monitoring progress in the 
development of operational and 








 Keeping central agencies informed 
on the progress on comprehensive 
claims implementation planning 




  Negotiating financial transfer 
arrangements and the preparation of 
related Treasury Board submissions 
as required.  
 
Assisting the claims negotiators in 
the preparation of sections in 
Memoranda to Cabinet dealing with 
implementation matters.  
 
Briefing staff of headquarters and 
DIAND regional offices on the 
interpretation of, strategy behind 



















in terms of future requirements for 
implementation. 
 
Making presentations on 
implementation matters to the 
Comprehensive Claims Steering 




     
Operations Providing, when necessary, 
advice and direction to those 
organizations responsible for 
implementation in the 
interpretation of clauses and 
commitments. 
Negotiating transfer arrangements 
and meeting statutory funding 
obligations pursuant to agreements 
with native parties.  
Negotiating, when necessary, 
adjustments to existing financial 




arrangements at the end of their 
term. 
 
Submitting negotiated financial 
transfer arrangements to Treasury 
Board for approval.  




agreements based on the 
processes, terms and 
conditions included in 
implementation plans.  
 
Acting as members in 




to resolve identified 
operation problems.  
 
Reporting on progress 
achieved in implementing 
their obligations.  
Legislation: 
Coordinating and/or 



































 Discussing and assisting in the 
resolution of conflicts arising from 
differing agreement interpretations.  
 
Providing, when necessary, advice 
to those organizations responsible 
for implementation on the rationale 
of the implementation plan and how 
to resolve operational problems.  
 
Conducting inter-departmental 
consultations on parallel funding 
arrangements with other federal 
departments based on principles in 
the financial transfer arrangements 
to assist in the adjustments of 
program funding authorities.  
Making recommendations 
to resolve identified 
operational problems 
involving themselves and 
other organizations.  
 
Assisting in the 
development of RIASs 





of those terms and 
conditions of the 
agreement for which they 
are responsible.  
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APPENDIX D: SAMPLE ACTIVITY SHEET 
PROJECT: Negotiation of economic development agreements 
 
RESPONSIBLE PARTY:  





Government may enter into economic development agreements with the Champagne and 
Aishihik First Nations which provide: 
• technical and financial assistance for economic development purposes to residents of the 
Champagne and Aishihik First Nations Traditional Territory and to organizations, 
businesses and corporations owned by those residents; and 
• for the participation of the Champagne and Aishihik First Nations in the planning, 
management, administration and decision making of those programs and services.  
 
Economic development agreements referred to in 3.1:  
• shall describe the purpose for which technical and financial assistance may be used; 
• may provide for a financial contribution by the Champagne and Aishihik First Nations, 
consistent with the ability of the Champagne and Aishihik First Nations to contribute; and 
• may provide for a financial contribution by Governmetn for the purpose of the agreement.  
 
The Champagne and Aishihik First Nations shall have the right to nominate no less than one third 
of the members of any joint planning, management, advisory, or decision making body 
established pursuant to an economic development agreement referred to in 3.1. 
 
REFERENCED CLAUSES: 





Table D.1 Sample Activity Sheet 
Responsibility Activities Timing 
Canada, Yukon, CAFN At discretion of any Party, initiate 
request to negotiate economic 
development agreements with CAFN 
After Effective Date 
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Parties Respond to request to enter 
negotiations. 
Within a reasonable period 
of time. 
Canada, Yukon, CAFN Negotiate economic development 
agreements. 
If Parties agree. 
CAFN Nominate no less than one third of the 
members of any joint planning, 
management, advisory or decision 
making body. 
If established pursuant to 
an economic development 
agreement. 
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APPENDIX E: CABINET DIRECTIVE ON THE FEDERAL APPROACH TO MODERN 
TREATY IMPLEMENTATION 
This Directive lays out an operational framework for the management of the Crown’s modern 
treaty obligations. It guides federal departments and agencies to fulfill their responsibilities.  
 
1- Roles and Responsibilities 
All Federal Departments and Agencies: 
• Will ensure that they are aware of, understand, and fulfill their departments’ obligations 
pursuant to all modern treaties in effect.  
• Will ensure that they are aware of, understand and are prepared to fulfill their 
departments’ obligations, prior to approving new modern treaties under negotiation. 
• Will develop and deliver activities, programs, policies and legislation in a manner that 
respects and complies with modern treaty provisions and the rights therein. To this end, 
departments and agencies will conduct an Assessment of Modern Treaty Implications on 
all policy, plan and program proposals to Cabinet.  
• Will report on the status of their obligations on an annual basis by contributing to an 
Annual Report, coordinated by AANDC, provided to the Minister of AANDC. 
• Will participate in treaty-related governance structures as per the terms of reference of 
those structures, and as appropriate to the scope of their responsibilities.  
 
Assessment of Modern Treaty Implications  
In developing policy, plan and program proposals to Cabinet, departments and agencies are 
expected to consider the implications of modern treaties on the proposals, and to attest to the 
compliance of the proposals with the legal obligations contained in modern treaties.  
More specifically, departments and agencies will complete an assessment of modern treaty 
implications and legislative policy, plan or program proposal, when: 
1. the proposal is submitted to Cabinet for approval; and 
2. implementation of the proposal may have implications on modern treaties in effect and 
the rights enshrined therein. 
 
Cabinet 
• Ministers, through meetings of Cabinet committees, will have the shared responsibility of 
determining if assessments of modern treaty implications have been undertaken on 
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Department of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada 
• AANDC is responsible for federal representation on implementation committees 
• AANDC will coordinate the interdepartmental committee structures put in place to 
manage the Crown’s approach to modern treaties.  
• AANDC will administer the Treaty Obligation Monitoring System (TOMS); will be 
accountable for regularly updating the system to reflect new or revised obligations, and 
will provide directions to departments and agencies reporting into the system. 
• AANCD will provide guidance for other departments and agencies in interpreting modern 
treaty provisions and their implications for departmental activities; in determining 
potential implications of modern treaties on departmental policy, programs and 
legislation; in completing Assessments of Modern Treaty Implications, and in 
undertaking intergovernmental relationships with Aboriginal signatories.  
 
Central Agencies 
• Central agencies, including the Privy Council Office, the Department of Finance and the 
Treasury Board Secretariat will confirm that the assessment of modern treaty implications 
has been completed prior to referral of proposals to Cabinet. 
 
Department of Justice 
• The Department of Justice will provide advice and guidance to departments and agencies 
with respect to their legal responsibilities pursuant to modern treaties; potential legal 
repercussions/risk of contemplated departmental activities; relationship of laws and 
interpretation of key legal concepts related to modern treaties, such as honour of the 
Crown.  
 
2- Deputy Ministers’ Oversight Committee 
A Deputy Minister-level Oversight Committee will be created and chaired by the Deputy 
Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada. The Oversight 
Committee’s mandate will be to provide executive oversight of the implementation of the 
Directive, and by extension, of Canada’s roles and responsibilities under modern treaties. 
This mandate will encompass:  
• Program and policy direction to departments in fulfilling Canada’s responsibilities under 
modern treaties; 
• Decision-making (and dispute resolution), as necessary, when cross-cutting issues arise 
that require senior executive intervention;  
• Coordination of the federal approach to broad, cross-cutting obligations;  
• Oversight of monitoring and reporting and performance measurement;  
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• Meeting with Aboriginal and other treaty partners as appropriate and as laid out in the 
committee terms of reference. 
 
3- Modern Treaty Implementation Office 
A Modern Treaty Implementation Office will be established in AANDC to provide ongoing 
coordination and oversight of Canada’s modern treaty obligations, and to support the 
mandate of the Deputy Ministers’ Oversight Committee. The Office’s mandate will be two-
fold: 
• The Office will work with departments to establish ongoing oversight and accountability 
through the development and implementation of a performance measurement framework, 
the development and administration of monitoring and reporting tools, the coordination of 
departmental input into these tools, and the development of an annual report provided to 
the Minister of AANDC. 
• The Office will provide interdepartmental coordination by serving a liaison function 
between implementation committees, regional and federal officials-level 
interdepartmental Caucuses, Federal Steering Committee and the Deputy Ministers’ 
Oversight Committee. Further, the Office will provide a secretariat function for 
interdepartmental committees and will coordinate issues management across departments.  
 
4- Evaluation of the Directive 
Within five years of the implementation of the Directive, AANDC will conduct an evaluation 
to assess the effectiveness of the Directive in meeting its stated objectives; to assess the 
ongoing need for the Directive, and to determine if changes to the Directive and its 
component tools and structures should be pursued.   
 
(Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada 2015)
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APPENDIX F: LAND CLAIMS AGREEMENTS COALITION’S “FOUR-TEN” 
DECLARATION OF DEDICATION AND COMMITMENT 
1. The first “modern land claims agreement” between Aboriginal peoples and the federal Crown 
was entered into in 1975. Since then, 19 modern treaties applying to Aboriginal traditional 
lands encompassing more than half of the lands and waters of Canada and the immense 
resources they contain have been negotiated by the Government of Canada and Aboriginal 
peoples and ratified by Parliament.  
 
2. For Canada, land claim agreements provide a basis for the shared beneficial usage of lands and 
natural resources, facilitating economic development on treaty lands, and also providing means 
for Aboriginal peoples to consent to and benefit from development within their traditional 
territories.  
 
3. For Aboriginal signatories, land claim agreements are intended to enable economic, social, and 
cultural development, environmental protection, and self-government. The rights defined in 
comprehensive land claim agreements are recognized and affirmed in Canada’s Constitution.  
 
4. In November 2003, leaders representing the Aboriginal peoples of Canada that have entered 
into Land Claims Agreements since 1975 gathered in Ottawa at Redefining Relationships: 
Learning from a Decade of Land Claims Implementation. The Land Claims Agreement 
Coalition (“LCAC”) was established, involving all of the beneficiary or signatory organizations 
or governments of the “modern” land claims agreements in Canada. 
 
5. In the face of persistent challenges in implementation of their land claims agreements, leaders 
at Redefining Relationships articulated “4 Points” for a renewed relationship with the federal 
government of Canada: 
 
LCAC “4 Points”  
1. Recognition that the Crown in right of Canada, not the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development, is party to our land claims agreements and Self-Government Agreements.  
2. There must be a federal commitment to achieve the broad objectives of the land claims agreements 
and Self-Government Agreements within the context of the new relationships, as opposed to mere 
technical compliance with narrowly defined obligations. This must include, but not be limited to, 
ensuring adequate funding to achieve these objectives and obligations.  
3. Implementation must be handled by appropriate senior level federal officials representing the entire 
Canadian government.  
4. There must be an independent implementation and review body, separate from the Department of 
Indian Affairs and Northern Development. This could be the Auditor General's department, or a 
similar office reporting directly to Parliament. Annual reports will be prepared by this office, in 
consultation with Groups with land claims agreements. 
6. LCAC leaders and organizations have elaborated upon these “4 Points” in 2005 with the 
following “10 Fundamental Principles” respecting modern land claims agreements and their 
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LCAC “10 Fundamental Principles”  
A new land claims implementation policy must be situated in the following context:  
1. The history of nation-to-nation contact and interaction between the Crown and the Aboriginal 
peoples in Canada has created an enduring relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples, 
one that is fundamentally predicated on the honour of the Crown.  
2. “[T]he doctrine of aboriginal rights exists, and is recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1), because of 
one simple fact: when Europeans arrived in North America, Aboriginal peoples were already here, 
living in communities on the land, and participating in distinctive cultures, as they had done for 
centuries.” Supreme Court of Canada. 
3. “The historical roots of the principle of the honour of the Crown suggest that it must be understood 
generously in order to reflect the underlying realities from which it stems. In all its dealings with 
Aboriginal peoples, from the assertion of sovereignty to the resolution of claims and the 
implementation of treaties, the Crown must act honourably. Nothing less is required if we are to 
achieve "the reconciliation of the pre-existence of aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the 
Crown." Supreme Court of Canada.  
4. Relations between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples have been and will always be manifested in 
a wide variety of political and legal arrangements and instruments. No single political or legal 
arrangement or instrument can be said to comprehensively express the dimensions, in breadth, depth 
or time, of the ongoing and evolving relationship that connects the Crown and an aboriginal people. 
5. Treaties and land claims agreements between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples are acknowledged 
to be “basic building blocks in the creation of our country …[T]reaties -- both historical and modern 
-- and the relationship they represent provide a basis for developing a strengthened and forward-
looking partnership with Aboriginal people.” Government of Canada.  
6. Among the key political and legal instruments that affirm the relationship between the Crown and 
Aboriginal people are modern land claims agreements, and ancillary agreements such as 
implementation and Self-Government Agreements that attach to or follow from land claims 
agreements.  
7. Modern land claims agreements, which give rise to treaty rights, are multi-faceted, and the ongoing 
rights they affirm are, among other things, constitutional, statutory, contractual, fiduciary, and in 
keeping with the “living tree” principle of Canadian law, evolving and progressive in nature.  
8. The negotiation and implementation of modern land claims agreements, and their ancillary 
agreements, engage the honour of the Crown, and demand results and ongoing outcomes that are 
just. “Where treaties remain to be concluded, the honour of the Crown requires negotiations leading 
to a just settlement of Aboriginal claims.” Supreme Court of Canada.  
9. The treaty rights arising from modern land claims agreements express the mutual desire of the 
Crown and Aboriginal peoples in Canada to reconcile through sharing the lands, resources and 
natural wealth of this subcontinent in a manner that is equitable and just – no longer so as to solely 
assimilate, take or extinguish the interest of the Aboriginal peoples involved, but rather so as to 
implement mutual objectives that will ensure their socio-economic, political and cultural survival, 
well-being and development as peoples.  
10. Aboriginal and treaty rights are human rights, and they are not amenable to extinguishment as a 
matter of respect for Canada’s international human rights obligations. “The situation of the 
Aboriginal peoples remains the most pressing human rights issue facing Canadians…. [T]he 
practice of extinguishing inherent aboriginal rights be abandoned as incompatible with article 1 of 
the [International] Covenant [on Civil and Political Rights].” United Nations Human Rights 
Committee. 
 
7. These 4 Points and 10 Principles are now known as the “LCAC FourTen”.  
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8. Consistent with the LCAC Four-Ten, members of the Land Claim Agreements Coalition will 
continue to undertake information sharing, joint activities and coordination, mutual 
encouragement and support, advocacy, policy development, Canadian and international public 
education, inclusion of new land claims agreement entities, appropriate contact and efforts with 
governments, and such other future steps as may be decided by Coalition participants.  
 
9. The task at hand is to implement the modern land claims agreements in ways that bring 
political, economic and social justice to their signatory nations and their members and that 
achieve in full measure, the letter, spirit, intent and lasting objectives of modern land claims 
agreements with the federal Crown.  
 
10. The land claims agreement coalition is dedicated and committed to achieving these necessary 
and important goals, for the benefit and development of all land claims agreement 
organizations, governments and beneficiaries and also for the benefit and self-respect of all 
Canadians. 
 
(Land Claims Agreements Coalition 2006)  
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APPENDIX G: DOUGLAS EYFORD’S RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF MODERN AGREEMENT 
1. Canada should increase awareness, oversight, and accountability across departments about 
modern treaty obligations and improve internal structures for co-ordinating and fulfilling 
implementation activities. 
 
2. Canada should centralize responsibility for the coordination and oversight of modern treaty 
implementation in a central agency.  
 
3. Canada should continue to collaborate with the Land Claims Agreements Coalition to advance 
the parties’ shared objectives 
 
4. Canada should ensure treaty provisions are interpreted and given effect in the manner intended 
by negotiators. 
 
5. Canada should develop a training program for federal officials whose responsibilities involve 
treaty implementation. 
 
6. Canada should, through the central agency responsible for the coordination and oversight of 
treaty implementation, file and annual report in Parliament about treaty implementation 
activities.  
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APPENDIX H: “CHAPTER 11: REGIONAL LAND USE PLANNING” 
11.1.0 Objectives 
 
11.1.1 The Objectives of this chapter are as follows: 
11.1.1.1 to encourage the development of a common Yukon land use planning process 
outside community boundaries;  
 
11.1.1.2 to minimize actual or potential land use conflicts both within Settlement 
Land and Non-Settlement Land and between Settlement Land and Non-Settlement-
Land; 
 
11.1.1.3 to recognize and promote the cultural values of Yukon Indian Peoples; 
 
11.1.1.4 to utilize the knowledge and experience of Yukon Indian People in order to 
achieve effective land use planning; 
 
11.1.1.5 to recognize Yukon First Nations’ responsibilities pursuant to Settlement 
Agreements for the use and management of Settlement Land; and 
 
11.1.1.6 to ensure that social, cultural, economic and environmental policies are 
applied to the management, protection and use of land, water and resources in an 
integrated and coordinated manner so as to ensure Sustainable Development.  
 
(Indian Affairs and Northern Development 1993b) 
 
11.6.0 Approval Process for Land Use Plans 
 
11.6.1 A Regional Land Use Planning Commission shall forward its recommended regional land 
use plan to Government and each affected Yukon First Nation. 
 
11.6.2 Government, after Consultation with any affected Yukon First Nation and any affected 
Yukon community, shall approve, reject or propose modifications to that part of the 
recommended regional land use plan applying on Non-Settlement Land.  
 
11.6.3 If Government rejects or proposes modifications to the recommended plan, it shall forward 
either the proposed modifications with written reasons, or written reasons for rejecting the 
recommended plan to the Regional Land Use Planning Commission, and thereupon: 
 
 11.6.3.1 the Regional Land Use Planning Commission shall reconsider the plan and make  
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11.6.3.2 Government shall then approve, reject or modify that part of the plan 
recommended under 11.6.3.1 applying on Non-Settlement Land, after Consultation with 
any affected Yukon First Nation and any affected Yukon community.  
 
11.6.4 Each affected Yukon First Nation, after Consultation with Government, shall approve, 
reject or propose modifications to that part of the recommended regional land use plan applying 
to the Settlement Land of that Yukon First Nation.  
 
11.6.5 If an affected Yukon First Nation rejects or proposes modifications to the recommended 
plan, it shall forward either the proposed modifications with written reasons or written reasons 
for rejecting the recommended plan to the Regional Land Use Planning Commission, and 
thereupon: 
 
11.6.5.1 the Regional Land Use Planning Commission shall reconsider the plan and make 
a final recommendation for a regional land use plan to that affected Yukon First Nation, 
with written reasons; and 
 
11.6.5.2 the affected Yukon First Nation shall then approve, reject or modify the plan 
recommended under 11.6.5.1, after Consultation with Government.  
 
(Indian Affairs and Northern Development 1993b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
